


THE CHURCH AND SOCIALISM

JOHN A. RYAN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES



The Social Justice Books

THE CHURCH AND SOCIALISM
AND OTHER ESSAYS

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BY

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
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PREFACE

This volume is a reprint of papers that have appeared in various publications during the past ten years. The opening chapter comprises four articles originally published in *The New York Evening Mail* in February and March, 1918; the second and fourth have been circulated in pamphlet form, respectively, by the Paulist Press and the Central Bureau of the Central Verein; the third was written for the Catholic Press Association and published by its constituent journals, and each of the others appeared in one of the following periodicals: *The American Catholic Quarterly Review*, *The Catholic World*, *The International Journal of Ethics*, *The Catholic Charities Review*, and *America*. Acknowledgment is hereby gratefully made of the permission granted by the original publishers to reprint the papers in their present form.

Although the productions embodied in this book were written at different times and on different subjects, it is hoped that they will be found not entirely unrelated to one another. The first six deal with important phases of the industrial problem, while the last four treat of social questions which have important industrial aspects. Upon the advice of friends the attempt is made to rescue them all from a too speedy oblivion.

JOHN A. RYAN.

The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C., September, 1919

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I

THE CHURCH AND SOCIALISM

I

In the course of the recent war all the belligerent governments extended enormously their control and operation of industry. Here in the United States we beheld the public authorities fixing the price of coal and food, regulating the kinds of bread that we shall eat, operating the railroads, building and sailing ships, and erecting houses for workingmen. Competent students of the subject fully expected that many of the new forms of state intervention would be continued for some considerable time, if not indefinitely, after the arrival of peace. While none of these activities, nor all of them together, constitute socialism in the true sense, they look like installments of or an approach to a socialistic reorganization of industry. Therefore, the time seems fit for a brief restatement of the attitude of the Catholic Church toward socialism, and toward certain industrial proposals which are improperly called socialism.

The authoritative and precise doctrine of the Church on these subjects is found in certain encyclicals and instructions of Popes Leo XIII and Pius X. In his encyclical, "On the Condition of Labor" (May 15, 1891), the former Pontiff condemned socialism explicitly as injurious to the workingman, destructive of the individual's natural rights, and perverse of the sphere of the state. The proposals of the socialists, said Pope

Leo, are harmful to the laborer, inasmuch as they would deprive him of the opportunity to invest his savings in land for the increase of his resources and the betterment of his condition in life. They violate natural justice, since they would prevent men from safeguarding the future of themselves and their families through the possession of durable and lucrative property in the earth's unfailing storehouse. They tend to a social condition of manifold disorder and dissatisfaction; for the state ownership and management of productive property would destroy individual incentive, cause "the sources of wealth to run dry" and "level down all to a like condition of misery and degradation."

In his encyclical on "Christian Social Action" (December 18, 1903), Pope Pius X explicitly reaffirmed the main propositions of his distinguished predecessor's defense of private property and denunciation of socialism.

Two objections have been raised to these papal pronouncements: First, that Pope Leo spoke only of land, not of capital; second, that the socialists no longer demand that degree of state ownership of land that the Pope condemned.

To the first objection the sufficient reply is that all the principles and arguments set forth by Pope Leo in defense of private ownership of land apply with substantially equal force to the artificial instruments of production. And they have been so interpreted and applied by all Catholic authorities. With regard to the second objection, it is not possible to speak quite so definitely, since the socialist position on land tenure and

management has been somewhat modified since the publication of Pope Leo's encyclical. Many European socialists of authority concede that the operation of small farms would better be left to individuals, while the Socialist party of the United States has gone so far as to declare that it is not opposed to the "occupation and possession" of land by actual cultivators. In the matter of urban land it is probable that the majority of present-day socialists would permit a person to own the site upon which his home was erected, together with a small garden. It seems certain, however, that they would not allow anyone to draw profit from land which he did not himself cultivate or occupy.

A less extensive modification seems to have taken place during the last twenty-five years in the socialist proposals concerning capital. The authoritative spokesmen of the party today would permit an individual to own those tools and machines that he could operate by himself or with the assistance of one or two other workers. Apparently they would not prevent the ownership and management of some of the larger productive establishments by the workers themselves organized in cooperative associations.

Making due allowance for all these mitigations of the ancient rigor of socialist doctrine, we still find the scheme liable to substantially all the objections brought against it by Pope Leo XIII. Socialism still contemplates government ownership and management of all land used for commercial and industrial purposes, of all mines, of all but the smallest farms, and of substan-

tially all but the very small artificial instruments of production and distribution. And it still calls for the abolition of all rent and interest, and of all incomes derived merely from the possession of property.

Therefore the worker would not be permitted to become the owner of anything from which he could derive an income when he became disabled. He could not put his money into savings banks, nor stocks, nor bonds, nor any other kind of interest-bearing wealth. Inasmuch as only a slight proportion of the workers could be self-employed on the small farms, in the small hand industries, and in the few cooperative establishments that the socialist state could afford to permit, the great majority would be deprived of that sense of independence, manliness, self-reliance, self-respect and economic power which can come only from property.

It is true that revenue-bearing property is not an indispensable means to adequate provision for the future of the worker and his family. A system of state insurance might, in theory at least, be a satisfactory substitute; that is, so far as concerns the things that can be bought with money. But no system of insurance, nor any scale of wages, can provide a man with those psychic goods which are an integral element of normal life, and which are only second in importance to food, clothing and shelter. Under socialism the worker would be directly and constantly dependent upon the state, from the cradle to the grave. All his life he would be merely a hired man. He could become contented with this degenerate status only after he had lost

all of that initiative, that self-respect and that ambition which are essential to an efficient and worthy human existence.

To retort that the majority of the workers are even now deprived of any solid hope of becoming property owners is to miss the point of the issue entirely. This sad condition is no necessary part of the present system. Not the abolition but the reformation of the existing social and industrial order is the proper and adequate remedy. We shall discuss this specifically in a later article.

The liberty and opportunity of the worker would be further diminished by his inability to control the most important details of his own life. Under socialism the state would be the only buyer of labor and the only seller of goods. No matter what the provocation, the worker would have no choice of employers. He must work for the state or starve. Likewise he must buy the necessaries and comforts of life from the state, and be content with what the state sees fit to produce. Instead of the wide variety of choice now offered by competing dealers he would find only the few standard types of goods regarded as sufficient by the state. It is no answer to these objections to prophesy that the state would prove a more generous and humane employer than the majority of existing captains of industry, and that it would provide all the variety of goods that is really required by genuine human needs. The point is that in these vital matters the worker would be denied all *liberty of choice*. This sort of freedom is a valuable.

possession in itself, on its own account. The mere provision of abundant material goods is not an adequate substitute or compensation.

Another grave injury to individual liberty would proceed from the unlimited power of oppression possessed by bureaucrats and majorities. The officials of the socialist state would have not merely political power but unlimited economic power. While they could in time be dislodged by a majority of the voters, the majority itself would enjoy the same power of unlimited tyranny. For example, the workers in the principal industries could effectively combine for the purpose of making their own remuneration exorbitantly high, and the remuneration of all other workers inhumanly low. Indeed, there is no practical limit to the economic oppression that a majority might inflict upon a minority.

Even if we could bring ourselves to put up with a regime of industrial and social servitude, we cannot welcome a system that would inevitably lead to industrial and social bankruptcy. When we turn from individual to social considerations, we find that a socialist organization of industry would, as Pope Leo said, end in universal "misery and degradation." It would not work, for the simple reason that it could not command the motives that are required for efficient and sufficient production. The salaried directors of industry would not have the indispensable incentive that is today provided by the prospect of indefinite gain. Even if they had the incentive, they would lack the power; for their positions would be dependent upon the masses who

worked under their direction. They would not endanger their place of authority by reprimanding or discharging men who refused to do a normal day's work. That the majority would shirk, would work only as much and as long as they liked, is as certain as the certainty that the majority of industrial tasks will remain forever inherently unpleasant. The average man will work hard at them only when compelled by sheer necessity, such as the fear of losing his job. Make the workers masters of the industrial establishment, and this fear would be ended. Therefore the only possible outcome would be an immense reduction in the social product, with the resultant universal "misery and degradation."

✓ The naive expectation of the socialists that men would work as hard for the common weal as they now do through love of gain or fear of loss is a futile and pitiable act of faith. It has no basis in experience. The assumption that the socialist mechanism would effect a revolutionary transformation in human motives and inclinations, and convert men at one stroke from egoists into altruists, indicates that the socialist believers are in the habit of using their emotions instead of their intellects for the business of thinking, and are unable to distinguish between aspirations and facts. They ask us to accept hope and prophecy in place of the uncomfortable conclusions of history.

So far as the economic proposals of socialism are concerned, the condemnation pronounced by Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius X remains in full vigor, and the

reasons for the condemnation are still substantially applicable and conclusive. In the next article we shall consider socialism in its moral and religious aspects.

II

In the preceding article we showed that the economic proposals of socialism have fallen under the ban of the Church, because they are a menace to individual and social welfare, and therefore to individual and social justice. In the present paper we shall try to show that the socialist movement is antagonistic and harmful to Christian morals and the Christian religion.

By the socialist movement we mean the organized association of socialists that exists today, with its writers, speakers, books, journals and other methods of propaganda. It is the means by which socialist principles are explained, defended and diffused. Now the socialist movement advocates not merely the collective ownership and management of the instruments of production but certain theories of philosophy and ethics and a certain attitude toward religion.

It professes not merely an economic theory but a philosophy of social evolution and of life. This philosophy is directly opposed to the doctrines of Christianity.

The main tenet of this philosophy, and the main reason of this hostility to Christian principles, is the theory of economic determinism. While this phase is formidable, it is as intelligible as its synonyms, "the economic interpretation of history," "the materialistic conception of history," "historical materialism," etc.

According to the theory of economic determinism, all social institutions and social beliefs are at bottom *determined*, caused to be what they are, by economic factors and conditions, by the methods of production and distribution. At any given time the existing sex relations, governments, laws, forms of religion and education, and the corresponding beliefs, doctrines and opinions, are what they are rather than something else, because the prevailing industrial system is what it is rather than something else.

As the economic factor is dominant and determining among the social phenomena of any particular epoch, so it has produced and determined the social *changes* that have taken place throughout history. The evolution and variations in domestic, governmental and educational institutions, and in the ethical, religious and political beliefs of men, have all been brought about by changes in economic factors and conditions, by changes in the way men got their living.

A few illustrations, taken from standard socialist writers, will help make clear the meaning of the theory:

When all goods were owned in common, sexual promiscuity prevailed, because there was no economic reason for stable unions. When private property was introduced the monogamic family came into existence because men wanted their wealth to go to their own children exclusively.

Primitive Christianity was mainly a revolutionary movement of the slaves and proletariat of the Roman empire; medieval Catholicism was the outcome of the

feudal economic organization; Protestantism was a revolt against the economic tyranny of the church as regards tithes and indulgences. Slavery gave way to serfdom and serfdom to individual liberty when the economic masters of society found that these institutions were no longer profitable.

Today the prevailing morality sanctions all ethical notions and all practices which tend to increase the profits of the capitalist. Thus far the determinist.

It is now universally recognized by competent students of the subject that economic conditions do exert a considerable influence upon other social conditions, and even upon men's practical notions of right and wrong.

If economic determinism meant no more than this, it would not necessarily make the socialist movement hostile to Christianity. As understood by its leading exponents, however, the theory goes far beyond this moderate conception. These men have been, with scarcely an exception, believers in philosophical materialism. That is, they hold that all existing things are matter, that there is no such thing as spirit. Hence they deny that the will of man is free, and assert that the economic factors in society produce all the aforementioned effects and changes *necessarily*, as heat melts ice and rain wets the ground.

Some of the more important conclusions regarding morality which flow from this theory may be briefly set forth. Since men have not free wills, they cannot properly be blamed for the evil nor praised for the good that they do. They are no more responsible for

their actions than are dogs and earthquakes. The tyranny of the capitalist and the dishonesty of the laborer are alike caused by forces over which they have no genuine control.

Hence the frequent assertion in socialist writings that the evils of our economic order are due to the system and not at all to the individuals. Obviously this rejection of the human soul, of free will, and of human responsibility is directly contrary to Christian principles.

As indicated above, the economic determinist holds that the present form of domestic society is an effect of the present form of industrial society. When the system of private ownership of the means of production has been supplanted by collective ownership, the relations between the sexes will change correspondingly. Woman will then be "economically independent," and therefore will bind herself to a man only when moved by love, and will remain with him only as long as love remains. The union of man and woman under socialism will be subject to dissolution at the will of either party.

In the words of Morris Hillquit, "most socialists favor dissolubility of the marriage ties at the pleasure of the contracting parties" ("Socialism; Promise or Menace," p. 163). The antagonism between this view and the Christian principle of marriage is patent.

Other anti-Christian implications of the theory of economic determinism are: The child belongs primarily to the state; all actions which are truly conducive to

the establishment of socialism are morally justifiable; the welfare of the socialist state is the supreme principle and determinant of right and wrong; and against the state the individual has no rights.

The attitude of the socialist movement toward religion is explained as well as stated by the socialist daily, the *New York Call*: "The theory of economic determinism alone, if thoroughly grasped, leaves no room for a belief in the supernatural!" (March 2, 1911).

Assuredly so. If all that exists be matter, and if all social institutions, changes and beliefs be produced by economic forces, there is no place in the universe for God or a responsible human soul. The economic determinist cannot consistently be a religious believer. And he must logically expect the disappearance of religion in the socialist state. *For if religious ideas be determined and caused by the prevailing mode of production, they must pass out with the passing of the present system. Christianity cannot survive the destruction of its capitalistic basis.*

Such is the attitude toward religion that we should expect intelligent socialists to take if they were logical. When we examine their utterances we find this expectation fulfilled. Speaking summarily, we assert that all the great leaders, most of the important books and journals and a very large proportion of the oratorical productions of the socialist movement are in greater or less degree opposed to Christianity; and that the number of socialist leaders, journalists and oratorical utterances that avow a belief in any form of supernatural

religion is negligible. We have not the space to prove these assertions by adequate citations, but we submit three which may arouse sufficient interest to induce further investigation.

James Leatham, a prominent English socialist, declared that he could not recall "a single instance of a person who is at one and the same time a really earnest socialist and an orthodox Christian." ("Socialism and Character," pp. 2, 3.)

William English Walling, an able and well-known American socialist, tells us that "the majority of socialists are firmly convinced that socialism and modern science must finally lead to a state of society where there will be no room whatever for religion in any form." ("The Larger Aspects of Socialism," p. 381.)

Morris Hillquit, whose competency to represent the mind of the socialist movement will not be questioned, is "inclined to believe that the majority of socialists find it difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile their general philosophic views with the doctrines and practices of dogmatic religious creeds." ("Socialism: Promise or Menace?" p. 204. Chapter VI of this work contains an abundance of quotations from, and references to, other socialists on this subject.)

Some of our readers will object that they can believe in the economic proposals of socialism without accepting the immoral and irreligious theories outlined in the foregoing paragraphs.

We reply by agreeing with them. Economic determinism is not essential to a belief in economic socialism.

Moreover, there exist socialists who have made and do make this distinction. Neither the little band of so-called Christian Socialists nor the select coterie of Fabian Socialists have subscribed to this materialistic and anti-Christian philosophy.

But these groups are relatively unimportant elements in the socialist movement as a whole. The vast majority of the socialists of the world are adherents of what is known as Marxian or International Socialism, which does profess this attitude of hostility to Christian ethics and the Christian religion.

The few followers of the international movement who still retain their Christian faith belong for the most part to that element of the rank and file that has not had the opportunity or the capacity to become acquainted with the underlying socialist philosophy.

According as they make progress in the study of the fundamental principles, they will imitate the great majority by yielding to the anti-religious theories and influences that permeate the leadership, the literature and the entire atmosphere of the organization. Such has been the unvarying lesson of experience.

In this situation there is but one possible attitude to be taken by the Catholic Church. It is that of vigilant and ceaseless opposition to the concrete, living institution called the socialist movement.

Even if the movement were aiming at the holiest and most beneficent social order that can be conceived, it would necessarily fall under the ban of the Church. An organization and movement that is saturated with

materialism and irreligion, that constantly propagates an un-Christian philosophy of life, that sooner or later makes atheists or rationalists of all, Catholics included, who remain within its ranks—cannot reasonably expect to escape the active opposition of the divinely appointed custodian of Christian morals and Christian faith.

When this movement aims, as it does aim, at a social and economic order which would be destructive of individual rights and disastrous to human welfare, it is doubly damned. Both as a movement and as an economic goal, both as a means and as an end, socialism deserves the condemnation of the Catholic Church.

In the two following articles we shall show that the church not only does not oppose but sanctions all the reforms that are necessary and desirable in the present economic system.

III

In the presidential election of 1912 the socialist candidate received about 900,000 votes, of whom not more than one-sixth were members of the socialist organization. A very large proportion of the other five-sixths did not accept the complete socialist program. They voted the socialist ticket mainly as a protest against economic abuses and to indicate their desire for radical improvements. They identified socialism with social reform.

This attitude is still held by thousands among the working classes, who do not realize the full meaning of the socialist program, and who think that the

socialist party is the only agency that is striving for the abolition of present economic wrongs.

Hence a great number of them assume that all opponents of socialism must also be antagonists of social reform and defenders of the evils of capitalism. To all who hold this opinion, and to all other persons whose minds are open to evidence, we say that all the necessary reforms of our industrial system are either explicitly set down or implicitly authorized in the official teaching of the Catholic Church.

These propositions we shall prove from that same encyclical, "On the Condition of Labor," which condemns socialism. Indeed, the discussion of socialism occupies only one-fifth of that document, the other four-fifths being devoted to remedies and reforms. (Copies of the encyclical can be obtained for ten cents each from the International Catholic Truth Society, 408 Bergen Street, Brooklyn, N. Y., or from any Catholic book store.)

The language in which Pope Leo characterizes the evils of the existing system and the need of reform is worth noting for its vigor, insight and sympathy. He declares that "some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and the wretchedness pressing so heavily and unjustly on the vast majority of the working classes"; that "workingmen have been surrendered, all isolated and helpless, to the hard-heartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition"; that "a small number of very rich men has been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the laboring poor a yoke that is little better than slavery."

These sentences are found in the opening paragraphs of the encyclical; near the close we find this statement: "The condition of the working classes is the pressing question of the hour, and nothing can be of higher interest to all classes of the state than that it should be rightly and reasonably adjusted." The encyclical was published May, 1891.

The principles and proposals laid down by Pope Leo may be conveniently presented under four heads: Religion; Individual Action; Private Associations; the State.

THE PART OF RELIGION

The Pope repudiates the assumption that the Church is so preoccupied with spiritual things that she has no care for men's temporal interests. "Her desire is that the poor should rise above poverty and wretchedness and better their condition in life." "While the chief treasure of society is virtue, it is by no means a matter of small moment to provide those bodily and external commodities the use of which is necessary to virtuous action."

In these two sentences are summarily stated the Church's attitude toward the material wellbeing of the masses, and the rational basis of that attitude. The Church is not a social reform organization, nor is social betterment her main function. Her mission is to bring men to religion and to make them virtuous. But they cannot be virtuous without a certain decent amount of material goods. Furthermore, they cannot be virtuous unless they practice justice and charity in

all the relations of life, including those of an economic character; therefore the Church must lay down and insist upon observance of all moral principles.

"No practical solution of the social question," says Pope Leo, "will be found apart from religion and the Church."

This statement will not be denied by any person who is acquainted with the facts of history, human nature and present conditions. When we consult history we learn that the Christian principles concerning the dignity and sacredness of the individual human person, the essential equality of all persons, the brotherhood of all men in Christ, and the dominion of the moral law over the industrial as well as the other actions of men, brought about the abolition of slavery, the establishment of innumerable works and institutions of compassion and beneficence, the prohibition of usury and the rise of political democracy. None of these reforms and institutions originated in a non-Christian land.

When we study honestly the tendencies and limitations of human nature we are forced to the conclusion that men will never set up and maintain a regime of social justice until they become convinced that the supreme law of life is the moral law. The most cunningly devised social statutes will not be able to compel men to act justly in their economic relations, unless they are impelled by a living and enlightened conscience. And the voice of conscience will ordinarily have little effect if it be not recognized as the voice of God.

This means that an effective conscience cannot be developed or maintained without the assistance and

direction of religion. When we consider the profoundly immoral maxims that have ruled economic practices and relations for more than a century, such as that every free contract is a fair contract, that all gain is lawful that can be obtained without the use of physical force or flagrant deception, that power and cunning may with impunity exploit weakness and ignorance, we see no hope of permanent remedies until these perverse principles are dislodged by religion and religious morality.

Neither legal ordinances nor humanitarian appeals will be effective. The determining mass of men must first become convinced that these maxims are contrary to the law of morality and the law of God. They cannot be brought to such a conviction by any social agency except organized religion.

But religion will never succeed in this work of moral conversion by the mere preaching of generalities. To proclaim that men must obey God, practice virtue and observe the Golden Rule will not suffice. What is needed is specific moral instruction, specific application of moral principles to the current industrial practices. This was precisely what Pope Leo did, in so far as it was possible in a brief document that had to be adapted to the varying economic conditions of the entire world. Let us glance first at his statements under the head of individual action.

Christian morality, says Pope Leo, teaches that the laborer should carry out fully and honestly all equitable agreements and should abstain from all forms of violence against persons and property. Here we have a

direct condemnation of labor-leaving and the use of physical force in industrial disputes.

On the other hand, employers, continues the Pope, must respect their employes as human beings instead of treating them as bondsmen, or "merely as so much muscle or physical power": must not tax work people beyond their strength nor employ them at tasks unsuited to age or sex; must give them rest from toil on the Sabbath and opportunity for the practice of religion; and, above all, must pay fair wages, instead of exploiting the worker's needs for the sake of profit.

Finally, the Pope declares that property owners have not the right to do what they please with what they call their own, for they are only stewards of their possessions; hence, when they have made reasonable provision for their own needs, they are obliged to use what remains for the benefit of the neighbor.

All these directions are proclaimed by Pope Leo to be matters of strict moral obligation, most of them being required by the law of strict justice. Yet they are openly ignored by thousands upon thousands of employers.

The Pope points out that the right of men to unite in private associations, such as a labor union, is a right granted by nature, and therefore may not be denied by the state. In our day and country this right is practically never hindered by the public authorities, but it is openly ignored by those employers who refuse to permit their employes to organize, or who refuse to deal with the representatives of labor organizations.

The aim of labor unions, says the Pope, should be "to help each individual member to better his condition to the utmost in body, mind and property." He also recommends associations composed of both employers and employes to deal with matters that are of common interest, and to prevent discord and strikes. This is a justification of those periodical trade conferences that have been fostered by the labor unions and the more enlightened groups of employers.

Pope Leo refers to and praises highly the work of the medieval guilds. As we know, the guilds were not merely associations of workmen in the ordinary sense, but to a great extent were cooperative societies in which the workers were the owners of the tools of production and had common rules for carrying on the business of their craft. The modern counterpart of the guild is not the labor union, but the cooperative productive association.

It should be noted that a cooperative system of production is quite another thing than socialism. In the former the workers of a given industrial establishment individually own particular and definite amounts of property in that establishment; under socialism the whole community would own all the industries in general, no individual being able to say that a definite portion thereof was his private property.

The cooperative establishment is managed exclusively by the workers engaged in it; under socialism every establishment would be managed by the nation or the city.

Up to the present the cooperative movement has achieved practically all its successes in agriculture, banking and merchandising. Industrial justice and industrial democracy demand that it should become widely extended in the field of production.

A social order in which the majority of the wage-earners do not own the tools with which they work, nor any important amount of other productive property, is abnormal and cannot endure permanently. The majority of the workers must be enabled to become in some degree capitalists as well as wage-earners, owners in part at least of the instruments of production in their respective industries.

The frequency with which Pope Leo speaks of the necessity of making the workers property owners, together with his sympathetic references to the guilds, renders it very probable that he would have favored the principles of cooperative production. Indeed, such an attitude would have been in the direct line of Catholic tradition; for, as Cardinal Gasquet observes, the basis of property in pre-Reformation times was not individualism, but "Christian collectivism."

Thank God, we Catholics are in no degree responsible for the invention of the cold, ugly, soulless thing called modern capitalism, with its industrial autocracy at one extreme and its proletarian masses at the other. Without the Reformation the capitalism that we now know would have been, humanly speaking, impossible.

Pope Leo praises and recommends for imitation the action of those persons, not themselves members of the

wage-earning classes, who unite in various associations for the benefit of the laboring people. In our own country are many such organizations; for example, the American Association for Labor Legislation, the National Child Labor Committee and the National Consumers' League, all of which have produced splendid results. It is regrettable that the Catholics of the United States have not taken a more prominent part in such associations.

Indeed, it must be admitted that we have as yet given but a feeble and ineffective response to the injunction that Pope Leo lays down toward the close of the encyclical, namely, that Catholics "are not free to choose whether they will take up the cause of the poor or not; it is a matter of simple duty." This declaration was repeated in even stronger and more specific terms by Pope Pius X.

In the next and final article of the series we shall consider Pope Leo's teaching on the part in social reform that should be taken by the state.

IV

While Catholic teaching rejects the complete domination of industry by the state, as proposed in the socialist scheme, it is very far from advocating the opposite extreme of individualism and *laissez faire*.

Those who believe that the government should pursue an industrial policy of non-intervention will find no comfort in the traditional attitude of the Church. And they will be grievously disappointed with the encyclical,

“On the Condition of Labor.” Of the space devoted by that document to methods of betterment fully one-third deals with the positive duties incumbent on the state.

Among the general propositions which the encyclical sets forth under this head are the following: Public laws, institutions and administration should “be such of themselves as to realize public well-being and private prosperity”; the state should especially “provide for the welfare and comfort of the working classes”; this is simple justice, for “it may be truly said that it is only by the labor of workingmen that the states grow rich”; while the rights of all persons should be protected, “the poor and helpless have a claim to especial consideration.”

The general principle of state intervention is this:

“Whenever the general interest or any particular class suffers, or is threatened with mischief which can in no other way be met or prevented, the public authority must step in and deal with it.”

The last sentence contains an implicit indorsement of all legislation for the regulation and control of industry that is genuinely necessary. In any particular case the question of state action is to be determined by the facts: is such action the only adequate remedy? If it is it should be utilized. Pope Leo’s principle is empirical and scientific, avoiding both the *a priori* demand of the socialist for universal state control, and the *a priori* demand of the individualist for the complete absence of state control.

Another significant fact of the foregoing quotations from Pope Leo is his frank acceptance of the principle that the state has the right and duty of legislating for the benefit of particular classes, more especially those that are incapable of defending their own interests. In taking this position the Pope merely restated the traditional doctrine of the church. According to that doctrine, the object of the state is not self-glorification, nor merely the common welfare as such, but the good of all individuals and all classes of individuals. The hypocritical opposition to labor laws on the ground that they constitute class legislation finds no sanction in the Catholic doctrine of the functions of the state.

The specific applications which Pope Leo makes of his general principles to labor conditions are worthy of brief notice.

(A) *Strikes*.—When the workers go on strike, says the Holy Father, “it is frequently because the hours of labor are too long, or the work too hard, or because they consider their wages insufficient.” The law should prevent such trouble by “removing in good time the causes which lead to conflicts between employers and employed.”

(B) *Religion and Rest*.—The laborer should be protected in that most precious form of property, “his soul and mind,” for “no man may with impunity outrage that human dignity which God himself treats with reverence, nor stand in the way of that higher life which is the preparation for the eternal life of heaven,” hence the laborer must be guaranteed “rest from work on

Sundays and certain holy days." In general, "he ought to have leisure and rest in proportion to the wear and tear of his strength," for "it is neither just nor human to grind men down with excessive labor so as to stupefy their minds and wear out their bodies."

(C) *Hours of Labor*.—The proper length of the working day depends on "the nature of the work, on circumstances of time and place, and on the health and strength of the workman." The general rule is that labor should not be "protracted over longer hours than strength admits."

(D) *Woman and Child Labor*.—"Women are not suited for certain occupations; by nature they are fitted for home work." Children should not be placed "in workshops and factories until their bodies and minds are sufficiently developed," for "too early experience of life's hard toil blights the young promise of a child's faculties, and renders true education impossible."

(E) *A Living Wage*.—"Wages, we are told, are regulated by free consent, and therefore the employer, when he pays what was agreed upon, has done his part, and seemingly is not called upon to do anything beyond. The only way, it is said, in which injustice might occur would be if the master refused to pay the whole of the wages, or if the workman should not complete the work undertaken; in such cases the state should intervene to see that each obtains his due—but not under any other circumstances.

This mode of reasoning is to a fair-minded man by no means convincing, for there are important considerations which it

leaves out of account altogether . . . Every man has a right to procure what is required in order to live, and the poor can procure it in no other way than through work and wages.

Let it be taken for granted that workman and employer should as a rule make free agreements, and in particular should agree freely as to the wages; *nevertheless there underlies a dictate of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, namely, that remuneration ought to be sufficient to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort. If, through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the workman accept harder conditions because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the victim of force and injustice.*"

The claim of the worker to a living wage is here declared by a strict moral right. Although this principle had been for centuries an integral part of Catholic moral teaching, and had received some specific recognition in the demands of labor unions during the years immediately preceding Pope Leo's encyclical, the doctrine itself had never before received such precise, positive and authoritative expression. If the doctrine is all but universally accepted to-day a great part of the credit is due to Pope Leo XIII.

Two points concerning the Pope's statement of this doctrine require a word of comment and explanation. They are: the meaning and scope of "reasonable and frugal comfort," and the part which Pope Leo would accord to the state in the enforcement of the living wage.

As to the first, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the Pope intended the wage to be understood as comprising not merely the means of keeping body and soul together and continuing at work, but as including

all things required for the reasonable maintenance and development of the human faculties, physical, mental, moral and religious.

No fair-minded person can read the encyclical through and escape the conclusion that the Pope had not only a warm sympathy with the condition and aspirations of the laboring classes, but a reasoned and profound conviction of the intrinsic worth, dignity, sacredness and rights of the worker as a person, as a human being with an inviolable claim to a normal and human life.

Again, while the Pope did not specifically say in the passage quoted above that the living wage should be sufficient for the worker's family as well as himself, other parts of the encyclical make the fact clear beyond any reasonable doubt. In the second paragraph following he declares: "If a workman's wages be sufficient to enable him to maintain himself, his wife, and his children in reasonable comfort, he will not find it difficult . . . to put by some little savings and thus secure a small income." Evidently the "reasonable comfort" and the "natural wage" which Pope Leo has in mind is not the mere equivalent of personal sustenance.

The second question is whether the Pope would have the living wage enforced by civil law. Our only reason for hesitating to give an affirmative answer arises from his explicit statement that recourse should be had to societies and boards, or some other method, "in order to supersede undue interference on the part of the

state." Should circumstances require, he says, "the state should be appealed to for its sanction and protection."

In other words, he would have the state called in only as a last resort. He does not say that the state should never enter this province. All the declarations quoted above, including that regarding a living wage, are found in that section of the encyclical which he himself specifies as the discussion of the functions of the state. And the second of the longest paragraphs quoted above shows that the Pope explicitly rejects the theory that the state should not interfere with the terms of the wage contract, and clearly implies that it may fix its terms and enforce a living wage.

Those few Catholics who still oppose the movement for a living wage by law can get little comfort from the encyclical. Before they can appeal to it with any show of reason they will have to prove that the evil of insufficient wages can be "met or prevented" by some other means. That task will keep them busy for a long time; so long, in fact, that they will all be dead before it is finished.

In the meantime, Catholics who read Pope Leo's statements without bias, and who are not afraid to face the deplorable facts of the wage situation, rejoice that the man whose name is written in the annals of the United States Supreme Court as the official upholder of the first minimum wage law in the United States is a priest, the Rev. Edwin V. O'Hara.

(F) *Private Property*.—Pope Leo condemns the in-

equitable division of property which enables one party to "grasp the whole of labor and trade, to manipulate for its own benefit and its own purposes all the sources of supply, and which is even represented in the councils of the state itself."

Therefore, he says, "the law should favor ownership and its policy should be to induce as many as possible of the humbler class to become owners." By this means "the gulf between vast wealth and sheer poverty will be bridged over."

The Pope is speaking of ownership of land, and his words are strictly applicable to the rural portion of the United States. All observing students are becoming alarmed at the growth of tenancy in our agricultural sections, and realize that systematic and far-reaching assistance will have to be given by the government to convert the masses of tenant farmers into farm owners.

The principle of Pope Leo's statements can be applied quite as well to conditions in the cities. As pointed out in our last article, no permanent solution of the social question will be obtained until the majority of the wage earners become owners of productive property, preferably and so far as possible in the industries in which they work. Neither high wages, nor comfortable working conditions, nor security of employment, nor provision against all the unfavorable contingencies of life, nor all of these together, will render the position of the working classes satisfactory if they must continue in that status of dependence which marks the mere wage earner. Like the tenant

farmers, the urban workers must be aided by the state to become property owners.

Such are the doctrines and proposals which Pope Leo would have the state put into operation for the benefit of the working classes. They do not constitute a complete and formal programme of labor legislation, for that was beyond the scope of the encyclical. In a document of that kind the Pope could do no more than lay down certain fundamental principles of state action, and by applying these to some of the foremost needs of labor indicate the broad outlines of a comprehensive system of betterment. The details can easily be filled in by the specialists of each country.

As a matter of fact, the concrete methods and reforms that are mentioned by Pope Leo are in the main strikingly similar to the "platform of minimums" formulated in 1912 by one of the committees of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections (Proceedings, pp. 376-394). Under the head of wages, hours, safety and health, housing, term of working life, compensation or insurance, the committee endeavored to define the minimum decent standards of life and labor for the working people of America.

Naturally this programme covers the ground in much greater detail than the encyclical, and it includes certain important topics which Pope Leo does not touch; for example, housing and insurance. But it embodies no *principle* that is not found in Pope Leo's proposals; for example, the question of housing is implicitly met by the Pope in his declarations on a living

wage, and the question of insurance by his demand that the worker be enabled to become the owner of property from which he can derive an income.

All things considered, we are justified in claiming that the principles and proposals set forth by Pope Leo concerning the function of the state in relation to labor constitute an adequate scheme of amelioration. Were they but reduced to practice, the workers would not only find their condition immensely improved but would be able of themselves to obtain all the further advantages that are feasible and just.

The two supreme evils of our industrial system are the unreasonably small share of the national income obtained by the majority of wage-earners, and the unreasonably large share that goes to a small minority of capitalists. The remedies which Pope Leo offers for the former evil are, as we have just said, sufficient. The second evil he does not directly touch in the encyclical. His subject was the "Condition of Labor," not the wider topic of social reform, or social justice. Nevertheless, he makes two or three references to the evil of excessive gain that are not without significance when taken in connection with the traditional teaching of the Church.

He declares that the hard condition of the working classes "has been increased by rapacious usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is nevertheless under a different guise but with the like injustice still practiced by covetous and grasping men." Again, he enjoins the rich to "refrain from cutting down

the workmen's earnings, whether by force, fraud or by usurious dealing."

There can be little doubt that the new form of usury stigmatized in these sentences refers to the extortionate prices exacted from the working classes for the necessities of life by the monopolists. A certain great meat packing industry last year obtained dividends of 35 per cent. During the same period this concern helped to promote an artificial shortage of hides, with the result that the price of shoes was kept at a much higher level than was required by the relation between supply and demand. Were Pope Leo alive, he would probably have little hesitation in classifying this coarse injustice as "usurious."

For centuries the Catholic teaching on monopoly has been that a combination which artificially raises the price of products above the market or competitive level is guilty of unjust dealing, and that such practices ought to be prevented by law. Taken in conjunction with the general principle of state intervention enunciated by Pope Leo, these doctrines constitute a sanction for the use of any legislative method that is necessary to meet the evil of monopoly.

Let us recall Pope Leo's general principle: "Whenever the general interest or any particular class suffers, or is threatened with mischief which can in no other way be met or prevented, the public authority must step in and deal with it." Therefore, if that "usurious dealing" which is practiced by monopolistic concerns for the sake of extortionate profits can "in no other

way be met or prevented" than by the destruction of the monopoly, or by fixing maximum prices for its products, or by state ownership of the industry, in whole or in part, or by all these methods combined, the state will have not only the right but the duty to intervene in any or all of these ways.

Did space permit, it would be easy to show that all the other social questions, such for example as those of land tenure and taxation, and taxes on incomes and inheritances, can be adequately solved in conformity with the social and moral teachings of the Catholic Church. All the evils of our industrial system can be abolished by sane and progressive measures of social reform, against which the Church has not a word to say. There is no need to resort to socialism, even if that scheme would not leave the last state of society worse than the first. (Elsewhere I have tried to set forth in detail a comprehensive program of reforms, "Distributive Justice," The Macmillan Company.)

II

PRINCIPLES AND PROPOSALS OF SOCIAL REFORM

Social reform is here taken to mean reform of industrial conditions, not of all social conditions; hence we have nothing to do with such social problems as the divorce question, the liquor traffic, tuberculosis, or methods of relieving distress. While all these are social questions, they are not *the* social question. "Industrial conditions" include the production, but chiefly the distribution of wealth. The latter constitutes the most important of the social questions, because it deeply affects all the others.

Most of the principles, as well as the methods and measures, that I shall advocate would probably be accepted by the majority of the American people. All of the principles have received the explicit endorsement of Catholic authority, and all of the measures are in harmony with Catholic teaching. This authority and this teaching are found in the traditional doctrines of the Church, particularly in the Encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius X.

I shall discuss the subject under the heads of the four main agencies of social reform: The Individual; Private Association; the State; and the Church.

The individual is not the mere creation of his environment, as socialists and determinists would have us believe. He can to a great extent control and modify

his environment through his free will. In the majority of cases the laborer could in some degree better his condition by more energy, honesty, and thrift, and by avoiding indolence, shirking, and wastefulness. He could also acquire a higher sense of his own responsibility for his condition. While it is not true that in America everyone gets what he deserves and earns, it is a fact that the fortunes of every man depend to some extent upon his own efforts. Individual employers could treat their employes better than they do, despite the sins of other employers. The well-disposed employer is not always compelled to follow the bad example of his competitors by oppressing labor. Even if only a minority of employers and a minority of employes should honestly strive to do a little better than the majority of the members of their classes, their action would have a most beneficial effect upon the whole of industry. Individual employers and individual employes are under moral obligation to rise above the low levels of business and industrial conduct in which they find themselves. To conclude that they must do as everybody else does is to adopt the working creed of cowards.

The well-to-do and the rich could put away that false conception of life and values which permeates all classes of contemporary society, and which holds that right life consists in the indefinite expansion and satisfaction of material wants. They could spend very much less money for food, clothing, shelter, amusements, and "social" activities, and very much more for

the cultivation of their minds and hearts. As a rule, the family that spends more than ten thousand dollars per year for the satisfaction of its *material* wants would be better off, physically, intellectually, and morally, if its expenditures were kept below that limit. If the rich and the well-to-do were to adopt saner views and practices in this matter of personal expenditures, they would set a most beneficial example to all the poorer classes, would do much to diminish class envy and hatred, and would have abundant means to carry on charitable, educational, and reform works of every description. The importance and necessity of this kind of individual action can scarcely be exaggerated.

The contributions that can be made by individuals to the solution of the social question, is, therefore, by no means insignificant. If men but applied the commandment of brotherly love to industrial relations, they would establish the reign not only of peace and good will, but of social justice; for charity includes and is broader than justice. Since they will not do this to the extent that is necessary, we must have recourse to other and additional remedies.

There is need of organization, in order that men may be able to do in this way what they cannot accomplish separately. First in importance among societies come labor unions. This is the statement of Pope Leo XIII. At this late day labor unions do not call for a formal defense or justification. They have probably done more for the betterment of the working population than all other agencies combined, with the

exception of religion. Some of their achievements have been brought about by direct influence exerted upon employers, and, not a little indirectly, by moulding public opinion and legislation. Labor unions are a permanent and necessary institution of our social and industrial life, and ought to be continued for their educational influence, even if they were no longer needed for obtaining such material benefits as better wages, hours, or other conditions of employment. To be sure, the abuses must be put away. Violence, limitation of apprentices, and unreasonable restriction of output must be discarded, not only in theory but in practice. Let us, however, look at this matter in its proper proportions. Every considerable violation of justice or charity by organized labor can be, at least, duplicated in the history of capital. The sins of capital have been less crude and spectacular, but not less cruel nor injurious than those of labor.

Employers' associations are likewise proper and necessary. Of course, they should not be used for unjust ends any more than labor organizations. Neither kind of association should regard itself primarily as a fighting institution, but as a means of promoting the welfare of its members effectively and intelligently, and of solving in the most satisfactory way those problems which are of common interest to both capital and labor.

Hence there ought to be some sort of union or conference which will include the representatives of

both employers' and employes' organizations. Pope Leo recommends this form of association, although he admits that it cannot be modeled after the Medieval Guilds, which embraced masters and men in very close union. Probably the only feasible association of this sort is the periodical conference between employers and employes for the purpose of making what are called "trade agreements" regarding wages and all other conditions of employment. Conferences of this kind have been in vogue in the coal mining industry for many years, with the very happiest results for both parties and for the public generally. In great industries these conferences are absolutely necessary in the interest of peace and justice. Employers who refuse to meet their employes on this basis are deserving of the severest condemnation. This much at least of Christian equality and industrial democracy is essential if the wage system is to have the stability to withstand the attacks of revolution.

Cooperative societies are also important and necessary. These are of many varieties, but the aim of all is essentially the same. They seek to distribute among their members the profits that now go to capitalists and middlemen, and to make the wage-earner a sharer in the ownership of productive property. The chief kinds are producers, consumers, agricultural and credit associations. Consumers' and credit associations have been the most successful, the former in Great Britain, the latter on the Continent, especially in Germany. In the former—that is, cooperative stores—the profits,

above a moderate rate of interest to the stockholders, are divided among the purchasers of goods and the employes of the concern. Thus wage-earners and salary-earners become owners of small capital and receive the profits that otherwise would go to a distinct capitalist class. Of credit associations the most prominent are the Raiffeisen banks, which are found chiefly in agricultural districts, and loan money to members at 5 per cent. They are particularly beneficial to small farmers, who would be unable to obtain credit at the ordinary commercial banks. Approximately one-fourth of the population of Great Britain shares in the benefits of cooperative stores, while in Germany alone more than two million persons are interested in the Raiffeisen banks. Cooperative associations for production have not been so successful, owing to their greater complexity and the greater need of specialized business ability, but they are growing steadily all over Europe, especially in Great Britain, and with time and patience will undoubtedly continue to increase and prosper. In agriculture, cooperation takes the form mainly of associations for production, as the cooperative creameries of Denmark and Ireland, and for marketing, as the farmers' selling associations in England. In all these kinds of cooperation the Catholics of Europe have taken a very prominent part, both the laity and the clergy.

The United States are still very backward in this movement, but there are signs of a concerted and widespread advance in the near future. Through co-

operative associations the high cost of living can be reduced, farmers and city consumers can become mutually helpful and profitable, small farmers can unite in the ownership of costly machinery, the social spirit can be developed in rural regions, country life can be made more attractive, the disastrous trend to the cities can be checked, and city wage-earners can be made less dependent upon distributive and manufacturing capitalists.

While not much emphasis is laid upon cooperation in most of the current proposals of social reform, it is an essential element in any complete scheme that rejects socialism or other revolutionary systems. Confining our attention now to the laboring classes, we see that, in addition to the material benefits already described, cooperation would be of the highest educational value. It would develop the laborers' business capacity initiative, sense of self-reliance and of responsibility, organizing ability, feeling of economic security, and reasonable contentment. No one will deny that improvement in all these lines would make the laborer a better citizen, a better man, and a better Christian.

One of the most telling counts in the socialist indictment of modern industry is that the laborer has been divorced from ownership in the tools of production, and been made a mere wage receiver, utterly dependent upon a separate class of beings called capitalists. I do not believe that this condition is final. If the wage system and the system of private ownership of capital are to endure, this baneful and unnecessary

separation of the capitalist as such from the laborer as such must be greatly lessened. Laborers must, in ever-increasing numbers, become capitalists as well as wage-earners. Of course this result can be obtained in some measure through profit sharing and stock ownership in the ordinary private corporation, but these are much less desirable and effective than the cooperative association. Owing to the many and great obstacles confronting it, the cooperative movement will advance slowly, but such has been the history of all movements that have arrived at permanent and far-reaching results.

If anyone should hasten to conclude that cooperation is essentially collectivism or socialism, let me reply that the difference between the two systems is fundamental. Cooperation is much more democratic than any form of state ownership and management, for it leaves the control of the business in the hands of those immediately interested. As already noted, this develops the business talents and the self-reliance of the members; moreover, it excludes paternalism and bureaucracy. It is better for a local group, just as it is better for an individual, to do things themselves than to have others do things for them. State officials in charge, say, of a municipal bakery would, indeed, represent the people, but acting, as they do, through state forms and state machinery, they are farther away from the people, less responsive, and less democratic in their administration and spirit than a cooperative association. For citizens to call upon the state to manage affairs which they can as efficiently

manage themselves through private associations, is to hasten the advent of the servile state and to exchange dependence upon the capitalist for dependence upon a bureaucracy, a form of government whose "idea of an earthly paradise," to quote the words of George Russell in his delightful little volume, "Cooperation and Nationality," "seems to be to have rows of electric buttons all round the official armchair; so that when one of these buttons is touched whole battalions of people can be set in motion." The essence of paternalism consists in an *unnecessary* extension of state activities. Hence it would be paternalism to have state operation of any industry that is small, local, and naturally competitive in character. Such industries are the legitimate field of cooperation. The great industry and the natural monopoly are beyond the scope of cooperative effort.

A final form of private associations to be mentioned is mutual insurance societies. These may have one or more of a great variety of purposes, but the most important of them aim to protect their members against sickness, accidents, invalidity, and unemployment. Within their legitimate fields they have about the same advantages over state insurance and other forms of state protection that cooperation possesses over state operation of industry; but there are very large classes of persons whom they cannot adequately protect, namely, poorly paid wage-earners.

We Catholics are fond of contrasting the modern industrial system with the organization of industry

that prevailed in the Middle Ages. Well, the leading features of the medieval system were private associations of all kinds, a sort of dual ownership of land between the lord and the tenant, and labor ownership of the tools of production. That system can never be restored as it then existed, but the principles underlying it can and ought to become the foundation of a reformed industrial order. Accordingly we must have private organizations of every conceivable legitimate sort and for every legitimate purpose; and the supreme aim must be to make the mass of the wage-earners, in some degree, owners and managers of capital. This is one essential part of social reform on Catholic lines, and it is a vital part of any scheme that would be an effective alternative to socialism.

Individual effort and associated effort will not suffice to carry out an adequate scheme of social reform. An important share in the work must be taken by the state. Under this head are embraced the city, the state in its special American acceptation, and the nation. Opinions concerning the proper industrial functions of the state vary from socialism to the extreme but happily antiquated individualism which would restrict these functions to the prevention of violence and fraud, and the enforcement of contracts. Neither of these is the Catholic view. In the words of Pope Leo XIII: "Whenever the general interest or any particular class suffers, or is threatened with evils which can in no way be met, the public authority must step in to meet them." In this general statement we find warrant

for the principle laid down above, that the state should not do for individuals anything that they can, either separately or by association, do themselves. Going more into detail, Pope Leo says that the state must protect the rights of every class, and must especially care for the most helpless sections of the community, the poor, and the wage-earners. All this is in accord with the traditional Catholic doctrine, which is that the state has two chief duties, namely, to protect natural rights and to promote the interests of all orders and classes in the community.

What does this cover in our present industrial conditions? To prepare the way for a systematic and comprehensive answer, let me point out the two great evils of the present situation: first, millions of the poorest paid laborers are insufficiently protected against unjust conditions of life and employment, and, second, immense masses of fortunately placed capital receive excessive and unnecessary profits or interest. Neither of these evils can be adequately met except by the action of public authority, the state.

In particular, therefore, the state must enact legislation which will prevent any worker from being compelled to accept less than decent living wages. Between 50 and 75 per cent of our laboring population got less than this measure of remuneration in 1914 and only a small proportion of these persons were able to increase their wages themselves, through organization or otherwise. Laws of this kind have been successful in Australia and England, and the agitation for their in-

roduction in this country is rapidly growing. While Pope Leo did not expressly advocate this measure of state activity, his language seems to imply it. Most Catholic authorities today favor it as included in the primary function of the state, that is, the protection of natural rights. Pope Leo declares explicitly that the intervention of the law must be sought to prevent injury to health by excessive labor, or by work unsuited to age or sex. In America, this would seem to mean a legal eight-hour day in most industrial employments, abolition of night work for women and children, and the fixing of sixteen years as the minimum at which children could be continuously employed as wage-earners. Legislation is likewise imperatively needed to provide effective measures of conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes and to modify judicial discretion in the matter of injunctions and boycotting. Furthermore, there must be provided legal insurance against accidents, illness, invalidity, and employment. While insurance through private societies is preferable to insurance by the state, it is beyond the reach of the majority of workers. For these the only adequate provision is through state action, either entirely in the case of those who are not affiliated with a private society, or in part by subventions to those societies that are able to give partial insurance. The latter method is better than complete state protection, inasmuch as it encourages and requires the workers to do what they can for themselves. In many of our great cities the public authority will be compelled to under-

take, directly or indirectly, the housing of the poorest classes on such terms as will promote instead of weakening thrift and self-reliance. In conjunction with this movement the state might well encourage and assist the migration of urban dwellers to the land. Systematic action in this direction would seem to be necessary to reduce the price of food-stuffs, to better the condition of those who are willing to go to the country, and to safeguard the health and vitality and morals of the nation. The fact that between 1900 and 1910 city population in America increased 34 per cent, while the increase in rural districts and unincorporated towns combined was only 11 per cent, is of sufficient gravity to warrant and demand some deliberate public action of the kind just recommended.

Turning to the second of the two great evils to be met by state intervention, we see that measures must be taken to prevent capital enjoying monopolistic privileges from obtaining more than the ordinary and reasonable rate of profit. Since the days of Aristotle men have known that human beings cannot, as a rule, be trusted to exercise justly and reasonably the power of monopoly. When this power is not restrained by public authority, it is generally used to extort unreasonably high prices and exceptionally high profits and interest. Catholic theologians have always condemned these monopolistic practices, and Pope Leo XIII probably had them in mind when he denounced that "rapacious usury" which has reappeared in new forms. It is the current teaching of theologians that

a man should not charge more than a moderate rate or the prevailing rate of interest on money that he has loaned; consequently, he is not justified in using the power of monopoly to extort a higher rate of interest or profit on the money that he has invested in a productive enterprise. To be sure, allowance must be made for greater risk, and a bonus ought to be given to encourage and reward any genuine cheapening of the cost of production. Apart from the bonus for improvements in methods of production, however, not a single valid reason can be given for allowing monopolistic capital to obtain higher profits or interest than capital which is compelled to face competition. To demand that the state should somehow require monopolistic capital to be content with competitive rates of interest is merely to demand the enforcement of an elementary rule of justice. It is the perception, more or less instinctive, of this elementary truth by the average man that accounts for the universal outcry against trusts and monopolies in America. This outcry is sometimes the result of misinformation as to particular facts, but it is never mistaken in its apprehension of the fundamental moral principle.

Just how the state is to prevent this kind of extortion in the various fields in which it is practiced cannot here be described in detail. In general the state should regulate the rates and charges of all natural monopolies, such as railroads, street railways, telegraphs, telephones, lighting, and other public service corporations, so as to leave them only the prevailing

rate of interest on their actual investment. Indeed, this is the *theory* upon which those corporations are regulated now, but unfortunately the practice does not always correspond to the theory. /If the policy of regulation should prove inadequate after a fair and sufficient trial, undoubtedly we shall be compelled to adopt public ownership of these natural monopolies, after the manner of so many countries in Europe and Australia. /As for those monopolies that are not natural, or that have not been proved to be of this character, those concerns commonly known as trusts, they must likewise be restricted to the prevailing rate of interest on their actual investment. One of two, or possibly three, methods must be adopted to reach this end. They must be divided into a sufficient number of parts to ensure actual competition, or if this proves to be impossible or undesirable, the state must fix the maximum prices that they will be allowed to charge consumers. This would be merely returning to the practice of the Catholic Middle Ages. The possible third alternative is that the state should compete with some of the obstinate and intractable trusts by manufacturing and selling their kinds of products. However, this seems scarcely necessary, except temporarily, and in a few extreme cases. If competition were only guaranteed a fair chance, something that it has not enjoyed in this country for the last thirty years, it would probably produce goods just as cheaply as monopoly, would permit of the largest plants that are economically

desirable, and would, therefore, render unnecessary legal regulation of prices.

Finally, the state must introduce comprehensive reforms in the field of taxation. The rapid increase in the value of land, both rural and urban; the vanishing supply of new agricultural land; the immense numbers of people who possess no land and who find possession of it becoming, day by day, further and further beyond their reach, and the appalling congestion of population in many of our great cities—demand immediate and systematic correction and remedy. Between 1900 and 1910, farm land rose in value 108 per cent per acre, while great tracts in the cities have advanced with even greater rapidity. In the interest of the common good it would be highly desirable that the average value of land should not rise above its present level. While the upward movement cannot be wholly prevented, it can and should be moderated by a gradual transfer of some of the taxes from the necessities of life and from improvements to land, and by a special tax on the increases in land value, particularly in cities. Both these methods have already been employed with excellent results, the former in Australia and Western Canada, the latter in Germany. Of course this higher taxation of land should not be imposed in such a way as to inflict loss upon any land-owner, for, despite the contentions of the single-taxers, titles to land are quite as valid in morals as any other property rights. But there is no practical danger that anything of this sort will happen. Moreover, all incomes and inherit-

ances above certain minimum exemptions should be subjected to taxation, and the tax should be progressive. This would be in harmony with the rules of just taxation as laid down for centuries by the Catholic moral theologians.

All these activities of the state make for greater social justice. They are all necessary because the reforms that they aim at cannot be brought about in any other way. They are neither paternalistic nor injurious to the liberty of the individual; for they do nothing that the individual could do for himself, and the only individual liberty that they interfere with is the license of a small minority to oppress the majority. While they are not all specifically recommended in Pope Leo's Encyclicals, they are in agreement with the general teaching of these documents.

Pope Leo declared that while the social question demands the attention of "the rulers of states, of employers of labor, of the wealthy, and of the working population themselves, . . . all the striving of men will be vain if they leave out the Church." Surely no man who honestly studies social facts and tendencies as they are can doubt this statement. The social question will not be solved without the aid of religion. On the other hand, religion alone will not and should not be expected to furnish the whole solution. For the Church is not a social reform institution, nor is it her function to propose specific economic and social remedies. Her primary and supreme mission is to save the souls of men for an eternal existence with God. To take social

reform for her mission would be to mistake a part of the means for the end. The Church is interested in the social question only in so far as it is related to souls, that is, in so far as it involves questions of right and wrong. She cannot be indifferent to those aspects of the social problem which involve relations of charity and justice. To these issues she never has been indifferent. Her insistence upon the supreme principles of individual sacredness, the essential equality of all individuals, and the right use of wealth, brought about the abolition of slavery, the medieval system of dual ownership of land, the guild organization of industry in the towns, and the establishment of democracy as against the absolute rule of kings, lords, and tyrants of every description. These doctrines have lost none of their efficacy or appropriateness. All that is necessary is that they be applied specifically and in detail to the new conditions.

Under the head of charity the Church teaches that all men are brothers, that the Golden Rule has not become antiquated, and that a man's superfluous goods belong to his needy fellows. The last doctrine is far-reaching, but is today more honored in the breach than in the observance, even by the majority of those who call themselves good Catholics. On behalf of the virtue of justice, the Church demands that workmen perform their tasks faithfully and abstain from acts of violence against persons and property; that employers should pay at least living wages to all their employes and refrain from overtaxing age, sex, and strength; and that

capitalists should discontinue the practice of new and insidious forms of usury. All this is explicitly contained in Pope Leo's Encyclical on the "condition of labor." With him we may well ask, "Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed, would not strife die out and cease?"

In addition to her positive teaching, the Church provides the most effective *motives* for social action. No motives of mere brotherly love, or naturalistic morality, can stimulate so powerfully the individual conscience as those drawn from the fatherhood of God, and the sanction of heaven and hell. No mere external agencies, no mere social machinery, whether in a private or public organization, will produce systematic and lasting reform without a quickening of the individual conscience. And this must be the work of religion.

Now we are obliged to admit that, while the true and effective motives of social duties are fairly well taught in the Church, her positive teaching with regard to charity and justice has not yet been applied with sufficient definitiveness and thoroughness to the industrial conditions of our time and country. Is it right that Catholics should spend so much money on themselves as do the very rich, and, indeed, almost all classes except the very poor? Are Catholic employers who fail to pay living wages, and who oppress their work-people in other ways, sufficiently instructed concerning these relations and sufficiently corrected when they fail in these duties? Are the methods of

getting money through monopoly, which are condemned by the general conscience of the American people, morally right or morally wrong? What are we to think of professing Catholics who do not hesitate to make use of these methods and to profit by them? These, and many similar questions, are extremely practical and are all moral questions. They are difficult and they are new; therefore they cannot be fully answered as promptly as we should like to see them answered. Yet they must be faced, fully, frankly, and honestly, and we must receive answers and solutions that will be at once sound, and unequivocal, and comprehensive. This aspect of social Catholic reform is fundamental and is a necessary preliminary to effective work in all the other departments of social action.

If Catholics are to do effective work in solving the social question and in counteracting revolutionary social theories, they must possess a definite and constructive program. Neither vague and edifying generalities, nor mere opposition to socialism, will any longer suffice. The generalities are self-evident, but they bring us nowhere; opposition to socialism is a necessity, but by itself it may do us as much harm as good.

The program of principles, methods, and measures which I have tried to outline may claim, I think, to be fairly comprehensive. Probably it includes all the reforms that we can hope to see realized within the next quarter of a century. Indeed, some will be inclined to call it "advanced." That is a question of personal appreciation and viewpoint. The epithets "advanced"

and "retrograde," "radical" and "conservative," "progressive" and "reactionary," are all relative. Most of the time they do service as mere catchwords in the mouths of persons who are too indolent to exercise the thinking faculty. Social principles and proposals cannot be permanently justified or condemned because of their factitious connection with a catchword. Their only enduring and rational test is the test of truth. And the standards of social truth are to be sought in the teaching of the Catholic Church, the precepts of the moral law, the conclusions of economic authority, and the verdict of experience. Judged by these standards, the program that I have all too briefly and feebly put forth in these pages will, in its essentials at least, prove to be constructive, efficient, and impregnable.

No loyal Catholic, priest or layman, is permitted to be indifferent toward the movement for Catholic social reform. In the first place, we are all commanded to interest ourselves in the work by the supreme authority at Rome. Pope Leo XIII enjoined every minister of religion to "throw into the conflict all the energy of his mind, and all the strength of his endurance"; and reminded the laity that they were "not free to choose whether they will take up the cause of the poor or not; it is a matter of simple duty." These mandates have been more than once reaffirmed and emphasized by Pius X. In the second place, Catholic social reform is necessary in the interests of morality and for the glory of God; without it millions of men, women, and children,

for whom Christ died, will continue to be deprived of the material means of living decently and serving God properly. Finally, unless Catholics enter actively and intelligently upon this work of social reform, large sections of our wage-earning co-religionists will be drawn from their Catholic allegiance into Socialism or other revolutionary and anti-Christian organizations. That this is an impending and an imminent danger, no one who is moderately acquainted with our working population would think of attempting to deny. Despite the comforting assurances of complacent optimists, there exist today in our American industrial society forces and tendencies which, if unchecked by intelligent and sympathetic Catholic action, will lead to such a defection from the Church among the masses as has taken place in more than one country in Continental Europe. Given essentially similar conditions, history is likely to repeat itself.

Any one of the three considerations which I have just set forth ought to be sufficient to rouse sluggish Catholics to a sense of their social obligations; taken together they leave the socially indifferent Catholic without a vestige of excuse for his inactivity.

III

A LIVING WAGE

I

“A Living Wage” forms the title of a chapter in Professor William Smart’s “Studies in Economics.” This chapter was written in Scotland, November, 1893. In its opening sentences we are told: “The last few weeks have seen the birth of a new and attractive catchword. Before it has even been defined, it is already put forward as arguing a claim. . . . The expression ‘living wage’ seems to give a reason and a basis for a certain amount of wage. It has, accordingly, found its way into every-day language, and we may expect soon to find that the conception which it expresses has taken its place among the convictions of many.”

In all probability, these sentences describe the origin of the phrase, “living wage.” But the idea that it expresses goes back much farther than the summer of 1893. Because the idea is so much older than the expression, it has “taken its place among the convictions of many” to a far greater extent and with much more rapidity than Professor Smart expected when he wrote the words just quoted. Because the expression neatly and concretely sets forth the idea, it likewise has obtained a currency that the professor never anticipated. Both the idea and the expression owe their vogue and their popularity to the fact that they represent a fundamental principle of justice.

Although the idea of a living wage goes back at least to the early Middle Ages, it received its first systematic and authoritative expression in the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, "On the Condition of Labor." This was published in May, 1891, something more than a year before the "catchword" was first heard in Great Britain. In that document the great pontiff flatly rejected the prevailing doctrine that wages fixed by free consent were always fair and just. This theory, he said, leaves out of account certain important considerations. It ignores the fundamental fact that the laborer is morally bound to preserve his life, and that his only means of fulfilling this duty is to be found in his wages. Therefore, concluded Pope Leo, "a workman's wages ought to be sufficient to maintain him in reasonable and frugal comfort." This proposition, he declared, is a "dictate of natural justice."

What is "reasonable comfort?" Evidently, it is something more than the conditions and essentials of mere existence. To have merely the means of continuing to live and to work is not to be in comfort. What degree of comfort is reasonable? To this question we could get a hundred different answers from as many different persons. Each of the one hundred might conceive reasonable comfort as that to which he had become accustomed, or that to which he aspired because it seemed to bring happiness to others. The reasonable comfort that the Pope had in mind is merely the reasonable minimum. It is

that smallest amount which will satisfy right reason. One way of finding out how much is required by this standard is to consult the judgment of competent and fair-minded men. Another and more fundamental method is to interpret reasonable comfort in the light of man's nature and essential needs. These are the ends to which any degree of welfare is but a means. Man's nature and needs, therefore, should indicate the amount of goods that constitute the minimum measure of reasonable comfort.

Like every other human being, the wage-earner is a person, not a thing, nor a mere animal. Because he is a person, he has certain needs that are not felt by animals, and his needs and his welfare have a certain sacredness that does not belong to any other species of creatures. A dog or a horse may be used as mere instruments to the welfare of man. They may rightfully be killed when man no longer wants them. Not so with the human person. He has intrinsic worth and dignity. He is made in the image and likeness of God. He is an end in himself. He was not created for the pleasure, or utility, or aggrandizement of any other human being or group of human beings. His worth and his place in the universe are to be measured with reference to himself, not with reference to other men, or to institutions, or to states. He is worth while for his own sake.

What, then, are the needs to which are attached this prerogative of intrinsic worth and sacredness? How much of the good things of life must a man have in

order that he may live in a manner worthy of a person? In general, he must have sufficient goods and opportunities for the exercise of all his faculties and the development of his personality. On the physical side, this means food, clothing and housing adequate to maintain him in health and working efficiency. If he is underfed, or insufficiently clothed, or improperly housed, he is treated with even less consideration than wise and humane men extend to their beasts of burden. Since the worker is not merely an animal and an instrument of production, but an intellectual and moral person, he requires the means of exercising and developing the faculties of his soul. Therefore he needs some education, some facilities for reading and study, the means of practicing religion, an environment that will not make unreasonably difficult the leading of a moral life, and sufficient opportunities of social intercourse and recreation to maintain him in efficiency and to give him that degree of contentment that is essential to a healthy outlook on life. As regards the future, the worker requires a certain minimum amount of security against sickness, accident, and old age. Finally, all these goods should be available to the worker, not as a single man, but as the head of a family; for marriage is among the essential needs of the great majority.

All the foregoing goods and opportunities are included in the concept of reasonable comfort. Within the last few years, many groups of persons have attempted to translate these requisites into more con-

crete symbols. They have tried to describe reasonable comfort or a decent livelihood, in terms of food, housing, insurance, etc. Their statements and estimates have shown a remarkable measure of agreement. This substantial uniformity proves that "reasonable comfort" is not only a practical and tangible conception, but one that springs from the deepest intuitions of reason and morality.

We pass over their specific statements concerning the amount and kinds of food required, as these are too technical for our present purpose. It is sufficient to say that these specifications cover an allowance of food adequate to the perservation of health and working efficiency. As regards clothing, the estimates include not merely what is needed for health and efficiency, but those additional articles and changes of raiment which are essential in order that the worker and his family may, without loss of self-respect, attend church, school, and participate in public gatherings, and various forms of social intercourse. The provision of apparel for these latter purposes may not be directly necessary on the ground of health, but it meets one of the fundamental needs of a human being. It is among the requirements of the mind and the emotions. To deny it to a man is to treat him as somewhat less than a man.

In the matter of housing, the authorities agree that the wage-earner and his family require at least four or five rooms, with adequate sunlight, ventilation, and all the elementary requisites of sanitation, and in moral and healthful surroundings.

The majority of social students believe that the workingman's wife should not be compelled to become a wage-earner, and that his children should not regularly engage in gainful occupations before the age of sixteen. If these conditions are not realized, the family is not living in reasonable comfort, and its younger members are deprived of reasonable opportunities of education and development.

All the members of the family should have some provision for recreation, such as an occasional trip to the country and visits to moving pictures or concerts, some access to books and periodical literature, in addition to schooling for the children up to the age of sixteen; and of course the means of belonging to a church.

The worker should have sufficient insurance against unemployment, accidents, sickness and old age to provide himself and those normally dependent upon him with all the above mentioned goods during those periods when he is unable to make such provision by his labor and wages.

Such are the requisites of reasonable comfort as determined by man's nature and needs, and as interpreted by all competent authorities on the subject. That the wage-earner, as all other persons, ought to have this much of the good things of life will not be denied by anyone who appreciates the dignity and intrinsic worth of personality. The man who would assert that the worker and his family may reasonably be deprived of these things must logically contend that

the worker may be killed or deprived of his liberty for the benefit of others. For the right of life, liberty, marriage and all the other fundamental goods rests on precisely the same basis as the claim to reasonable comfort. That basis is the inherent sacredness of personality. This sacredness is outraged, not only when the person is killed, crippled, or imprisoned, but also when he is prevented from exercising and developing his faculties to a reasonable degree.

In the next paper we shall consider the moral principles which are at the basis of the claim to a living wage.

II

In the first article of this series we saw the meaning of "reasonable comfort," as determined by man's nature and needs, and estimated by authoritative social students. Pope Leo XIII declared that the workman's claim to a wage that provides reasonable comfort is a "dictate of natural justice." That is to say, a living wage and reasonable comfort are not merely desirable advantages, goods which we should all like to see possessed by the working man and his family, things necessary for reasonable life, but they are required by the principles of justice; they belong to him as a right. To a large proportion of employers, and to many other persons, this is still "a hard saying." How can it be justified?

Pope Leo could not present an extended justification in a document that dealt with the whole field of in-

dustrial relations. Hence he contented himself with laying down the general principle that a living wage and a condition of reasonable comfort are required in order that the wage earner may fulfill his duties of life and self-development. Obligations cannot be discharged without the necessary means; for the laborer, wages are the only means.

The latest ethical defence of the right to a living wage is that presented by the Rev. Dr. Cronin, in the second volume of his "Science of Ethics." It is, in brief, that a wage which is not sufficient to provide reasonable comfort is not the just equivalent of the wage-earner's labor. Why? Because the worker's energy or labor is the one means that God has given him to provide the essentials of reasonable life and comfort. When the employer appropriates to his own uses this energy, he is bound in strict justice to give in exchange for it that amount of welfare which the laborer's energy is the divinely given means of obtaining. Other writers give other arguments and justifications. Among the Catholic authorities the differences in this matter are differences of view-point rather than of principle. The following argument seems to be more fundamental and thorough than some of the others.

When we consider man's position in relation to the bounty of nature, we are led to accept three fundamental principles. The first may be thus stated: Since the earth was intended by God for the support of all persons, all have essentially equal claims upon it, and essentially equal rights of access to its benefits.

On the one hand, God has not declared that any of His children have superior or exceptional claims to the earth. On the other hand, all persons are made in the image and likeness of God, composed of the same kind of body and soul, affected by the same needs, and destined for the same end. Therefore they are all equally important in His sight. They are all equally persons, endowed with intrinsic worth and dignity, ends in themselves, not instruments to the welfare of others. Hence they stand upon an essentially equal footing with regard to the animal, plant, and mineral bounty of the earth. This bounty is a common gift, possession, heritage. The moral claims upon it held by these equal human persons are essentially equal. No man can vindicate for himself a superior claim on the basis of anything that he finds in himself, in nature or in the designs of nature's God.

Nevertheless, this equal right of access to the earth is not absolute. It is conditioned upon labor, upon the expenditure of useful and fruitful energy. As a rule, the good things of the earth are obtained in adequate form and quantity only at the cost of considerable exertion. And this exertion is for the most part irksome, of such a nature that men will not perform it except under the compulsion of some less agreeable alternative. The labor to which the earth yields up her treasures is not put forth spontaneously and automatically. Therefore, the equal and inherent right of men to possess the earth and utilize its benefits becomes actually valid only when they are willing to

expend productive energy and labor. This is the second fundamental principle.

Obviously we are speaking here of the original rights of men to the earth, not of those rights which they have acquired through the possession of private property. The rights in question are those which inhere in all men, whether or not they are private owners.

From the two principles of equal right of access to the earth, and universal obligation to perform a reasonable amount of useful labor, follows a third fundamental principle. It is that men who at any time or in any way control the resources of the earth are morally bound to permit others to have access thereto on reasonable terms. Men who are willing to work must be enabled to make real and actual their original and equal right of access to the common bounty of nature. For the right to subsist from the earth implies the right actually to participate in its benefits on reasonable conditions and through reasonable arrangements. Otherwise the former right is a delusion. To refuse any man reasonable facilities to exercise his basic right of living from the common bounty by his labor is to treat this right as non-existent. Such conduct by the men who are in possession implies a belief that their rights to the gifts of God are inherently superior to the right of the person whom they exclude. This position is utterly untenable. It is on exactly the same basis as would be the claim of a strong man to deprive a weak one of liberty. The right to freedom of movement is not more certain nor more indestructible than

the right of access on reasonable terms to the bounty of the earth. Were a community to imprison an innocent man it would not violate his rights more vitally than does the proprietor or the corporation that deprives him of reasonable access to the resources of nature. In both cases the good that he seeks is a common gift of God.

This, then, is the moral basis underlying the laborer's right to a living wage. Like all other men, he has an indestructible right of access to the goods of the earth on reasonable terms. Obviously, the conditional clause, "on reasonable terms," is of very great importance. Neither the laborer nor anyone else has a right of direct and unconditional access to those portions of the earth that have rightly become the property of others. Such a claim would be the height of unreason. The laborer's right to participate in the common heritage must be actualized in such a way as not to interfere with the equally valid rights of others. The laborer's right must be satisfied with due regard to existing acquired rights and the existing form of industrial organization.

In the following paper we shall show how this right becomes the right to a living wage from the employer.

III

In our first paper we found that a life of reasonable comfort implies at least that amount of material, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and other goods, which are becoming to, worthy of, a human person. In the

second paper we saw that the person's need for these things gives him certain moral claims upon the common bounty of nature. These claims we summed up in the principle that every person has a right of access to the goods of the earth on reasonable terms. Since a right in one person implies a correlative obligation in someone else, it follows that those who are in possession of the earth or its resources must so use these goods that every man shall be able to enjoy his right of access without unreasonable difficulty.

From this principle to the principle that the laborer has a right to a living wage, the transition is logical and certain. Pope Leo XIII declared that the laborer's right to a living wage arises from the fact that his wage is his only means of livelihood. Owing to the manner in which the goods of the earth have been divided and appropriated in the present organization of industrial society, the wage-earner has no way of exercising his original and equal right of access to the earth except through the sale of his labor in return for wages. An occasional worker might get a livelihood by cultivating a piece of land, but the cost is so great that only those can defray it who are already receiving more than living wages. If such an opportunity and alternative were general, the living wage would not be a practical question. Men would not hire themselves out for less than that amount when they could obtain a decent livelihood by employing themselves on a piece of land. To assure a laborer that if he does not like to work for less than living wages, he can fall back upon his

right of access to the earth by taking up a piece of land, is but to mock him. Such access as he has is evidently not access on reasonable terms.

For the wage-earner of to-day, therefore, access to the resources of nature can be had only through wages. The men who have appropriated the goods and opportunities of the earth have shut him out from any other way of entering upon his natural heritage. Therefore they are morally bound to use and administer these goods in such a way that his right shall not be violated and his access to the resources of nature not rendered unreasonably difficult. This means that the industrial community in which he lives, and for which he labors, shall provide him with the requisites of a decent livelihood in the form of living wages. On the one hand, the worker has performed a reasonable amount of labor; on the other hand, the industrial community is the beneficiary of his services. In the product which he has created the community has the wherewith to pay him living wages. To refuse him this amount of remuneration is surely to deprive him of access to the earth and to a livelihood on reasonable terms.

It is assumed here that the laborer's product is sufficiently large to provide this much remuneration, and that the employer would rather pay it than go without the laborer's services. The case in which the product falls short of this sufficiency will be considered presently. If the employer does not think the laborer worth a living wage, he has a right to discharge him.

Otherwise the employer would be treated unreasonably. But when the employer regards the employe worth a living wage, but refuses to pay it merely because the laborer is economically constrained to work for less, he is surely treating the latter unreasonably. He is depriving the laborer of access to the goods of the earth on reasonable terms. In the striking words of Pope Leo XIII, he is making the laborer "the victim of force and injustice."

The reader will have noticed that in the last paragraph the word "employer" is substituted for the word "community," which was used in the paragraph preceding. If the community in its corporate civil form—that is, the state—were the direct beneficiary of the laborer's services, if it came into direct possession of the laborer's product, it would obviously be charged with the duty of paying him a living wage. In our present industrial organization, however, the state permits the employer to obtain the product and imposes upon him the duty of wage paying. Therefore he is the person who is obliged to perform this duty adequately, that is, in the form of living wages. If he fails to do so, he abuses his social and industrial functions; he uses his control over the goods of the earth in such a way as to deprive the laborer of access thereto on reasonable terms.

What if the employer cannot pay living wages? Space limitations will not permit us to discuss the very interesting ethical question whether such an employer is morally obliged to go out of business. The employer

has a right to take from the product the equivalent of a decent livelihood for himself and his family, even though the remainder will not provide full living wages for all his employes. For his claim to a decent livelihood is as good as theirs, and in a conflict of equal claims a man is justified in preferring himself to his neighbors. When, however, the employer has already obtained a decent livelihood, he has no right to take from the product one cent more until he has given all his employes the full measure of living wages. In the first place, the right to take interest in any circumstances on invested capital is only presumptive and probable, not certain. In the second place, the right of the laborers to get from the joint product the means of satisfying their essential and fundamental needs is morally superior to the right of the employer to the means of indulging in luxurious living or of making new investments. To deny this proposition is to assert that the claims of the laborers upon the common bounty of nature are morally inferior to those of the employer, and that they are but instruments to his welfare, not morally equal and independent persons.

One can easily imagine some employer exclaiming that a right of access to the resources of nature does not mean the right to take as much as the equivalent of a living wage. The objection ignores the truth that the access should be "on reasonable terms." Surely this phrase implies that the access and the wage should provide at least a decent livelihood. The employer who thinks that he may rightfully pay the lowest

wage that the laborer can be forced to accept forgets that he himself is only a steward of the gifts of God. What he calls his product is his, not to use as he pleases, but to administer with due regard to the natural rights of his employes.

We have made no formal defense of the proposition that the just living wage for an adult male is one that will support decently his wife and children as well as himself. We have assumed that anyone who recognizes the claim of the laborer to develop his personality to a reasonable degree will take for granted that those advantages are possible only when the father's wage is adequate to decent family maintenance.

In the next and last paper we shall discuss the money measure of a living wage and the methods of bringing it about.

IV

Up to the present we have given no more specific definition of a living wage than it is the equivalent of a decent livelihood, or a sum sufficient to maintain the worker and his family in conditions of reasonable comfort. The attempt to define it in terms of money is beset with many difficulties. Some housekeepers are much better managers than others in making purchases and in utilizing them; the number and quantity of concrete goods that suffice for decent living conditions, for example, in the matters of recreation and non-material things, do not easily submit to exact measurement; the variation in the cost of commodities from city to city and from section to section renders any

single estimate inadequate; and, finally, the recent extraordinary rise in prices, culminating in the present abnormal cost of living, has made almost all previous estimates antiquated.

Nevertheless, the difficulties are not insurmountable. They can be overcome sufficiently to yield approximate estimates that will be of great practical value. That is all that we require in a matter of this kind. We are dealing with the realm of moral approximations, not with the province of exact science. While the cost of living of a workingman's family varies indefinitely on account of the varying proficiency of the housewife, we have to consider only the average level of domestic economy and efficiency. This average is ascertainable quite as definitely as a hundred other important social facts. The goods that are required to provide a minimum decent level of existence can be estimated with sufficient accuracy to safeguard the welfare of the laborer and his family. The variation of prices over space and time can be dealt with by making the estimates of a living wage apply only to specific places and specific dates.

Within recent years we have been provided with many such estimates. For example, the New York Bureau of Standards concluded in 1915 that the minimum cost of living for a family of five was a little less than \$850 annually. In the same year a commission of members of the legislature gave an estimate of about \$875 for the same city and about \$100 less for Buffalo.

In the summer of 1918 the experts of the National

War Labor Board found that the lowest annual amount upon which a man and wife and three children could be maintained decently was \$1,386. The cost of living is probably as high today (September, 1919) as it was in July, 1918.

Four methods are conceivable by which a living wage might become universal. The first is the automatic operation of economic forces. Some twenty or twenty-five years ago this theory enjoyed considerable favor among economists. It took substantially this form: Capital is increasing much faster than labor; therefore, its demand for labor is increasing relatively to the supply; therefore, the remuneration of labor will necessarily increase. The fatal flaw in this argument is its neglect of the fact that a large proportion of the new capital takes the place of labor, thereby reducing instead of enhancing the demand for laborers. Machines are constantly made to do the work of men, and so far as we can see, the process will go on indefinitely. The remuneration of underpaid labor measured by its purchasing capacity has decreased rather than increased during the last quarter of a century. No economic forces are discernible that are likely to cause a contrary movement within the next twenty-five years.

The second agency that might theoretically be expected to raise the wages of the underpaid is the benevolence of employers. Only visionaries put any faith in this method. In so far as experience is a guide, it warns us that only an insignificant minority

of employers will ever voluntarily increase the remuneration of employes who are getting less than living wages. Were the number of those disposed to do so multiplied indefinitely, they would not be able to carry out their lofty design. Owing to the force and keenness of competition, the great majority of employers must conform to the wage standards fixed by their most selfish competitors. A benevolent majority might, indeed, raise wage rates to the level of decency by combining for that purpose. Our readers would not thank us for inviting them to consider seriously such a fantastic hypothesis.

The third conceivable method is that of organization by the laborers themselves. While labor unions have done much, very much, to increase wages within the last forty years, their influence in this field has been mainly restricted to the skilled trades. The proportion of unskilled and underpaid labor enrolled in the unions has always been very small, and it shows very little tendency to increase. Effective organization requires time, patience and considerable financial resources, the very things which underpaid labor lacks. Not within a generation would organization be able to obtain living wages for more than a minority of those who are below that level.

The one device that gives promise of making the living wage universal is a minimum fixed by law. This means that the public authorities, state or federal, or both, should enact legislation forbidding any employer to pay less than the equivalent of a decent livelihood.

IV

THE LEGAL MINIMUM WAGE

Previous to the rises in wages and prices which began in 1915, the majority of laborers in the United States were receiving less than living wages. Since that date the increase in prices seem to have been, on the whole, as great as the increase in wages. Therefore it is probable that the majority of wage-earners are still getting less than the equivalent of a decent livelihood.

This situation is at once a grave reproach to our Christian civilization and a grave menace to the national welfare. It is a grave reproach to Christian civilization because every one of those persons who is forced to live below the normal standard is a human being possessed of intrinsic worth and sacredness, having an absolute and imperishable value, all of which, as the German political writer Gierke tells us, was, in opposition to the theory of antiquity, revealed by Christianity. The most insignificant child, the most degraded and exploited worker, is equal in moral importance and in the eyes of God to the greatest statesman or the most efficient captain of industry. Because of his personality the worker has an equal right with the capitalist to at least the elementary requisites of reasonable life and reasonable development of personality. When, through no fault of his own, the wage of the worker is inadequate to this end, his

personal dignity is outraged and his indestructible rights violated. For he has an indestructible right, either against his employer or against society, to the minimum conditions of a decent livelihood. To deny this is to assume that men are not equal as persons, and that some human beings may lawfully be used as mere instruments to the welfare of others; or that God did not intend the resources and opportunities of the earth to be available in a reasonable degree for all His children. Against this assumption the principles of natural morality and of democracy, no less than the teaching of Christianity, utter an emphatic protest. Any attempt to evade the force of this protest by appealing to considerations of industrial prosperity or social utility will lack logical and moral validity; for the exploitation of one section of the community for a so-called social end means in the concrete the subordination of one group of persons to another, albeit larger, group of persons. It means that men are to be treated as essentially unequal. If it is to be defended at all, the defense must be based frankly upon force, physical and intellectual, and not upon moral grounds.

This is the individual and the moral side of the problem, and it would seem to be logically and fundamentally more important than the social side. While society is something more than the sum of its individual members, apart from these it is a mere abstraction; while it is in a very real sense an organism, unlike the physical organism, it exists for the sake of its constituent

elements; while its immediate and formal end is the common good, its ultimate and concrete object is the good of all its component individuals. Nevertheless the welfare of society can and ought to be considered, in itself, as something immediately and formally different from the welfare of its members or any particular group of them. In the long run, however, social and individual welfare are interdependent, fostered by the same means and hindered by the same obstacles. The injury done to social welfare by insufficient wages and subnormal planes of living is quite as certain, though not always quite as obvious, as their evil effects upon the individual immediately concerned.

The social injury has been strikingly presented by Mr. and Mrs. Webb through the illustration of parasitism. Those industries which do not pay wages sufficient for the physical efficiency and the reproduction of their workers are called parasitic trades because they draw a part of their productive energy from the general stock of the nation, instead of from within themselves. We may distinguish two forms of industrial parasitism, the mild and the extreme. In the former the workers, or some of them, are partly supported by their husbands, brothers, fathers, or other relatives, and thus are enabled to live at or near the normal standard. These are for the most part women workers and child workers. From the viewpoint of national welfare this mild parasitism is an evil only indirectly, inasmuch as it gives to the industries in which it exists an unfair advantage over com-

peting industries which pay living wages, and thus continually attracts capital and labor from the latter to the former. The subsidizing of the workers has, therefore, a very important influence in extending the area of parasitism, both mild and extreme. In the extreme form of parasitism the underpaid workers do not receive from other sources sufficient assistance to maintain health, industrial efficiency, and the conditions of family life. The chief consequences of this situation are: the young workers who might have become more productive through training are deprived of the opportunity; women workers are in great numbers rendered unfit for the burdens of motherhood; the children who are born into the families of these exploited classes are denied the conditions of healthy moral and physical development, and grow up even less efficient than their parents; forced to live below the normal level, the workers are unable to turn out a normal amount of product during the time they are actually at work; their total working time is shortened by an abnormal amount of sickness and premature death. These facts represent the industrial loss to the community. In addition, there is a direct financial loss, owing to the large outlay for private and public relief to these workers in times of sickness, unemployment, and old age, and a considerable increase in the expenditure on account of crime that can be directly traced to the subnormal conditions in which these people are compelled to live.

Evidently the national losses that we are considering

are not offset by the supposed fact that the exploited workers turn out cheaper goods. We have heard a great deal lately about the conservation of natural resources and the wasteful exploitation of the soil. We easily realize that the cost of restoring our agricultural land to its normal productivity will be much greater than would have been the cost of preventing its deterioration, and that the average level of prices of agricultural products will in the long run be considerably higher than it would have been had the farmers adopted the method of prevention. The early saving in prices will not compensate for the later loss arising from deterioration of the soil. Neither will the assumed saving in the prices of the goods produced by the exploited workers equal the loss due to lower industrial efficiency, sickness, poverty and crime. If the underpaid workers were able to produce a normal amount of product annually during their shorter working lives, and if they were then so considerate as to disappear suddenly, leaving no burden of sickness or funeral expenses to the community, the process of exploitation might be socially profitable and expedient. "Might be," for the result is by no means certain. But the workers do not turn out a normal amount of product during their working years, and they do create abnormal burdens for the community. By expediency as well as by morality the parasitic industry stands condemned. There may be exceptional industries that are deserving of a temporary subsidy, but this should come from the state in the form of a direct bonus, and

not in the form of human exploitation. As a general rule, an industry that is not self-supporting, that cannot pay living wages to all its employes, has no valid reason for existing. If its products are not in sufficient demand to command prices adequate to this end, they ought not to be produced.

How, then, are the millions of American workers who are unable to support a normal standard of living to be brought up to that standard? Not by the automatic operation of blind economic forces; for bitter experience has compelled us to reject the complacent assumptions of the theory of "economic harmonies." We have learned that competition, if left to itself, invariably forces wages downward instead of upward. Even the late Francis A. Walker wrote some thirty-five years ago: "There is therefore no virtue at all, no tendency even, in strictly industrial forces or relations to make good that great loss" ("The Wages Question," p. 83). This was written in reply to Professor Perry's contention that competition among capitalists would inevitably and soon enable an oppressed group of laborers to recover the ground that they had lost. About fifteen years later Walker applied the same thought to the laboring classes generally: "Nothing, economically speaking, can save industrial society from progressive degradation except the spirit and the power in the working classes to resist being crowded down" ("Elements of Political Economy," p. 266). In the case of the great majority of the underpaid, however, both the spirit and the power of adequate

resistance are wanting. The low-skilled workman "cannot organize because he is so poor, so ignorant, so weak. Because he is not organized he continues to be poor, ignorant, weak. Here is the great dilemma, of which whoever shall have found the key will have done much to solve the problems of poverty" (Hobson, "Problems of Poverty," p. 227).

There seems to be but one measure that gives any promise of anything like general efficacy, namely, the establishment by law of minimum rates of wages that will equal or approximate the normal standards of living for the different groups of workers. And the most effective method of introducing such legislation seems to be the minimum wage board. This is a board or committee composed in equal numbers of the employers and employes in a trade, together with one or more disinterested persons. No employer would be prevented from paying more than the rates fixed by the board, but every employer would be forbidden under legal penalties to pay less. It would seem that this device of minimum wage boards is not merely the only one that offers general relief, but would naturally fit in with and strengthen all partial measures, such as organization, good will and enlightened selfishness among the employers, restriction of immigration and industrial education. In fact, a great part of its efficacy would be derived from the cooperation of these partial remedies. On the other hand, the latter can never become active, vital, or effective until they are preceded by the establishment of minimum wage boards.

The objections to this proposal are numerous, but not nearly so formidable as they appear to the average person. In the first place, legal regulation of wages probably strikes most Americans as exceedingly novel, if not revolutionary. Our national constitution was drawn up, our political institutions organized and our theories of the sphere of legislation formed and developed under the influence of a philosophy which regarded men as equal not only juridically and politically, but as approximately equal physically and intellectually. The founders of our government believed that if all class privileges and all economic favoritism were abolished, if the legal restraints upon industry, which had by that time become antiquated, were repealed, and if complete freedom of contract and of competition were substituted, every member of the community would be able to protect himself in the struggle with his equals, and all would be able to pursue and attain an ample degree of welfare. In a word, our economic life and its relations to the state were, from the beginning of our national existence, dominated by the theory of *laissez faire*, the theory that social and individual welfare would be best promoted by a policy under which the state should not interfere in the affairs of industry except to prevent fraud, violence or theft. Before long, however, the people found that the complacent expectations built upon this theory were not realized; that the forces of supply and demand did not automatically promote either equality or humanity; that in the industrial

world men were unequal not only physically, as in the case of women and children against men, but economically, as in the case of the individual laborer against the individual employer, and the consumer against the monopolist. They realized that large sections of the population would continue to suffer grave hardship and injustice unless protection were obtained through legislation. Hence the enactment of laws regulating safety and sanitation in factories, laws fixing a minimum age for working children and a minimum working day for both women and children, laws in restraint of monopoly, and laws regulating the services and charges of public utility corporations.

Why should we hesitate to prevent by legislation the hardship, injustice and social waste due to freedom of contract in the matter of wages? Instead of opposing, historical precedent favors the method. Down to the latter part of the eighteenth century, wages in commercial and industrial employments had been in most cases fixed either by formal statutes and edicts, by the ordinances of quasi-legal corporations such as the medieval guilds, or by custom, which was as effective as law, and as little subject to the influence of free contract. Speaking generally, we may say that it is the present system, and not the method of regulating wages by law, that is an innovation. Nor does the legal determination of wages differ in principle from the other industrial legislation that we have already enacted. Every argument for the latter can be urged with at least equal force in favor of the former. In

both instances the law is designed to protect one section of the community against exploitation by another section. A wage that will enable the worker to live decently is as important and as necessary as protection to life, limb and vitality in the factory, or the safeguarding of his income from the extortionate prices of monopoly. All legislation is ultimately for the benefit of concrete human beings, and every law is justified which, without doing injustice to any class, brings a wider measure of justice to some class or classes of the community.

The second objection to be considered is that drawn from the National Constitution. Any attempt to regulate wages by law would seem to conflict with those constitutional provisions against the taking of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, against any abridgement of the privileges or immunities of any class of citizens. Probably if these provisions were interpreted in their widest and most general comprehension, as the tendency was formerly, they would be an effective bar to all legislation regulating age, hours, and wages, and even sanitation and safety, in so far as these measures were designed for the benefit of the workers alone. For all such legislation interferes with freedom of contract and is in favor of a special class. Hence Professor Adams observes that the labor laws that have been sustained by the American courts are "easiest explained and understood as a collection of exceptions to these general rules" ("Labor Problems," p. 464). The fundamental and

far-reaching principle upon which the courts have permitted most of these exceptions to and contraventions of the constitutional provisions above mentioned is the right and duty of the state to exercise its police power in the interest of the public health, especially of the weaker classes. Two observations by the U. S. Supreme Court are worth citing here, as indicating a departure from the earlier tendency, and a more enlightened and encouraging attitude. In its decision upholding the Utah eight-hour law for adult males in mines (the case of *Holden vs. Hardy*) the court declared that in dangerous or unhealthful employments, employer and employe "do not stand upon an equality"; that the laborers "are practically constrained to obey the rules laid down by the proprietors," and that in such cases "the legislature may properly interpose its authority" in the interest of the workers. This is a frank recognition of the fact that unlimited freedom of contract is not the unmixed good that it is assumed to be by the constitution and by our earlier political philosophy. Neither the public health nor the welfare of women or children was involved in this case, but the welfare and health of a class of male adults; yet the court decided that this species of class legislation, and this restriction of the right of free contract, were constitutional. In its opinion sustaining the ten-hour law for women in laundries (*Muller vs. Oregon*) the same court declared that "woman is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation destined for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is

not necessary for men and could not be sustained." Here is an implicit acceptance of an elementary but far-reaching principle of reason and common sense: while legislation should treat all individuals and classes equally in so far as they are equal, it ought just as surely to treat them unequally in those respects in which they are unequal. Nevertheless this elementary principle of proportional justice is at least verbally contradicted by the provision about class legislation in the national constitution. Under the influence of public opinion and a larger judicial outlook, this principle, and the principles noticed above in the Utah case, could very well be made to sustain minimum wage legislation. For the latter is as certainly, though not as obviously, required to secure genuine freedom of contract, and to protect the health and vitality of a class that is otherwise unable to protect itself, as an eight-hour law for men in mines and a ten-hour law for women in laundries. At any rate, the amendment of the constitution is not a physical impossibility, and is apparently inevitable if we are to obtain all the legislation demanded by our changed social and industrial conditions¹.

It is asserted, in the third place, that minimum wage laws could not be enforced. Undoubtedly they could not be enforced perfectly, but there is no sufficient reason to think that they would not be obeyed as fully

¹Since this paragraph was written the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld the minimum wage law of Oregon. This law applies, however, only to women and minors.

as the great majority of legal enactments. On the contrary, the proportion of the population desiring the enforcement of such legislation would be perhaps larger than in the case of most laws that are fairly well observed. The appeal to the failure of the old wage legislation in the eighteenth century is not valid; for, as Professor Adams points out, those regulations were established by an autocratic minority against the interests of the great majority for the maintenance of maximum instead of minimum rates of wages; and yet many of them were consistently enforced for centuries, until the landed gentry began to lose control of the government ("Labor Problems," p. 499). Today minimum wage legislation would be in favor of the majority, inaugurated and supported by the majority, and enforced by a sympathetic administration.

Finally we come to the most important objection, the one drawn from economic considerations. Those who urge this objection do not, as a rule, deny that the natural and technical resources of the country are sufficient to provide decent wages for the vast majority, and considerably more than this for the remainder of the population. All they contend is that the economic processes of production, exchange, distribution and consumption could not be so modified by the proposed legislation as to bring about this happy result. Specifically and in brief their argument is this: An increase in the wages of the underpaid in any given industry would cause an increase in the cost of production; increased cost of production would necessitate a rise

in the price of the product; the latter would be followed by a lessened demand, at least on the part of those consumers who were not also producers of the goods in question; and the diminished demand would either be balanced by an increased demand on the part of the laborers whose wages had been increased, or it would not thus be balanced. In the former hypothesis the workers would lose as consumers all that they had gained as producers; in the latter contingency, some of them would be thrown out of employment.

The objection looks formidable, but only because of its bold and easy assumptions and its evasion of the task of specific analysis. It is no more valid against a legal minimum wage than it is against any other measure that aims to benefit labor at the immediate and apparent expense of the employer. Every successful effort of a labor union to obtain more wages, shorter hours, or any other improvement in working conditions, and every legal regulation of factory conditions, of the length of the working day, or of the age of the working child, puts a new burden on the employer and tends to increase the cost of production and the price of the product. Consequently, if the objection were sound, the whole policy of trade unionism and all the achievements of labor legislation would have been futile and without benefit to the working classes. As a matter of fact, this argument has always been used against any interference with the freedom of contract between master and man, whether by legal or by trade union action. It was for many

years effectively urged both by the manufacturers and economists against the first proposals to limit the hours of labor and age of child employes in the English factories, something less than a century ago. If it had prevailed, English women would still be laboring as beasts of burden harnessed to carts in the depths of mines, children from five years upward would be toiling in the English factories sixteen and even eighteen hours a day under the lash of an overseer, English laborers of all classes would still be forbidden by law to organize for self-protection, the era of English wage slavery would have been prolonged in ever-increasing harshness to the present hour, and the degeneration of the city populations of England would have been infinitely greater than it has actually become (Cf. Gibbins, "Industry in England," pp. 391, sq.).

Experience has shown that the injurious results predicted by the opponents of labor legislation and labor organizations have not taken place. There has been no general increase in prices, nor any increase in any case that equaled the increase in wages or the expected increase in other items of the cost of production. In the majority of instances the greater part of the cost has been met by an increased efficiency in the productive process, that is, in labor, in machinery, and in the combination of these two factors. Another part has come out of the profits of those concerns that were obtaining more than the usual amount of interest on their investment. Precisely the same forces would operate in those industries in which wages would be

raised by law to a decent level. It is not, indeed, true that every increase in wages will be followed by an equivalent increase in productive efficiency, so that all the added cost of production will be provided by the workers themselves, or by the workers in conjunction with better technical processes. This will happen in some cases, but no general rule can be formulated to indicate when it will happen (Cf. Hobson, "The Evolution of Modern Capitalism," chap. xiv, new ed.). It seems quite probable, however, that where the increase in wages is merely sufficient to raise the worker from a condition of sub-normal to one of normal physical efficiency, the greater part of the additional wages will be available in the form of a larger product. In other words, the underfed, under-clothed and underhoused laborer, when brought up to the level of a normal standard of living, is able to create most of the difference between starvation wages and the remuneration necessary to maintain the normal standard. The greater part of the remaining cost of the higher wages would probably come through the substitution of machinery for hand labor, and of better machinery for antiquated processes; through the elimination of the less efficient directors of industry, and the better organization of the productive forces; and through a reduction of the returns on monopolistic capital, and on capital that would suffer such a reduction rather than take flight into other industries. Nevertheless it is overwhelmingly probable that some of the additional wage cost would in some of the in-

industries be transferred to the product in the form of higher prices.

How large this increase in prices would be cannot be determined even approximately. Obviously it would differ in different industries. The one general statement that seems to be fairly safe is that the total increase in prices in all the industries affected would be less than half the total increase in wages. Consequently, even if the laborers themselves were the sole consumers of their products, they would gain in wages much more than they would lose on account of the higher prices that they would be obliged to pay as consumers. In most industries, however, the workers would consume only a small fraction of the goods of which they are the producers. By far the greater part would be, as now, consumed by persons not connected with the industry. Now, it is morally certain that the latter would not buy as much as they formerly did of the goods upon which the price was raised. On the other hand, it is no less certain that they would not reduce their demand in exact proportion to the rise in the price. In other words, they would as a body pay out a larger sum total for the purchase of these goods than they had paid formerly. Some of them, indeed, would take just as much of the goods as before; others would take somewhat less, but would still expend a larger sum total; while others would reduce their purchases by an amount fully equivalent to the increased price. The net result, therefore, is twofold; first, a part of the increased wage

cost would be defrayed by consumers not engaged in the industry, but whose remuneration was not affected by the operation of the minimum wage law; and, second, there would be some falling off in the combined demand for goods by these two classes of consumers. Consequently, it would seem that this decrease in demand must lead to a smaller amount of employment in some of the industries affected by the minimum wage legislation.

This inference, however, is fallacious, inasmuch as it leaves out of account the increased purchasing power of the workers whose wages would be raised. The latter would create a new demand for the products of the affected industries in two ways; directly, because the benefited workers would expend part of their increased remuneration for these products, and indirectly, since their increased demand for the products of other industries would increase the purchasing power of those employed in the latter, part of which would be exchanged for the products of the workers in the industries affected by the minimum wage regulation. So many factors and so many elements of prophecy are involved in the problem that the net result as to employment cannot be foretold with any degree of confidence. Nevertheless, experience, analogy and all the available indications would seem to justify the assertion that the sum total of employment, both within and without the affected industries, would not necessarily be diminished, and would not improbably be increased.

Even if some of the workers should be thrown out of employment the general social effect would be good.

The number of workers who would be able to fit their children for and to raise themselves into higher occupations would be increased, while the social cost of lessened vitality and of various forms of dependence among those actually employed would be greatly diminished. Most important of all, an increase in unemployment arising out of a legal regulation of wages would force the state to face squarely and in a comprehensive way the whole problem of the unemployed and the unemployable. To this we shall have to come sooner or later, and the sooner the better. We need public labor exchanges for an adequate adjustment of supply to demand in place and time, labor colonies for those who can but will not work effectively, and employment in public enterprises for those who cannot be taken care of by the other two methods. If all these measures combined should fall short of complete effectiveness, both individual and social welfare would suggest that the state should support some of the laboring class in idleness rather than permit anyone of average efficiency to work for less than living wages.

In this, as in all other cases where there is question of the solution of a social problem, an ounce of fact is worth a pound of theory. Unfortunately we have as yet no sufficient amount of facts, in the sense of experience, to afford as much guidance. What we have, however, is distinctly favorable. The compulsory arbitration laws of New Zealand and of some of the Australian states embody the principle of a legal

minimum wage, inasmuch as the rates fixed by the arbitration courts are the lowest that any employer is permitted to pay throughout the trade involved in the dispute and the award. Despite their limitations, these laws have been successful not only in securing industrial peace, but in maintaining decent wages in all the trades affected. This is the verdict of all impartial observers. Victoria, Australia, has had minimum wage boards since 1896. They consist of two groups, numerically equal, chosen from among the employers and employes in an industry, together with a chairman elected by both these groups or appointed by the governor. At the beginning there were only six boards, but the number has increased steadily until it has reached thirty-eight or more. Eleven of these have been established at the request of employers. Since 1904 the boards are forbidden to fix higher rates than those paid by the reputable employers in a trade. Workers who fall below the average in speed or efficiency can obtain permits to work for less than the legal minimum, but the number of these must never be greater than one in five in any establishment. There is a court of appeals to which the decisions of the boards may be taken for revision.

This Victorian scheme was inaugurated during a period of business depression, and has since been tested by good times and moderately good times. Through an oversight of the legislature in 1902 the boards were deprived of legal authority, but so great was the dissatisfaction ensuing that the law was quickly re-

enacted. Among the beneficial effects of the boards enumerated by Mr. Macrosty, an impartial witness, are: A better organization of industrial factors and processes, no rise of prices to the consumer, and an increase of both wages and employment in dull times, as compared with the trades in which no wage boards existed ("Trade Unions and Labor Problems," pp. 213-216). Another competent and fair observer, Dr Victor S. Clark, declares that "the wages of all female workers and of all adult male workers are higher in the trades affected by the boards; but the wages of boys and youths are higher in occupations free from government control" ("The Labor Movement in Australia," p. 148). Boys get higher pay in the unregulated trades because they do men's work there, while in the regulated trades the employment of juvenile labor is discouraged. The obvious and urgent remedy for this condition is to extend the operation of the boards to all trades, compel employers to pay boys and women men's wages for men's work, and provide some comprehensive plan of industrial training and apprenticeship. If, as is probable, the minimum wage legislation forces the state to take up the latter problem sooner than it would otherwise have acted, the legislation will have still another achievement to its credit. Dr. Clark's general conclusion is that no final judgment as to the value of the boards is now possible, that while the law has not eradicated the evils it was designed to meet, "nevertheless it appears to have mitigated them," and that "the workers themselves, who ought to be

the best judges, commend the effect of the act." Indeed, the minimum wage legislation is, according to the Report of the Select Committee on Home Work appointed by the British Parliament, "very largely and generally, if not universally, approved by the people of Australia." The tendency seems to be toward extending the law to all trades, and this is well; for its best effects cannot be obtained until it is applied universally, and systematic provision is made for the unemployed and unemployable. Dr. Clark declares that state responsibility for a living wage, which is implied in the Victorian legislation, "logically leads to the responsibility of the state for employment at that wage." So much is not necessarily included in the theory. On its face a law of this kind merely lays down the principle that all workers of average efficiency who are employed must be paid sufficient to maintain them in conditions of decent living, although this principle undoubtedly suggests that the state has an equivalent duty toward those of its citizens who cannot find employment. It is not, indeed, obliged to provide a livelihood for all its members directly, but it fails in one of its primary functions if it does not assure to them the conditions in which they can obtain a decent livelihood. If some of the population cannot obtain such conditions in private industry, they ought to be provided with public employment. For the right to live decently by one's labor is as important as the right to life and more important than the general right of property.

The Report of the Select Committee referred to

above, recommended the establishment of minimum wage boards for the protection of the home workers in Great Britain. In accordance with this recommendation Parliament passed an act which went into effect at the beginning of the present year. The constitution of the British boards is substantially the same as that of the boards in Victoria. Inasmuch as they are to apply only to home workers, who are the most helpless and the poorest paid of English laborers, the new experiment will have a distinct value. If it proves successful in even a moderate degree it will, in conjunction with the experience of Victoria, create an exceedingly strong presumption in favor of the universal value of minimum wage legislation.

Some who admit that minimum wage boards would effect considerable improvement in the conditions of the underpaid deny that they would prove an adequate remedy. Since the radical cause of insufficient wages is an excessive supply of unskilled labor, no measure will afford permanent relief that does not reduce this over-supply. Not even state employment of all who could not find work otherwise would be effective, for the latter would be unskilled laborers, and their product must, therefore, be thrown upon a market that is already overstocked with that class of goods. Hence, the only adequate remedies are limitation of offspring among the families of the unskilled, restriction of immigration, and universal industrial education. There is considerable force in these observations. Undoubtedly the fundamental evil is an excessive supply

of unskilled labor. Nevertheless, deliberate limitation of the size of families is delusive, immoral and socially demoralizing. Some restriction of immigration would no doubt be helpful and wise, and a comprehensive scheme of industrial education, which will not only increase the efficiency of the unskilled, but reduce their numbers by a leveling-up process, is a crying necessity. No advocate of minimum wage legislation contends that it would be all-sufficient. It must be supplemented by the measures advocated, by far-reaching provision for the unemployed and the unemployable, and by legislation that will prevent the exploitation of the consumer, and the limitation of opportunity, through monopoly and special privilege. Moreover, the adoption of most of these supplementary measures would be considerably hastened by the establishment and operation of minimum wage boards. The number and the grievances of the underpaid would be forced upon public attention, and the problem of devising adequate remedies would become a vital and urgent public question.

Since the foregoing was written, thirteen states of our country and the District of Columbia have enacted minimum wage laws. The legislation has become universal in Australia and New Zealand and has been extended to a very large proportion of the industries of Great Britain. A considerable beginning has also been made in Canada. This rapid development and application of the movement and measure have been mainly due to the favorable results of the law wherever it has been tried. It is no longer an experiment.

V

MORAL ASPECTS OF THE LABOR UNION

The purposes of the labor union are, briefly, two: to give pecuniary aid to members in time of sickness, accident or unemployment, and to secure better conditions of employment than would be possible if the men acted as individuals. The first of these aims is much the less important, and tends year by year to occupy an ever smaller place in labor union consciousness. Indeed, the mutual insurance feature must, as Sidney and Beatrice Webb observe, be regarded, "not as the end or object, but as one of the methods of Trade Unionism" ("Industrial Democracy," p. 165). The common funds of the association are used chiefly to support members who are out of work because of a strike or lockout. Thus the mutual insurance afforded is for the most part only against the necessity of accepting unfavorable terms from the employer. The first aim tends to become subordinate to the second, a mere means, a method of securing or retaining industrial advantages. Therefore, the justification of the labor union as an institution turns upon the morality of combining to get higher wages, shorter hours or other economic advantages, and of resisting the efforts of the employer to reduce the laborer's present position in any of these respects.

Laborers have a moral right to unite to obtain better terms from their employers if this action would

involve no injustice to either employer or consumer. They may, for example, rightly combine to get higher wages when these would not be unfair wages. But if they are at present receiving all the remuneration to which they are morally entitled their action is wrong and unjust. For men have no more right as an organization than as individuals to "better their condition" by causing other men to enter into an extortionate contract. What is true of wages applies also to the length of the working day and the other conditions of employment that are commonly at issue between master and man. Again, if the purpose of the organization be merely to enable its members to retain present advantages that are fair the union will be morally good. It will be unlawful only when the members enjoy conditions that are in excess of the requirements of justice. Hence, whether the union aims at making things better or preventing them from being made worse, it will be justifiable only on condition that its members have a right, as against either employers or consumers, to the object sought.

This reasoning assumes that there is an element of justice in the labor contract. Neither employer nor employe may exact from the other all that he can but only as much as is his right. Owing to the prevalence of false theories of politics and rights, this elementary truth has been, and still is, too frequently ignored. Professor Sidgwick confesses that during the greater part of the nineteenth century political economy as well as the business world assumed that a contract

made without force or fraud was generally a fair contract. This extraordinary theory of contractual justice would justify alike the starvation wages of the sweatshop and the extortionate prices of the most tyrannous monopoly. If it were sound, the question of the morality of labor union aims would be idle and irrelevant. Whatever the unions could obtain without fraud or force they would have a right to take. They could be condemned only on grounds of expediency. Happily there is in progress a very general reaction from this immoral doctrine, and almost all men now admit that there is a fair price and an unfair price for labor, as well as for all other goods that men buy and sell. The world is returning to the concept of "just price," which the economist, as Professor Ashley tells us, "has been accustomed to regard as quite out of place in political economy," but which in the ages of faith was elaborated with scientific precision and carried fairly well into practice throughout the Christian world. Interwoven with all the criticisms of labor unions is the assumption and frequently the explicit assertion that they are asking not merely what is unwise, but what is unjust.

Now it is the general belief of all classes of men, a small section of employers excepted, that the laborer of today receives less than his just share of wealth and opportunity. The organized struggle of the laboring classes, says John Graham Brooks, "assumes that the present competitive wage system does not bring justice to labor," and he adds that "our society is

full of extremely influential persons who say point blank that labor's protest is in the main a righteous one and should prevail" ("The Social Unrest," p. 154). In proof of the latter statement he quotes a large list of these "influential persons," beginning with Wagner, the composer, and ending with Leo XIII. Although the determination of the laborer's just share of economic and social goods is neither so simple nor so easy as is frequently assumed, the general conviction just mentioned is undoubtedly correct. Reference is had, of course, to the laboring class as a whole, not to a small, highly paid section; for it seems sufficiently clear that some groups of workmen receive at present a wage that meets all the requirements of justice, and consequently that any attempt on their part, whether by organization or otherwise, to exact more favorable conditions would be an act of injustice. Even in the case of these, however, the labor union will usually be necessary in order that effectual resistance may be offered to those forces that tend to reduce the position of labor below an equitable level.

In order to realize these aims the labor union is not only justified but indispensable. Unbiased and well-informed men no longer accept the complacent and utterly gratuitous theory of Bastiat and his school concerning the beautiful compensations and harmonies of unlimited competition. Natural economic forces do not tend automatically and inevitably to a continuous betterment of the position of the laborer. It has been proved by abundant and bitter experience

that the unchecked tendencies of the industrial world all point in the opposite direction. So conservative a writer as the late Francis A. Walker declared almost thirty years ago that there was no virtue, no tendency even, in strictly industrial forces to make good the loss caused by specific instances of unemployment, wage reductions or other labor misfortunes (see "The Wages Question," chap. iv). Fifteen years later we find him writing: "Nothing, economically speaking, can save industrial society from progressive degradation except the spirit and power of the working classes to resist being crowded down" ("Elementary Course in Political Economy," p. 266). The fact is that, instead of being endowed with the fatalistic character that is still too frequently attributed to them, economic forces are for the most part created and controlled by the human beings that compose economic society; and if the laborer leaves their direction entirely in the hands of the consumer and the employer, his economic position must grow steadily worse. The consumer generally cares only for cheap goods, and even with the best intentions cannot, merely as a consumer, do much to check this tendency. The majority of employers are neither sufficiently benevolent, sufficiently far-sighted, nor, in a regime of sharp competition, sufficiently powerful to afford the laborer adequate protection. No entire class or industrial grade of laborers has ever secured or retained any important economic advantage except by its own aggressiveness and its own powers of resistance, brought to bear upon

employer through the medium of force (economic) or fear. It is not denied that individual employers have voluntarily bettered the condition of their employes, or willingly refrained from making it worse; but these instances are exceptions and, considering the whole number of employers and the entire history of the wage system, rare exceptions. Now it is obvious that the alertness, the aggressiveness, to seize and make the most of opportunities for advancement, the energy and power to resist being crowded down, can be made efficacious only when crystallized in organizations. This *a priori* expectation has been realized in experience. The labor union has secured large gains not only for the employes of single establishments but for entire groups of workers, and it has probably been even more effectual in preventing losses. To quote the United States Industrial Commission: "An overwhelming preponderance of testimony before the Industrial Commission indicates that the organization of labor has resulted in a marked improvement in the economic condition of the workers. . . . And it is regarded by several witnesses as an influence of great importance in moderating the severity of depression and diminishing its length" ("Final Report of the Industrial Commission," pp. 802, 804).

1. *The Strike*.—Both in its general effects upon the community and in the place that it occupies in the minds of workingmen, this is the most important of labor union methods. Even when it is carried on

without violation of the rights of any one, it usually causes losses more or less grave to employer, employe and the general public. It has, moreover, a strong tendency to foment the passions of anger and hatred, and it puts before the workers temptations to physical force that cannot easily be resisted. In view of these facts, common-sense and respect for the moral law dictate that a strike should not be resorted to unless three conditions are verified, namely: that a peaceful solution of the difficulty has been found ineffective, that the grievance is great in proportion to the inconveniences that are liable to result, and that there is a reasonable hope that the strike will be successful. Of course it is always understood that the strike is on behalf of some advantage to which the laborers have a right. Where any one of these conditions is wanting, the calling of a strike will be unjustifiable and immoral.

Two of the subordinate methods—subordinate because in nearly all cases incident to the strike—that are sometimes employed by union workmen (and others likewise) are violence and the sympathetic strike. Concerning the prevalence of the former practice, there is a great deal of exaggeration in the public press, and especially in the statements of some employers. For example, the executive committee of the "Citizens' Industrial Association" asserted a few years ago that within the last few years "the cases are innumerable in which workingmen have been disabled and murdered." If words are to be accepted in their ordinary sense, this assertion is

simply false. John Mitchell maintains that the amount of violence in strikes is infinitesimal when compared with that which attends the ordinary course of life. "After all, violence is a less common accompaniment of labor disputes than is often supposed" ("Final Report of Industrial Commission," p. 879). Within recent years there has been a considerable improvement in this matter—an improvement both in the attitude of the leaders and in the conduct of the workers. Nevertheless, it seems to be even now true to say that the use of physical force in strikes is not of the nature of a rare exception. The conclusion seems reasonable that a large proportion of workingmen believe that they have a moral right to use this method both against the intractable employer and against the laborers who would take their places. They seem to claim a certain "right to their jobs." They quit these with the expectation of resuming them when their demands shall have been conceded, and they seem to hold that the employer and the so-called "scab" are in the position of men attempting to deprive them of their rights. They conclude, therefore, that they are justified in meeting this aggression with the weapons of might, just as they would resist an attack on their persons or property by robbers.

In this claim which we suppose the laborer to make there are two distinct issues which, though often found together, are separable both in logic and in the world of reality. The first is the laborer's right to his job, while the second is his right to just conditions of

employment. The latter right can exist in the absence of the former, and both might be valid without conferring on the laborer the right to defend them by force. Moreover, it is clear that even though there be no such thing as a right to a job, both the employer who discharges his men without just cause and the workers who strike without a real grievance will be guilty of violating charity.

Does the laborer possess this so-called right to his job? The question, of course, concerns moral, not legal rights. The Abbé Naudet strongly maintains that such a right exists in the case of skilled laborers. These men have spent a considerable time in learning their present trade and cannot readily become acquainted with another equally remunerative. The civil law should guarantee them a right to their avocation (*propriété de la profession*) similar to that which the officer enjoys with regard to his rank in the army. The skilled laborer performs, after a costly apprenticeship, a duty to society, and in return has a right to receive adequate protection in his position ("Propriété, Capital, et Travail," pp. 383-390). The Abbé Naudet would vindicate this right of the skilled man as against the unskilled, even in the case of a job for which both are competing and which neither has previously held. Whatever may be said about this particular class, the reasons for asserting that *some* workmen have a right to remain in their present employment as long as they conduct themselves reasonably are much stronger than is commonly assumed. And they are based not

merely on the principles of social or legal justice, but have to do with the justice that exists between men as individuals. Here is a laborer with a family and owning, perhaps, the home in which he lives. If he loses his present position, he must either accept a much less remunerative job or leave the city. Certainly it seems in accordance with not only the spirit, but the accepted principles of justice to say that if this man is discharged without reasonable cause the injury done him amounts to a violation of his rights. There is, indeed, no obligation issuing immediately either from the natural law or the wage contract binding the employer to keep this particular man on his pay roll, but such an obligation seems to flow mediately from the conjunction of law and contract. The laborer has a natural right to enjoy reasonable conditions of existence. This abstract right takes, on the occasion of the wage contract, the concrete form of a right to reasonable security of position, as well as a right to fair wages. If we compare the right thus claimed with the right of the first occupant to a given portion of land, we shall see that it is not essentially different from or essentially inferior to the latter. The first arrival on a piece of land has, in common with other men, a natural right to live from the produce of the earth, and, as a corollary of this, a right to hold a portion of the earth as his private property. But he has no immediate natural right to the *particular section* of the earth that he has seized. There is nothing in the nature of this land nor in his own nature which would dictate that he should

have it rather than his neighbor, who arrived a little later. How comes it, then, that, according to all Catholic moralists and the practically unanimous usage of all peoples, the land belongs to the first comer rather than to the second? Simply because this arrangement is reasonable. The indeterminate, general and abstract right which by nature every man has to private property must, if men are to live rationally together, become determinate, particular and concrete in some reasonable way; and one of the reasonable ways is by assigning validity and sacredness to the contingent fact of first occupancy. On precisely the same principles the laborer that we are considering seems to have a right to his job. His indeterminate and abstract right to private property in the goods that are essential to right living is for the present converted into the determinate and concrete right to fair wages from this particular employer, and it would seem that the latter right is not properly and reasonably safeguarded, does not, indeed, contain all that is involved in the right to a reasonable living, unless it includes the further right to continue to receive these wages as long as he honestly earns them and the employer is able to pay them. True, there is nothing in the nature of things to suggest or require that John Jones should continue to employ John Smith, but neither is there anything in the nature of things obliging John Brown to recognize the right of John White to a particular piece of land. What the natural law and natural justice obliges Brown to respect is White's right to some private

property; and through the contingent fact of first occupancy this general right has been transformed into the particular right in question. Similarly, the right of John Smith to the private property that is necessary for reasonable life has been transformed into the right to a particular job. Both rights are finally determined and in a sense created by contingent facts, which derive their entire moral and juridical value from the circumstance that they afford a reasonable method of concreting and safeguarding individual rights.

Hasty and unqualified denials of the right to a job are usually based on the assumption that a contract cannot give rise to any obligation of justice that is not expressly set down in the contract itself. If this theory were true, the employer would be bound to pay a living wage only when he had agreed to do so. The fact is that special relations—mere propinquity of various kinds—create special obligations, not merely of charity, but of justice. Americans have duties of justice to one another that they do not owe to foreigners. Brown is obliged to recognize White's right to a definite portion of a newly discovered territory because the latter is already in possession, but he may take any other part of the land that he chooses, regardless of the wishes of Green, who has not yet arrived; Jones is obliged to protect Smith's right to a decent living by paying him a living wage, but he is not obliged to do likewise with respect to Johnson, who is not in his employ. In the use of his faculties and of the goods of the earth, every man is bound in justice to respect

the rights of every other living soul, which means in the concrete relations of life, not that he is to concern himself about the rights of all mankind in precisely the same degree—to refrain, for example, from occupying a tract of land because somewhere on the globe there exists a fellow-man whose property rights are unrealized—but it means that he is to give special attention to the claims of those with whom he comes into immediate contact, and whose rights, consequently, are more directly affected and more likely to be violated by his conduct. Propinquity in a hundred ways creates, fixes and limits men's concrete rights because only in this way can indeterminate and conflicting claims be reconciled. The reasonable conclusion from this long discussion seems to be that men who are performing their tasks efficiently and to whom discharge will bring very grave inconvenience have a right to their jobs that differs in degree only from the right to a living wage and the right to land because of first occupancy.

From this principle it follows that the employer has a corresponding right to the services of his employes as long as he treats them justly. They do him an injustice if they leave him without a reasonable cause. A sufficient reason would be, for example, the desire to remove to another locality, or to get better wages at some other kind of work. In large establishments, however, changes of this nature would usually be made by the men individually and at different times, and consequently would not cause the employer serious

inconvenience. It very seldom happens that the entire group of men in a given business quit their employer in a body with a view to getting employment elsewhere. Almost always their intention is to get back the old jobs when they shall have secured some advantage. Assuming that they have no just grievance, the loss inflicted on the employer by this interruption of work will in itself constitute an act of injustice. The reason that the employer has, within the limits indicated, a right to the continued services of his men is precisely the same as that on which rests the right of employes, also within due limits, to their jobs, namely, the right to the requisites of reasonable living, as modified by the facts of relationship and environment. In view of these considerations it would seem that Carroll D. Wright was mistaken when he declared, with reference to a miner who had been wantonly discharged, that employes have not only a legal but a moral right to quit work whenever they choose, and that the employer enjoys the corresponding right arbitrarily to dismiss.

The second assumption upon which strikers sometimes seem to base a right to use violence is the right to just conditions of employment. We have said that this right could exist even in the absence of the right to a job. But the question naturally arises, and is in fact often asked: How can this right, which is in a general way valid, have any bearing on the positions that the strikers have vacated, or affect in any way a man who is no longer their employer? They must try to secure their rights in a wage contract with

someone else, since their former master has no further relations with nor obligations to them. The answer to this presentation of the matter is that it is too simple, too theoretical to represent the facts of actual life. Few, indeed, are the strikes in which there is such a complete severance of the old wage relations. Even in the case of strikes that fail the great majority of the workers involved usually go back to their former places. New men are not taken in sufficient numbers to carry on the work alone, and not all of them are retained permanently. Some of them, indeed, never intended to remain beyond the strike period, nor does the employer desire them any longer. These are the "professional strike breakers," men of great animal courage and recklessness, whose character and antecedents make them unsuitable as permanent employes. Of course these men are not engaged in every strike, nor do they ever form more than a small minority of those taking the places of the strikers. At any rate, the general fact is that both employer and strikers fully expect that the great majority of the latter will finally get back their old jobs; consequently the effort of the employer is in *the concrete* an attempt to compel the men to return to work on his terms. If these terms are unjust, the employer and those who cooperate with him by taking the places of the former employes are in very fact engaged in an attack on the rights of at least as many of the latter as will resume their old jobs.

In these cases, and *a fortiori* on the assumption that

the men have a right to their places, are not the employer and the new workers acting the part of unjust aggressors, whom it is licit, within due limits, to resist by force? This is the question that many laborers seem to answer in the affirmative. The Abbé Pottier would turn the problem over to wiser minds, but declares that the use of force will certainly not be justifiable unless three conditions are verified, namely: that there be no less objectionable means by which the strikers can obtain justice; that this particular means be efficacious, and that the good to be derived from it be great and certain in proportion to the evils that will ensue ("De Jure et Justitia," pp. 208, 209). In America, at any rate, the last condition is never realized. The wrongs endured by labor are insignificant when compared with the disorders that would follow any recognition of the claim that violence is lawful in justifiable strikes. That the state does not, or cannot, protect the laborer's natural right to a living wage, just as it protects his right to security of life, limb and property, is to be regretted, but the private use of force to defend the former would bring about a condition of veritable anarchy. It would be equivalent to a rebellion against existing political institutions, and consequently could be justified only in the conditions that justify rebellion. Now, conditions of this force and magnitude are most certainly not created by either the exactions of capital or the sufferings of labor. Evils of equal importance are tolerated by the law in every civilized society, yet no one maintains that they

ought to be abolished by private violence. The use of it to redress the grievances of labor cannot be too severely condemned.

The sympathetic strike is of two kinds—against another employer than the one concerned in the original dispute, or against the latter by a section of his employes having no personal grievance. An example of the first occurs when brickmakers quit work because their employer persists in furnishing material to a building contractor whose men are on strike. Their sole purpose is to embarrass the contractor and compel him to concede the demands of his own employes. It is, of course, clear that the brickmakers have committed an act of injustice if they have violated a contract requiring them to remain at work for a definite period. Even in the absence of any contract, their action will be, generally speaking, contrary to the law of charity and likewise contrary to justice. It is in violation of charity because it shows a want of Christian consideration for the welfare of the innocent employer, and it sins against justice because it inflicts upon him a grave loss without sufficient reason. As stated above, employer and employe are too intimately dependent upon each other in the realization of their natural rights to make *arbitrary* severance of their relations consistent with justice. Employes have no right to cause their employer to suffer on behalf of men who are mistreated by some one else. No doubt there are extreme cases in which the outside employer is bound in charity to assist strikers by refraining from doing

business with the man against whom they have struck, but these are rare. On the other hand, when the sympathetic strike affects only the employer concerned in the original strike, it will sometimes be not merely licit, but laudable. For example, if the "common laborers" in a business have quit work on account of oppressive conditions, the skilled workers might do a good action by striking on behalf of their fellow-employees. The obligations owed by the skilled men to their employer would yield before the claims of the laborers whom he is treating unjustly. Their position is analogous to that of one nation extending aid to another in resisting the unjust aggressions of a third. The case of France assisting the American colonists to throw off the yoke of England furnishes a good example. The obligation of remaining at peace with the oppressive nation does not extend so far as to render illicit all sympathetic action. Similarly, a disinterested spectator may come to the relief of a weak man who is suffering at the hands of a strong one. The case for the sympathetic strike becomes clearer when we remember that a single labor union frequently includes men performing very dissimilar tasks. They agree to act as a unit in defending not only the rights and interests of the whole body, but those of every section of it. Hence a strike of all the employes of a given employer may be called to redress the grievances of a small proportion. If the cause is a just one, this action will usually be lawful and frequently commendable; for it is becoming more and more evident that only

by this means can the weaker laborers, the great army of the unskilled, obtain adequate protection.

2. *The Boycott*.—Although the boycott is usually begun on the occasion of a strike, it is frequently continued long after the strike has failed. It seems, therefore, worthy of a place among the labor union's primary methods. In essence it consists of a refusal to have business or social intercourse with a certain person or persons. If the cause on behalf of which it is instituted is just, it will, within due limits, likewise be just, provided that it is used solely against those who are acting unjustly. A distinguished Catholic prelate recommended a boycott some years ago when, in a sermon in his Cathedral, he asked the people not to patronize clothing manufacturers who had their goods made in "sweat shops." This would be a boycott entirely unconnected with a strike, and it would be justifiable in view of the intolerable conditions that he wished to remove. But the boycott must always be kept within the limits of fairness and charity. It must be free from all violence and threats of violence, and it must not be carried so far as to deny to the boycotted what the theologians call the "*communia signa charitatis*." By this phrase are meant those social acts that are dictated by the most fundamental of human relations—those manifestations and tokens of common humanity which man owes to his fellows, even to his deadliest enemy, from the simple fact that they *are* his fellows. Hence the boycott is carried to immoral lengths when it comprises a refusal to give or

to sell the necessaries of life, or any other action of equivalent harshness. With these reservations, and in a just cause, the boycott may become licit both against the unjust employer and against the workmen who will not strike or who take the strikers' places. Lehmkuhl says that laborers who are contending for a living wage may use *moral* force against workers that refuse to cooperate with them, to the extent of denying to the latter all except the fundamental forms of intercourse above described ("Theologia Moralis," vol. i, no. 1119). Mueller lays down the same principle ("Theologia Moralis," vol. ii, p. 594, 8th edition).

This is the "primary" boycott. There is another form, called by the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission the "secondary" boycott, and by the United States Industrial Commission the "compound" boycott, which consists in a refusal of intercourse with innocent third persons who are unwilling to join in the primary boycott. This form has been condemned by both of the bodies just mentioned, and rightly, for in all except extreme cases it constitutes an offense against Christian charity. To be sure, men may licitly persuade or try to persuade outsiders to assist them in a just boycott, but they go to an immoral excess when they unite to inflict inconvenience—often grave inconvenience—on those who refuse to be persuaded. This is the general rule; it is not denied that there may occur instances in which the obligation of disinterested persons to join in a laudable boycott would become so

grave and direct as to render them justly liable to the penalty of being themselves boycotted when they fail to discharge this obligation. The sweat shops, for example, to which reference was made above, might possibly become so degrading that the buyers of clothing would do right to withhold their patronage not only from the guilty manufacturers, but even from merchants who persisted in handling the sweat-shop goods. Cases of such gravity could, of course, occur but seldom. Moreover, when the utmost that the moral law will allow has been said in defense of the boycott, one all-important consideration remains, namely, that it is, like the strike, a dangerous and extreme method, should be employed only as a last resource, and then only with the greatest caution.

3. *The "Closed Shop."*—This phrase refers to the unionist policy of refusing to work with non-unionists. The "shop," that is to say, any establishment in which the union has got a foothold, is to be "closed" to all except the union's members, not "open" to all comers. The union wishes to organize all the workers in a trade, so that it will be in a better position to bargain with the employer. If this motive is not justifiable, the unionists, it is evident, sin against charity by attempting such compulsion toward their fellow-laborers. They offend against the rule which requires men to do unto each other as they would be done by—to treat one another as brothers. The unionist maintains that the ends that he seeks to attain are amply sufficient to justify the policy of the "closed shop."

Workingmen who refuse to join the union and yet work side by side with its members share the advantages that the union makes possible. They desire to reap where they have not sown. They, furthermore, frequently render impossible collective bargains between the union on one side and the employer on the other, because they are not amenable to union discipline. It is not fair that the union should be held responsible for the fidelity of men over whom it can have no effective control. Finally, the "open shop" is impossible, since it tends inevitably to become either all union or all non-union. There is constant bickering and ill feeling between the two classes, and, worst of all, the non-unionist too frequently allows the employer to use him as a lever to lower the conditions of the whole establishment or group. In a word, the demand that all shall join the union is made in the interests of self-protection. Now any one of these reasons would sometimes be sufficient to absolve the union from uncharitableness in its policy of the "closed shop." To what extent they are realized in the industrial world need not now be discussed, but it seems quite probable that one or more of them finds occasional application. We may say in a general way that the cause of unionism, which is the cause of labor, renders more or less necessary the organization of all workers. Still less does the method in question seem to be contrary to justice. Neither employer nor non-unionist can show that any right of his is violated by the mere fact that the unionist refuses to work with the latter.

Where the union is very strong, it is quite possible that this action will deprive the non-unionist of all opportunity of working, and consequently of earning a living. If, indeed, the refusal of the unionist were absolute—if he were to say to the non-unionist: "In no circumstances will I work with you," he would undoubtedly sin against justice. He would violate the non-unionist's right to live from the bounty of the earth, just as truly and as effectually as the owner of an island who should drive a shipwrecked voyager into the sea. As a matter of fact, the unionist does nothing of this kind; his refusal is conditional; he says in effect that if the non-unionist will not join the organization he shall not work, but this condition is sometimes reasonable. Then, even though the "closed shop" policy should deprive the non-unionist of all opportunity to work, the blame, so far as justice is concerned, should be placed on his own perverse will.

These are the general conclusions. They are evidently subject to some qualifications. For there are laborers whose unwillingness to join the union is due to weighty reasons of personal inconvenience, and not merely to a selfish desire to escape the burdens of unionism or to compete unfairly with the unionist. Again, it seems probable that many of the unions, as at present constituted and led, cannot be trusted to administer moderately and equitably the immense power that comes from complete unionization. This, however, is a question more of expediency than of rights. Undoubtedly the employer has the right to

oppose the "closed shop" so long as his action does not tend to force unjust conditions upon the laborer. Within the same limits the non-unionist has the right to keep himself aloof from the organization. The rights of all three, the employer, the non-unionist and the unionist, in this matter are not absolute, like the right to live, but are conditioned, first, by the consent of the other party whom it is desired to bring into the contract, and, second, by the effects that the intended action will have on the rights of others. These several rights have of late been the subject of much loose thinking and looser speaking. The legal and the moral rights of the non-unionist have been hopelessly confused. But, as John Mitchell pointed out a few years ago, the question is not legal but ethical; for there is no law on our statute books which forbids unionists to refuse to work with non-unionists, or to attempt by peaceable means to unionize any shop or trade. "The rights guaranteed to the non-unionist by the Constitution," which are so indignantly and patriotically proclaimed, have absolutely nothing to do with this question. Some of the attempts to set forth the moral rights involved are equally absurd. Very decidedly, the non-unionist has *not* the right to work when, where, how and for whom he pleases, and even if he had, it would not give him the right to compel the unionist to work beside him. A man has no more right to work when, where, how and for whom he pleases than he has to fire off his pistol when, where, how and at whom he pleases. No man

has "a right to do what he pleases with his own"—neither with his life, nor his faculties, nor his property, nor his labor, nor anything that is his. The non-unionist has no right to work for John Jones if the latter does not wish to hire him, nor, in general, to work in any circumstances involving the consent of others without having first obtained such consent. If one were to take seriously some of the hysterical denunciations of the "closed shop," one might be tempted to infer that this policy was entirely new to the world and in defiance of all the lessons and precedents of history. The truth is that it was enforced for centuries by the trade and craft guilds throughout Western Europe. Speaking of the charters obtained by the English craft guilds from Henry II, Ashley says: "The only definite provision was that no one within the town (sometimes within the district) should follow the craft unless he belonged to the guild. The right to force all other craftsmen to join the organization—Zunft-zwang, as the German writers call it—carried with it the right to impose conditions, to exercise some sort of supervision over those who joined" ("English Economic History," vol. i, p. 82). Imagine a modern labor union, say the Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Workers, clothed with this legal privilege! The non-unionist would be prevented not merely by the refusal of the unionist to work with him, but by the law of the land, from securing employment on any street railway in the country unless he became a member of the union. Yet this was the arrangement that arose and flourished

under the guidance and encouragement of the Catholic Church. And it was right. In those days men believed in the reign of law, in the doctrine of live and let live, in security of occupation for the honest worker, in preventing the selfish and irresponsible worker from injuring his fellows; and they knew nothing of that insane individualism that ends logically in the crushing out of the weak and the aggrandizement of the strong.

4. *The Limitation of Output.*—The unions are not infrequently accused of fixing an arbitrary limit to the amount of work per day that their members shall do or allow to be done in a given establishment. While this practice is not formally recognized or defended, there is a great deal of evidence tending to show that it is more general than labor leaders seem willing to acknowledge. Be this as it may, the morality of limiting a man's output depends entirely on the point at which the limit is placed. Indiscriminate condemnation of this method is just as unreasonable as indiscriminate condemnation of the strike, the boycott or the "closed shop." The unionist is charged with preventing the more efficient workmen from producing a greater amount than those of medium ability and with refusing to allow machinery to be operated at its highest capacity. His reply is that the exceptional man is welcome to turn out all the work that he pleases, and to get all the wages that he can, provided that his output is not made the standard for the majority. He complains that in a given trade, say bricklaying, the man of exceptional skill and quickness is often set as a

pacemaker. To equal what is for him an ordinary rate of speed, the efforts of all the others will have to be extraordinary. This is manifestly unfair. Workmen of average capacity—that is, the overwhelming majority—toiling day after day, should not be required to perform more than an average, normal day's work. They ought not to be expected to work continuously at the highest pitch of exertion of which they are capable, for this is to violate the laws and standards of nature. Man's fullest and most intense exertions were intended as a reserve for special emergencies, and the attempt to put them forth continuously means disease and premature decay. It is consequently inhuman and immoral. By all means let the exceptional man produce more and receive more than the others, but let him not be constituted the standard to which they are compelled to conform.

The unionist will sometimes admit that he hinders the most productive use of machinery, but his defense is that machines are frequently run at a speed that demands unreasonable activity and an unhealthful intensity of effort. This claim is true to a greater extent than most persons suspect. "Perhaps the most significant feature of modern industry is the increasing intensity of exertion, owing to the introduction of machinery and the minute division of labor. . . . The result is that the trade life of the workingman has been reduced in many industries" ("Final Report of United States Industrial Commission," p. 733). "I have seen in a New England factory," says John

Graham Brooks, "a machine working with such rapidity as to excite wonder that anyone could be induced to follow it nine hours a day. Upon inquiry the foreman told me how it had been managed. 'This invention,' he said, 'is hardly six months old; we saw that it would do so much more work that we had to be very careful in introducing it. We picked the man you see on it because he is one of our fastest. We found out what it could do before we put it into the room. Now they will all see what it will turn out when it is properly run.' 'Properly run' meant to him run at its very highest speed. This was the standard pressure to which all who worked it must submit" ("The Social Unrest," p. 191). In the chapter from which this extract is taken there is a mass of evidence sufficient to warrant the conclusion that running machinery at such a high speed as to demand from the tender the fullest exertion and intensity of which he is capable is the settled policy of a very large section of the owners of machinery. As Dr. Cunningham puts it: "There is a temptation to treat the machine as the main element in production and to make it the measure of what man ought to do instead of regarding the man as the first consideration and the machine as the instrument which helps him" ("The Use and Abuse of Money," p. 111). The result is that the machine tenders are worn out, useless, unable to retain their places at fifty and not unfrequently at forty-five. If the trade union or any other lawful social force can "restrict output" sufficiently to prevent this process

of slow murder, it will vindicate the moral law and confer a benefit upon society that will be felt not merely today but for all future ages. The purpose of machinery is to improve life, not to destroy it, and the unionist is right in so far as he insists that it shall not be perverted from its proper function. In one word, restriction of output is right when it strives to protect the worker against being compelled to perform more than a normal day's work; when it goes beyond this point it is unjustifiable and dishonest.

5. *The Limitation of Apprentices.*—Employers of skilled labor often complain that the unions will not allow them to train as many apprentices as the trade requires. The unionist replies: "They ask us to put in more apprentices when there is no shortage of workmen, when we can furnish first-rate men who are now out of work. That would mean that we were to help train new men to compete with our own members out of work" ("The Social Unrest," p. 5). The issue here drawn seems to be one of fact: Do or do not the unions allow a sufficient number of apprentices to be trained to meet the demand? If we look a little deeper, however, we shall find that we are confronted by two incomplete and therefore inaccurate statements of the same fact. The employer's real burden of complaint in some cases is that he cannot get enough apprentices to supply the demand that would exist if wages were lower, and wages would be lower if he could increase the supply. This contingency the unionist recognizes, fears and tries to prevent by shutting out some of those

who wish to enter the trade. He is probably quite willing to admit them in numbers sufficient to meet the demand at current wages, or at the higher wage to which he thinks he is entitled. The fundamental difference, then, between him and the employer in this matter seems to be one of wages. What, then, is to be said concerning the morality of the practice? Conformably to his theory that the skilled laborer has a right to the trade that he has learned, the Abbé Naudet maintains that the limitation of apprentices should be enforced by law ("Propriété, Capital, et Travail," pp. 388, 389). So far as the relations between himself and his employer are concerned, it would seem that the unionist is guilty of no injustice or uncharity in keeping down the number of apprentices, provided they are still sufficient to supply the needs of the trade at fair wages. In other words, the limitation should not go so far as to create a scarcity that would cause wages to become extortionate.

There is, however, another aspect of the question besides the relations between employer and employe. The more difficult the entrance to the higher trades the greater are the disadvantages endured by the great mass having no special skill—"the common laborers." "One result of the organization of the skilled trades," says Mr. J. A. Hobson, "has been to render it more difficult for outsiders to equip themselves for effective competition in a skilled trade. To some extent, at any rate, the skilled unions have limited the labor market in their trade. The inevitable result of this

has been to maintain a continual glut in the low-skilled labor market" ("The Problem of the Unemployed," p. 20). This glut would be relieved to some extent if the entrance to the skilled trades were unrestricted. For those remaining in the ranks of the unskilled would not be obliged to compete quite so sharply with one another. And those who were allowed to move up would receive a considerable benefit. In the skilled occupations the tendency would, of course, be downward, but they are for the most part fairly well organized and pretty well able to take care of themselves. Even after the influx of members consequent on the removal of restrictions they would be in a much better position than the great body below them. It is the almost complete helplessness of the latter that makes the "labor question" so threatening and so difficult of solution. The skilled workers, as a rule, receive tolerable justice, and do not constitute a serious problem. In view of these facts there seems to be an obligation of charity forbidding the skilled workers to render the elevation of their less fortunate fellows as difficult as they sometimes do by the limitation of apprentices.

6. *Tyranny and Dishonesty.*—These features of the labor movement cannot in the strict sense of the word be called methods, but they have attracted sufficient attention and criticism to deserve notice in any treatment of the morality of union practices and tendencies. A peculiarity of much discussion of the labor union is the amount of denunciation visited upon the walking delegate. He is regarded by many as the chief cause

of labor disturbances, while as a matter of fact he is merely the representative, the business agent, as he is called technically, of the union, appointed to execute its will, not clothed with the powers of an autocrat. Only in rare instances has he the power of his own motion to declare a strike or inaugurate any other movement of similar importance. Generally speaking, all his larger acts, tyrannical or otherwise, are the acts of the men whom he represents. He could not long retain his position were he to conduct himself with the lordly independence and indifference that is sometimes attributed to him. "For trade unions at large in the United States the walking delegate represents the opinion and will of his union more closely than most Congressmen represent the opinion and will of their constituents" ("The Social Unrest," p. 151). And he is absolutely necessary if the union is to attain its object of enabling a group of individuals to act as a unit in dealing with their employer. To eliminate him would be to eliminate the union. This, however, does not mean that some of the petty tyrannies practiced both by him and the privates in the ranks could not consistently with the welfare of the union be abolished. In the manner in which strikes are sometimes called and conducted; in the reckless, inconsiderate, even cruel use of the boycott; in the oppressive enforcement of the "closed shop" policy, hardships are inflicted on the employer, the laborer and the general public which cannot be adequately described except as mean advantages taken of temporary helplessness. Especially

is this true of the innocent third party, the customer or consumer, who is dependent both upon the union and the employer. Want of space forbids giving instances of such petty annoyances and injuries, but anyone who has come into actual and interested contact with the disputes between labor and capital knows that they are not isolated exceptions. It is a question not of any one definite method, but of a reprehensible habit of mind and will which finds numerous and various outlets for practical expression. The unionists make the mistake of enforcing a too rigid interpretation of their rights in circumstances where their opponents or their innocent dependents are peculiarly unable to help themselves. They—or some of them—should try to realize that even in war certain weapons and practices are tabooed by all civilized peoples; that the use of oppressive tactics by the employer does not justify them in retaliating in kind; that, in the words of the poet:

It is excellent

To have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous

To use it like a giant.

The charge of dishonesty is directed almost entirely against the leaders. Those who make this accusation oftenest could not, in all probability, name half a dozen among all the union leaders in the United States. It is safe to say that many of them have in mind only one man, the notorious Sam Parks. The fact seems to be that the proportion of labor leaders who

are dishonest is smaller than the proportion of dishonest politicians or dishonest public officials. Parks was, indeed, both unfaithful to his fellow unionists and extortionate in his dealings with employers. He misused the funds of the union, called strikes with a view to being paid for declaring them off, and in return for bribes allowed employers to hire non-unionists instead of unionists. Yet even he represented the will of the union, inasmuch as the majority of its members were not sufficiently vigilant and aggressive to depose him. "How was it possible for such a man to control absolutely his thousands of iron workers?" asked Ray Stannard Baker of a labor leader, and got this reply: "If you will explain how Croker bossed the Democratic party of New York—a party full of honest men—when every one knew he was grafting; how he collected money from the wealthy owners of the street railway companies, and gas companies, and from other prominent business men, I will explain how Parks gets his hold on the building trades" (*McClure's Magazine*, November, 1903). There is no reason in the nature of things why a labor leader should be proof against the temptation to misuse his power for private gain any more than there is reason to expect that a public official will always be scrupulously honest and faithful. Especially if, as Mr. Baker has shown to be true in the case of Parks, there are employers who prefer a dishonest labor leader. Mr. Baker maintains that some employers, particularly in the building trades, do not want honest walking delegates any more than they want honest building

inspectors. They bribe the latter in order to escape compliance with the civil law, and the former in order to circumvent their agreements with the union or to secure an unfair advantage over a rival employer. They have induced labor leaders to supplant with cheaper workers the men whom the leaders were sworn to serve, and to foment strikes against competitors. Mr. Baker makes the latter charge against the Fuller Construction Company, "the trust of the New York building trades," whose buildings somehow went up without interruption during the big lockout a few years ago. Walking delegates of the type of Parks and Murphy deserve all the denunciation that they have received, but it must be remembered that not all their offenses were acts of brutal extortion. They made other dishonest contracts with employers—contracts which required a willing bribe-giver as well as a bribe-taker. If the case of these men stood on a bad eminence of complete isolation, it could be dismissed as unworthy of much attention, but unfortunately it seems to be merely one in a system that will not easily or quickly disappear. It is not reasonable to expect that men who will bribe a public official should hesitate about bribing the agent of a labor union. And, as already noted, we ought not to expect a higher grade of honesty from the representatives of labor than from the representatives of the general public. In the words of District Attorney Jerome: "This corruption in the labor unions is merely a reflection of what we find in public life—and this cor-

ruption in public life is merely a reflection of the sordidness of private life."

7. *Excessive Demands*.—A large number of the friends of labor are tempted to oppose the whole labor movement because of what seem to them unreasonable demands for higher wages and shorter hours. They complain that the unions very frequently show a disposition to take all that they can get, regardless of considerations of justice, and an utter indifference to the welfare of the consumer. Now, it is beyond reasonable doubt that unfair conditions have been demanded and obtained by some unionists. For just as there is a wage that is too low to be equitable, so is there one that is too high. Laborers have no more right to force wages indefinitely up than employers have a right to force them indefinitely down. Very few laborers seem to realize that a limit to the material advancement of the great majority of them has been fixed, not only by justice, but by the country's resources. In the present state of the arts of production and of the productiveness of nature, it is absolutely impossible that all Americans, or even a bare majority, should be provided with annual trips to Europe, automobiles or palatial dwellings; or even with long vacations, a horse and carriage and a piano. After the primary wants of all had been supplied—which is very far from being true at present—there would not be enough of these secondary goods to go round. In the most equitable scheme of distribution practicable they would have to be reserved for a minority comprising two classes: those who could make

the best use of such superfluities, and those whose social services are so important that they can demand and receive from society an exceptional remuneration. This is not to imply that all who at present enjoy these things fall into either of these classes. We are not now concerned with the inequalities of the existing distribution, but with the indestructible and undeniable fact that the physical impossibility of an indefinite improvement in the condition of the mass of laborers renders the claim to such advancement ethically invalid. Consequently they ought not to indulge in vain expectations nor talk glibly about rights that have no foundation in reality. In spite of these general truths the difficulty of determining the upper limit of fair wages for any concrete group of laborers is so great as to compel a prudent moralist to pause before attempting to estimate it in dollars and cents. All fair-minded men admit that the laborer has a right to a wage sufficient to maintain himself and family in the conditions of a comfortable, reasonable and moral life, and that this minimum varies for different classes, in accordance with the nature of their work and the standard of life to which they have been accustomed. But this is merely an irreducible moral minimum; it is not necessarily the full measure of complete justice. To deny this is to assume that of all the classes of the population, laborers only have not the right to use their power of entering into advantageous contracts—in their case, wage contracts—for the purpose of obtaining a higher standard of living. This position would scarcely be maintained

by any moralist of authority. Consequently those persons who assert that the unions have demanded more than is just would probably find it difficult to prove this assertion in more than an insignificant minority of instances. And this minority is undoubtedly smaller in proportion than the number of employers who receive excessive interest or excessive profits.

There seems to be a large amount of truth in the charge that the unions are frequently indifferent to the welfare of the consumer. A particularly flagrant type is described by Ray Stannard Baker in *McClure's Magazine* for September, 1903. Certain employers' and employes' associations in Chicago entered into an agreement which prevented the laborers concerned from working for anyone who was not a member of the employers' association. On the other hand, the employers bound themselves not to hire anyone not belonging to the association of laborers. The result was a monopoly more thorough than any combination of laborers alone or of employers alone. And they seem to have used their power to exact both unfair wages and unfair profits, the excess being charged to the consumer. Similar combinations, though not so oppressive nor so strong, exist elsewhere. And yet anyone who is acquainted with the industrial history of the last century is bound to acknowledge that the consumer is only receiving a modicum of poetic justice. During the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century the whole organization of industry was directed to the

supreme end of producing cheap goods. The human beings who produced the goods were almost entirely ignored by that portion of the community that is somewhat vaguely described as "the general public." "Cotton is already twopence a yard or lower, and yet bare backs were never more numerous among us. Let men cease to spend their existence incessantly contriving how cotton can be made cheaper, and try to invent, a little, how cotton at its present cheapness could be somewhat justlier divided among us." Thus Carlyle, in that passage in "Past and Present" which contains his merciless castigation of the Gospel of Mammonism and Competition, as it was preached and practiced in the England of his day. Indeed, the gospel of cheap goods is still somewhat widely practiced, for example, in the sweat shops of our great cities and in the cotton mills of the Southern States. At any rate, the consumer stands in no immediate or grave danger. Long before his exploitation by the labor unions—either singly or in combination with employers—becomes general, the state will undoubtedly resume a function that it should never have abdicated, namely, that of limiting the power of either labor or capital to exact extortionate prices. In this respect they managed things better in the Middle Ages. To quote Ashley: "Then, again, it is the merit of the guild system that it did for a time, and in a large measure, succeed in reconciling the interests of consumers and producers. The tendency of modern competition is to sacrifice the producers; to assume that so long as articles are pro-

duced cheaply, it hardly matters what the remuneration of the workmen may be; but the guild legislation kept steadily before itself the ideal of combining good quality and a price that was fair to the consumer, with a fitting remuneration to the workman" ("English Economic History," vol. ii, pp. 168, 169).

The unfavorable criticisms of the labor union which have been so frequent of late come mostly from employers who hold a partisan theory of the wage contract, or from public speakers and writers who cling to a false theory of individual freedom. Representatives of the former class seem to let pass no opportunity for denouncing the infringement of their rights committed by the unions that insist on the "closed shop," the limitation of apprentices and similar practices; and they seem to believe in their assertions. A good example of this habit of mind is seen in a speech made by the toastmaster of a banquet held by the Building Contractors' Association in Chicago: "It is ridiculous to think that you should be obliged to waste your time discussing your rights with walking delegates, business agents and labor leaders. You have your rights, and no man should be able to step in and dictate to you and tell you where your rights begin and end." Employers of this type are very fond of the word "dictate" in condemning the attempt of the unionist to lay down conditions without which he will not enter the wage contract; whereas the simple truth—self-evident to all except the prejudiced—is that in a two-sided contract, such as that between

employer and employe, every condition, concomitant and consequence that affects both parties should in all reason and justice be determined by both parties. The non-unionist who says to his employer: "Unless you give me a rise in wages I will not work for you any longer," is just as truly and as effectively "dictating" as the unionist who says: "I will not continue in your employ if you hire men that do not belong to the union." The same remark applies to about every other condition that the union regularly insists upon; and the employer has no more right or reason to assume that his employes should have no voice in the determination of these conditions than that they should have no voice in fixing the rate of wages. He would be incensed—and rightly—if they should refuse to hear any objection that he might have to the "closed shop," and should take the position that any attempt to induce them to concede this point, or even to discuss the question, constituted an attack on their "sacred right to work under whatever conditions they pleased." Yet this contention of the laborers would be no more tyrannical, unjust or unreasonable than the employer's assumption that any attempt to secure or to discuss the "closed shop" is an invasion of his right to "manage his business as he pleases."

One potent cause of this unreasonable position is the fact that many of the conditions of employment which the unionist now insists on helping to determine have until recently been under the exclusive control of the employers. Very naturally many of the latter do not

take kindly to the relinquishment of powers which they had come to regard as rights. In the beginning they opposed the union as such because its officials "interfered" between them and their own employes; now they object to the unions "going beyond their proper sphere." Mr. John Graham Brooks says that employers spoke very friendly words before the Industrial Commission concerning the right of labor to organize and the usefulness of the unions, "when they kept to their proper business, . . . but the labor organization which most employers approve is a docile, mutual benefit association. It is a trade union that makes no trouble for them. The actual trade union which exists to maintain what it believes to be its group rights, to make its bargains collectively and to struggle for every advantage it can get, few employers would tolerate an instant if they could avoid it" ("The Social Unrest," p. 37). The explanation of this attitude is, of course, to be found partly in the desire for gain, but it is to a large extent due to the desire for power, "the passion for masterhood," which in days gone by kept the serf in subjection to the lord and the slave in subjection to the master, and which still shuts out the negro from all but menial occupations. Consciously or unconsciously, too, many employers continue to regard the laborer as the lord looked upon the serf—a being of a lower order who was not qualified and should not presume to have a great deal to say in shaping the relations between himself and his master. The instinct of superiority which in one or other of its myriad forms is as

old as the race and as long lived is hurt when the superior is placed on an equal footing of contractual power with those who have long been regarded as inferiors.

Disinterested public speakers and writers who find fault with the principle of unionism or with its legitimate methods are largely influenced by a false conception of the liberty and rights of the individual. This conception, this theory, was supreme in France and throughout the English-speaking world at the beginning of the modern industrial régime one hundred years ago, and is still sufficiently strong to work immense harm in every relation of social life. "The principle which was in the mind of every eager politician Adam Smith and the Physiocrats applied to industry and trade. . . . Adam Smith believed in the natural economic equality of men. That being so, it only needed legal equality of rights and all would be well. Liberty was to him the gospel of salvation; he could not imagine that it might become the means of destruction—that legal liberty where there was no real economic independence might turn to the disadvantage of the workmen" (Toynbee, "The Industrial Revolution," pp. 13, 17). Precisely this happened. The doctrine of unlimited competition, of no interference with the industrial activity of the individual, either by the state or by private associations of men, which was adopted as the supreme principle of the economic order that was ushered in by the great mechanical inventions at the end of the eighteenth century, soon led to the awful

wage-slavery that for almost fifty years disgraced England. Not only women, but children from six years up were kept at work for sixteen hours out of the twenty-four, and the factories were operated by night as well as by day. "In stench, in heated rooms, amid the constant whirling of a thousand wheels, little fingers and little feet were kept in constant action, forced into unnatural activity by blows from the heavy hands and feet of the merciless overlooker and the infliction of bodily pain by instruments of punishment invented by the sharpened ingenuity of insatiable selfishness" (Alfred, "History of the Factory System," vol. i, pp. 21, 22). This was only the logical result of the doctrine of unlimited individual freedom, the freedom of the citizen to sell his labor, and that of his wife and children, in whatever conditions and on whatever terms he saw fit, without let or hindrance from "paternalistic" legislation or from the "interference" of labor organizations. Trade unions were under the ban of the law, for they restrained freedom of contract. When philanthropic men tried to secure the passage of factory laws limiting the working hours of women and children and fixing an age below which the latter could not be employed, they had to meet the same arguments for individual rights and liberty that are used today against the efforts of unionists to restrict the self-destructive and class-destructive activity of the selfish, the weak and the ignorant individual laborer. Not all the crimes that have been committed in the name of liberty are political.

What, after all, is liberty? Negatively, it is absence of restraint; positively, and more adequately, it is presence of opportunity. We speak here only of the liberty that is called physical. Now, physical restraints are not all imposed by the strong arm of the civil law or by the muscular force of one's fellows. There is, besides, the restraint exercised by hunger, and cold, and the various other forms of helplessness due to the forces known as *economic*. Political and legal liberty are not the whole of social liberty, for a man may be free from subjection to a political despot and be legally empowered to enter every contract that is within the limits of reason, and yet be hindered by economic conditions—restraints—from making a contract that will safeguard his welfare and his rights. Since the only rational end of liberty is the good of the individual, such a person is not completely free; he is without that opportunity which is the positive and vital side of all true freedom. The man, for example, who must work today or go to bed—if he can find a bed—hungry is not free in the same sense as the employer who, if he fail to come to terms with this particular laborer, can afford to wait until next week. There can be no genuine freedom of contract between men whose economic position is so unequal that the alternative is for one grave physical suffering, and for the other a monetary loss or an unsecured gain. Whenever this condition is realized, the liberty of contract possessed by the isolated laborer becomes the liberty to injure himself and his fellows by helping to establish an iniquitous

rate of wages. Such an extreme of liberty is, despite the eloquent sophistry of the defenders of individualism, not worth preserving. It is a curse both to the individual who makes use of it and to society. Neither the liberty nor the right to do unreasonable things is a desirable possession. And when the labor union, by means of the collective bargain, the "closed shop" or any other legitimate method, makes this suicidal and anti-social exercise of freedom impossible, it deserves the approval of every intelligent lover of liberty, since it makes possible the only real freedom, which is opportunity.

Catholics especially should not allow themselves to be misled into opposition to the labor union by this specious plea of freedom for the individual "to work when, where and under what conditions he likes." This unreasonable extreme of liberty is no part of either Catholic theory or practice. According to Catholic doctrine, liberty is merely a means to right and reasonable self-development, and the liberty that does not tend toward this goal is baneful and false. In the Middle Ages—especially toward the close of that period—when Catholic principles dominated the political and industrial institutions of the greater part of Europe, the two opposite evils of tyrannical absolutism and anarchical individualism were equally unknown. "The doctrine of the unconditioned duty of obedience was wholly foreign to the Middle Age," says Gierke in his "Political Theories of the Middle Age;" and Mr. W. S. Lilly justly observes: "The

monarch was everywhere bound by pacts, solemnly recognized and sworn to, as a condition of his unction and coronation, and was hemmed in on all sides by free institutions, by the Universal Church, 'the Christian Republic' as it was called, by universities, corporations, brotherhoods, monastic orders; by franchises and privileges of all kinds, which in a greater or less degree existed all over Europe" ("A Century of Revolution," p. 8). On the other hand, the fiction of the physical and mental and economic equality of all the members of the commonwealth and their complete individual independence was nowhere assumed or aimed at. The very obvious fact that all the citizens have not the same interests, but are divided into classes, chiefly on economic lines, was frankly recognized; hence the individual was primarily regarded, not as one of a multitude of equally powerful atoms, but as a member of a certain class. Accordingly the different classes received from the civil authority recognition and privileges—as in the case already cited of the craft guilds—which were more or less adapted to safeguard their peculiar welfare. The result was a truer and fuller, because more positive, liberty for the individual.

Here in America legislation does not formally recognize the existence of classes or class interests. It ignores the fact that for the great majority of individuals their class interests are their primary interests; that where they have one interest in common with all the other citizens of the country they have ten that are vital only to their particular class. The constitution

seems to assume that laws can be framed which will be equally favorable to all individuals, while, as a matter of fact, the balance of effect of almost every legal enactment of an economic nature is to benefit one class at the expense of another. As a consequence of this solicitude for an abstract individual citizen that never existed and never will exist, so long as men are born with unequal powers and perform different social functions, just and beneficial legislation is constantly prevented, or when enacted is declared unconstitutional. For example, the law providing for a progressive income tax was annulled by the Supreme Court as class legislation because it imposed a heavier burden on the larger incomes. Yet this was one of the law's vital purposes. The attempt to regard as equal men who are not equal hinders proportional justice; for, as Menger has finely said, "Nothing can be more unequal than to treat unequals equally." To remedy this condition there is no need to return to the industrial organization of the Middle Ages, to the guild system, for it could not be adapted to the regime of machinery and large businesses. This is not the only objection to a return of the old order, but it is sufficiently powerful to convince any well-informed man that the plan—and we sometimes hear it proposed seriously—is utterly impracticable. What is wanted is recognition of the political and social principle that underlay the guild organization of industry, the principle that so long as different economic classes exist each must receive the measure of protection, encouragement and privilege that is re-

quired to secure its rights and welfare. To this end it is necessary that the members of each class be organized; that the organizations be not merely tolerated and controlled, but assisted by law as well as by public opinion; that the labor union and every other lawful association be afforded adequate means to defend itself against both the unjust aggression of other classes and the destructive competition of the helpless, the ignorant and the selfish individuals of its own.

Criticism—constant and vigilant criticism—of the excesses of the labor union is, of course, demanded in the interests of justice and social order; but if it is to be effective it must not only be free from the prejudice begotten of self-interest or erroneous theories, as just described, but it must be, moreover, based on adequate knowledge. This implies that some attention be given to the presentation of the case of the union by its own members. What is true of every social class must be fully and frankly recognized as true of workmen, namely, that certain features and needs of the group can be understood by no one, no matter how good his intentions, so well as by the men who compose it. The failure of the older school of English economists to take into account this very obvious fact brought upon their science the hatred and contempt of the laborer. From their high and serene *a priori* ground the economists had proved to the benighted English workingmen that the whole principle of unionism, and especially the contention that wages could be raised by combination or by any other form of “artificial

effort" that ran counter of the "wage fund theory," was ruinous and false. But the workingmen would not listen, and they had the satisfaction of seeing their position justified both by the logic of events and by the revised verdict of the economists. "Thus economic authority today, looking back on the confident assertions against Trade Unionism made by McCulloch and Mill, Nassau Senior and Harriet Martineau, Fawcett and Cairnes, has humbly to admit, in the words of the present occupant of the chair once filled by Nassau Senior himself (Professor Edgeworth, of Oxford) that 'in the matter of unionism, as well as in that of the predeterminate wage fund, the untutored mind of the workman had gone more straight to the point than economic intelligence misled by a bad method'" ("Industrial Democracy," p. 653). Herein is contained a lesson for those well-meaning writers and speakers of today who feel competent to pronounce a final appreciation and criticism of unionism without having read the principles of a single trade union or made a serious attempt to understand the unionist's point of view. If criticism is to be intelligent and effective, it must proceed from a study of facts and conditions at first hand—or as nearly so as possible—and from a due consideration of the aims, and knowledge, and beliefs of *all* the classes concerned.

The conclusion that seems justified by this lengthy and yet summary study of the labor union is that the aims of the union are substantially right, and that of its methods, only violence, tyranny and the tendency

to make excessive demands are in all circumstances unjustifiable. When confined within reasonable limits all the other methods are lawful, both legally and morally. It is freely admitted that the unions have sometimes—perhaps correct language would authorize the term “frequently”—been too hasty in making use of their extreme, though legitimate, methods, and too willing to push them to their furthest limits. And it is always assumed that no one of the methods is justifiable unless the concrete demand on behalf of which it is employed is reasonable. It must, however, be noted here that the verification of this condition is not always as easy as the unionists seem to imagine. Certainly the determination of the equities of any dispute between employer and employes can no more be entrusted exclusively to the latter than to the former. The maxim that no one is a competent judge of his own cause does not admit the laborer as its unique exception. The tributes sometimes paid to the working class by union speakers and writers imply that the members of this class are the people, and that wisdom and fairness will die with them. As a matter of fact, some of the worst of the “labor-crushers,” whether among overseers or employers, are men who were formerly wage-earners; and some of the most exclusive and selfish social groups in existence are the unions that control certain trades—“the aristocracy of unionism.” An abundance of facts of this kind—to say nothing of the unchangeable limitations of human nature—forbids the calm observer to take

seriously the promises of socialism concerning the reign of justice and equality that will arrive when the proletariat gets control of the political and industrial power of the nation. Laborers are no more immune from error or the liability to abuse power than any other class of human beings. Happily, one is not constrained by any rule of logic or common-sense to make an act of faith in the moral perfection of the laborer as a preliminary to belief in the principle of unionism. For the man who is interested in the welfare of the toiler and who wishes to see our present social order preserved, it is sufficient to realize that the aims and methods of the union are substantially just; that, as long as religion has such small influence on industrial relations, the union is the only social force that can afford adequate protection to the great mass of laborers; and, finally, that the existing unions constitute the only power that can prevent a wholesale going over of the workers to socialism.

VI

THE CHURCH AND THE WORKINGMAN

"Even though it be only a dream, I like to indulge the thought that some day the Church of the poor will lead them out of bondage, and prove to the unbelieving world its divine mission."

The viewpoint indicated in this sentence is sufficiently frequent among Catholics to justify a brief reconsideration of a somewhat hackneyed topic. Among the Protestant churches that display any considerable amount of vitality, the tendency is rapidly growing toward a conception that identifies religion with humanitarianism, while the majority of non-churchgoers who admit that religion has any useful function probably share the same conception. In such an environment it is not a matter of surprise that many Catholics should exaggerate the social mission of the Church.

The Church is not merely nor mainly a social reform organization, nor is it her primary mission to reorganize society, or to realize the Kingdom of God upon earth. Her primary sphere is the individual soul, her primary object to save souls, that is, to fit them for the Kingdom of God in heaven. Man's true life, the life of the soul, consists in supernatural union with God, which has its beginning during the brief period of his earthly life, but which is to be completed in the eternal existence to come afterward. Compared with this immortal life, such temporary goods as wealth, liberty, education, or fame, are utterly insignificant. To make these or any

other earthly considerations the supreme aim would be as foolish as to continue the activities and amusements of childhood after one had reached maturity. It would be to cling to the accidental and disregard the essential. Scoffers and sceptics may contemn this view as "other-worldly," but they cannot deny that it is the only logical and sane position for men who accept the Christian teaching on life, death, and immortality. Were the Church to treat the present life as anything more than a means to the end, which is immortal life, it would be false to its mission. It might deserve great praise as a philanthropic association, but it would have forfeited all right to the name of Christian Church.

Having thus reasserted the obvious truth that the Church's function is the regeneration and improvement of the individual soul with a view to the life beyond, let us inquire how far this includes social teaching or social activity. Since the soul cannot live righteously except through right conduct, the Church must teach and enforce the principles of right conduct. Now a very large and very important part of conduct falls under the heads of charity and justice. Hence we find that from the beginning the Church propagated these virtues both by word and by action. As regards charity, she taught the brotherhood of man and strove to make it real through organizations and institutions. In the early centuries of the Christian era, the bishops and priests maintained a parochial system of poor relief, to which they gave as much active direction and care as to any of their purely religious functions. In the

Middle Ages the Church promoted and supported the monastic system with its innumerable institutions for the relief of all forms of distress. Under her direction and active support today, religious communities maintain hospitals for the sick and homes for all kinds of dependents. To take but one instance, the Church in America collects money for orphan asylums as regularly as for many of her purely religious objects. As regards justice, the Church has always taught the doctrine of individual dignity, rights, and sacredness, and proclaimed that all men are essentially equal. Through this teaching the lot of the slave was humanized, and the institution itself gradually disappeared; serfdom was made bearable, and became in time transformed into a status in which the tiller of the soil enjoyed security of tenure, protection against the exactions of the lord, and a recognized place in the social organism. Owing to her doctrine that labor was honorable and was the universal condition and law of life, the working classes gradually acquired that measure of self-respect and of power which enabled them to set up and maintain for centuries the industrial democracy that prevailed in the medieval towns. Her uniform teaching that the earth was given by God to all the children of men, and that the individual proprietor was only a steward of his possessions, was preached and emphasized by the Fathers in language that has brought upon them the charge of communism. The theological principle that the starving man who has no other resource may seize what is necessary from the goods of his

neighbor is merely one particular conclusion from this general doctrine. She also taught that every commodity, including labor, had a certain just or fair price from which men ought not to depart, and that the laborer, like the member of every other social class, had a right to a decent living in accordance with the standards of the group to which he belonged. During the centuries preceding the rise of modern capitalism, when the money-lender was the greatest oppressor of the poor, she forbade the taking of interest. Among her *works* in the interest of social justice and social welfare, two only will be mentioned here: the achievements of her monks in promoting agriculture and settled life in the midst of the anarchic conditions that followed the downfall of the Roman Empire, and her encouragement of the guilds, those splendid organizations which secured for their members a greater measure of welfare relatively to the possibilities of the time than any other industrial system that has ever existed.

To the general proposition that the Church is obliged to inculcate the principles of charity and justice both by precept and by action, all intelligent persons, whether Catholic or not, will subscribe. Opinions will differ only as to the extent to which she ought to go in this direction. Let us consider first the problem of her function as teacher.

The Church cannot be expected to adopt formally any particular programme, either partial or comprehensive, of social reconstruction or social reform. This is as far out of her province as is the advocacy of definite

methods of political organization, agriculture, manufactures, or finance. Direct participation in matters of this nature would absorb energies that ought to be devoted to her religious and moral work and would greatly lessen her influence over the minds and hearts of men. Her attitude toward specific measures of social reform can only be that of judge and guide. When necessity warrants it, she pronounces upon their moral character, condemning them if they are bad, encouraging them if they are good. They come within her province only in so far as they involve the principles of morality.

With regard to the moral aspect of existing social and industrial conditions, the Church does lay down sufficiently definite principles. They are almost all contained in the Encyclical, "On the Condition of Labor," issued by Pope Leo XIII. Passing over his declarations on society, the family, socialism, the state, woman labor, child labor, organization, and arbitration, let us emphasize his pronouncement that the laborer has a moral claim to a wage that will support himself and his family in reasonable and frugal comfort. Beside this principle let us put the traditional Catholic teaching concerning monopolies, the just price of goods, and fair profits. If these doctrines were enforced throughout the industrial world, the social problem would soon be within measurable distance of a satisfactory solution. If all workingmen received living wages in humane conditions of employment, and if all capital obtained only moderate and reasonable

profits, the serious elements of the problem remaining would soon solve themselves.

But the social principles here referred to are all very general in character. They are of very little practical use unless they are made specific and applied in detail to concrete industrial relations. Does the Church satisfactorily perform this task? Well, it is a task that falls upon the bishops and the priests rather than upon the central authority at Rome. For example, the teaching of Pope Leo about a living wage, child labor, woman labor, oppressive hours of work, etc., can be properly applied to any region only by the local clergy, who are acquainted with the precise circumstances, and whose duty it is to convert general principles into specific regulations. In this connection another extract from the private letter cited above may be found interesting and suggestive: "If the same fate is not to overcome us that has overtaken—and justly—the Church in Europe, the Catholic Church here will have to see that it cannot commend itself to the masses of the people by begging Dives to be more lavish of his crumbs to Lazarus, or by moral inculcations to employers to deal with their employes in a more Christian manner." There is some exaggeration in both clauses of this sentence. The defection of large numbers of the people from the Church in certain countries of Europe cannot be ascribed to any single cause. Some of its causes antedate the beginnings of the modern social question; others are not social or industrial at all; and still others would have produced a large measure of

damaging results despite the most intelligent and most active efforts of the clergy. When due allowance has been made for all these factors it must still be admitted that the losses in question would have been very much smaller, possibly would have been comparatively easy to restore, had the clergy, bishops and priests realized the significance, extent, and vitality of modern democracy, economic and political, and if they had done their best to permeate it with the Christian principles of social justice. On the other hand, where, as in Germany and Belgium, the clergy have made serious efforts to apply these principles both by teaching and action, the movement of anticlericalism has made comparatively little headway. At any rate, the better position of the Church and the superior vitality of religion among the people in these two countries can be traced quite clearly to the more enlightened attitude of their clergy toward the social problem.

The second clause of the quotation given above underestimates, by implication at least, the value of charity as a remedy for industrial abuses. It cannot, indeed, be too strongly nor too frequently insisted that charity is not a substitute for justice; on the other hand, any solution of the social problem based solely upon conceptions of justice, and not wrought out and continued in the spirit of charity, would be cold, lifeless, and in all probability of short duration. If men endeavor to treat each other merely as equals, ignoring their relation as brothers, they cannot long maintain pure and adequate notions of justice nor apply the

principles of justice fully and fairly to all individuals. The personal and the human element will be wanting. Were employers and employes deliberately and sincerely to attempt to base all their economic relations upon Christian charity, upon the Golden Rule, they would necessarily and automatically place these relations upon a basis of justice. For true and adequate charity includes justice, but justice does not include charity. However, the charity that the writer of the letter condemns is neither true nor adequate; it neither includes justice, nor is of any value in the present situation.

Let it be at once admitted that the clergy of America have done comparatively little to apply the social teachings of the Church, or in particular of the Encyclical "On the Condition of Labor," to our industrial relations. The bishops who have made any pronouncements in the matter could probably be counted on the fingers of one hand, while the priests who have done so are not more numerous proportionally.¹ But there are good reasons for this condition of things. The moral aspects of modern industry are extremely difficult to evaluate correctly, its physical aspects and relations are very complicated and not at all easy of comprehension, and the social problem has only in recent times begun

¹ In January, 1919, the four bishops who constituted the Administrative Committee of the National Catholic War Council issued a Program of Social Reconstruction which has been almost universally acclaimed as the sanest pronouncement made on that subject.

to become acute. Add to these circumstances the fact that the American clergy have for the most part been very busy organizing parishes, building churches and schools, and providing the material equipment of religion generally, and you have a tolerably sufficient explanation of their failure to study the social problem and expound the social teaching of the Church.

The same conditions account for the comparative inactivity of the American clergy in the matter of social *works*. Up to the present their efforts have been confined to the maintenance of homes for defectives and dependents and the encouragement of charitable societies. In some of the countries of Europe, particularly Germany and Belgium, and more recently France and Italy, bishops and priests have engaged more or less directly in a great variety of projects for the betterment of social conditions, such as cooperative societies, rural banks, workingmen's gardens, etc. Obviously activities of this kind are not the primary duty of the clergy, but are undertaken merely as means to the religious and moral improvement of the people. The extent to which any priest or bishop ought to engage in them is a matter of local expediency. So far as general principles are concerned, a priest could with as much propriety assist and direct building societies, cooperative associations of all sorts, settlement houses, consumers' leagues, child labor associations, and a great variety of other social reform activities, as he now assists and directs orphan asylums, parochial schools, St. Vincent de Paul societies, or temperance societies

None of these is a purely religious institution; all of them may be made effective aids to Christian life and Christian faith.

The necessity for both social teaching and social works by our American clergy is very great and very urgent. To this extent the sentence quoted in the body of this paper is not an exaggeration. There is a very real danger that large masses of our workingmen will, before many years have gone by, have accepted unchristian views concerning social and industrial institutions, and will have come to look upon the Church as indifferent to human rights and careful only about the rights of property. Let anyone who doubts this statement take the trouble to get the confidence and the opinions of a considerable number of intelligent Catholic trade unionists and to become regular readers of one or two representative labor journals. We are now discussing things as they are, not things as we should like to see them, nor yet things as they were fifteen or twenty-five years ago. Persons who are unable to see the possibility of an estrangement, such as has occurred in Europe, between the people and the clergy in America, forget that modern democracy is twofold, political and economic, and that the latter form has become much the more important. By economic democracy is meant the movement toward a more general and more equitable distribution of economic power and goods and opportunities. At present this economic democracy shows, even in our country, a strong tendency to become secular if not anti-

Christian. Here again we are dealing with the actual facts of today. Consequently, unless the clergy shall be able and willing to understand, appreciate, and sympathetically direct the aspirations of economic democracy, it will inevitably become more and more unchristian, and pervert all too rapidly a larger and larger proportion of our Catholic population.

VII

THE MORAL ASPECTS OF SPECULATION

Taken in its narrowest sense, the word *speculation* describes transactions that are made for the sole purpose of getting a profit from changes in price. This is the sense in which it will be used in this paper. Furthermore, the discussion will be confined to operations on the stock and produce exchanges. The speculator, then, buys and sells property because he expects to realize a gain from changes in its price, not because he expects to be a sharer in its earnings. The reason that he does not intend to profit by the earnings of the property that he ostensibly buys and sells is to be found in the fact that his control of the property will be either too brief to secure the actual earnings or too indefinite to create earnings. The former is the usual case of speculation in stock, the latter, of speculation in produce.

Some examples will make clearer this distinction between the speculator and the ordinary investor or trader. The man who buys railway stocks merely to sell them in a few days at an expected advance is a speculator; the man who buys them to hold permanently for the sake of the dividends that they will yield is not a speculator. The former looks to price changes for his gains, the latter to property earnings. Again, two men buy wheat on the board of trade: the first is a miller who wants wheat to grind; the second is a speculator who has no particular use for wheat. He

does not intend to change its form in any way or bring it nearer to the consumer; his interest in it is confined solely to its fluctuations in price. From these he expects to make his profit. The miller, on the other hand, will add utility to the wheat by converting it into flour. His profit will be in the nature of a payment for this productive and social service. In like manner, the dividends received by the genuine investor in railway stocks will be a return for the use of his capital in a productive business. Both he and the miller are producers of utility, while the speculative buyer of stocks and the speculative buyer of wheat add nothing to the utility of any property—make no contribution to production.

Pure speculation on the exchanges differs, therefore, from ordinary trade and investment in its effect upon the production of utility and in the source of its gains. These are in reality two aspects of the same economic fact. It is also unique in the manner in which its contracts are completed, or “settled.” I have spoken of the speculator as *ostensibly* buying and selling. In purely speculative purchases and sales there is no genuine *transfer* of goods. The stocks bought are not, in any adequate sense, brought into the possession and control of the purchaser, but are usually “carried” by his broker until they are sold. The exceptions to this rule are not of great importance and need not concern us here. The produce bought—wheat, cotton, petroleum, etc.—is not moved an inch in any direction. When the buyer completes one of these transactions

he merely receives or pays out a sum based on the extent to which the price of the goods in question has risen or fallen. The mechanism of these settlements falls outside the scope of this paper. It suffices to point out that speculative contracts are settled by a payment of price differences instead of by a genuine delivery of goods. In effect and intention they are substantially wagers on the course of prices.

Indiscriminate apologists for speculation and the exchanges are fond of insisting on the productive services of so-called speculators who gather and store up goods during a period of plenty and dispose of them during a period of scarcity, or who carry goods from a place where they are abundant to a place where they are in greater demand. Hence they conclude that speculation, *i. e.*, all speculation, is useful. Such reasoning betrays confusion of thought. With speculators in the sense just mentioned we have nothing to do in this place. Besides, their social worth is obvious. Nor are we concerned with the exchanges, as such. Their original function was a very necessary one, namely, to serve as meeting places for those who wished to buy and sell real goods. They still retain that function in so far as they constitute a market place for permanent investors and for manufacturers and productive traders. These productive transactions, however, have become subordinated to purely speculative operations, so that, according to conservative estimates, fully 90 per cent of the business done on the exchanges is of the latter character.

Now this kind of speculation, as already pointed out, is non-productive. It creates no utility, either of time, place, or form; that is to say, it neither distributes goods over intervals of time or space nor puts them through any process of manufacture. Does it perform a social service of any kind? If it does, there will arise a presumption that it is morally good.

Prof. Henry C. Emery ("Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States," Macmillan) strongly maintains that organized speculation, of the kind that we are discussing, is of great service to legitimate trade. Since the market for great staples, like grain and cotton, so runs his argument, has become a world-market, the large dealers in these goods must not only buy, store, and move them, but also take extraordinary risks of changing prices. These risks are extraordinary because they extend over a long period of time and are subject to world-wide trade conditions. What the dealers need, then, is "a distinct body of men to relieve them of the speculative element of their business." The professional operators on the produce exchanges constitute just such a class. The wheat merchant buys a quantity of wheat in the northwest for shipment to Liverpool, where he intends to sell it some time later. But the price of wheat may fall before that time arrives. Here arises the element of risk. To avoid it, he immediately sells to a speculator, for future delivery, an equal quantity of "paper" wheat. The delivery of this "paper" wheat, or, rather, the settle-

ment of this speculative contract, is to take place about the same time that his cargo of actual wheat is to be delivered and sold in Liverpool. If in the meantime the price of wheat falls he will lose on his actual wheat, but he will gain on his "paper" wheat. For when a man sells any commodity in the speculative market for future delivery, his interest is to have the price of that commodity fall. Thus he gains the difference between the price of the article when he sold it and its price at the time of delivery, or settlement. Hence, by means of this "hedge" sale the wheat merchant is secured against loss on his cargo of actual wheat. Sales of this kind are a sort of insurance that lessen both the possibilities of great profit and the risks of great loss. It is said that nine-tenths of the wheat stored in the elevators of the northwest is "sold against" in this way ("Proceedings of Twelfth Annual Meeting of American Economic Association," p. 110).

So much for speculation in produce: speculation in stocks, it is maintained, enables the small investor to have within reach a class of men "ready to assume all the risk of buying and selling his security, and a market that fixes prices by which he can intelligently invest." The army of professional speculators stand prepared at any time to buy or sell any kind of stocks that are at all marketable, while their incessant buying and selling keeps the market active and the quotations of the different securities at their proper level. The whole function of organized speculation is summed up to be: taking the great risks of fluctuating values,

reducing these fluctuations to a minimum, and providing an active market for produce and securities.

The obvious answer to the above argument is that traders in produce should take the risks of fluctuating prices themselves. At present, indeed, they seem unwilling to do so, because the speculators stand ready to do it for them. But it is difficult to see how the public would suffer if traders, importers, and manufacturers were compelled to take all the risks incident to their business, instead of handing them over to a special class. Under such an arrangement many of them would doubtless go to the wall, but the community would be the gainer through the elimination of the unfit. Besides, there is reason to believe that the superior knowledge of market conditions possessed by the professional speculators, and their work in reducing the range of price fluctuations, is very much overestimated. At any rate, there seems to be no good reason why the capable dealer or manufacturer could not acquire a sufficient amount of this same knowledge and foresight. To set apart a body of men for the sole purpose of *dealing in risks* seems to be carrying the principle of division of labor unnecessarily far, especially when these men manage to charge the high price for their services that is obtained by the professional speculators of our produce exchanges.

As to stock speculators, it may be reasonably admitted that they know the true value of the various securities more accurately than the small investors, and that they are able to fix more correct prices than

would be possible without their activity. Yet if there were no dealing in stocks, except for permanent investment, there would still be a stock market. That is to say, if there were no speculators, and if stocks were bought solely for the sake of their dividends, it would still be possible for an investor to buy them at quotations sufficiently correct and stable. This fact is exemplified today in the case of numerous securities that are not dealt in by speculators nor listed on the exchanges. It is worthy of note that two prominent German economists, who maintain that the produce exchange is a necessary institution, declare that the stock exchange is "an unnecessary and injurious one."

The institution of organized speculation is not only of doubtful benefit to the community, but produces serious public evils. Only those who have expert knowledge of market conditions can, in the long run, make money on the exchanges. These are the prominent professional speculators, the "big operators," as they are often called. The great majority of all the others who speculate, namely, the outside public, either know nothing of the intricacies of the market, or rely on "inside information" that is worse than useless because misleading. Out of the losses of this class comes the greater part of the gains of the big operators. One proof of this is seen in the fact that, when the general public and the small operators desert the exchanges after being fleeced, speculative activity is checked until such time as the "small fry" begin operations anew. And yet the general public continues to patro-

nize the centers of speculation in ever-increasing numbers, notwithstanding the lessons of the past. Thus the chief losses of speculation are borne by those who can least afford to bear them.

Speculation absorbs a considerable amount of the community's capital and directive energy. It diverts money from productive enterprises and engages the activity of men who, if removed from the unhealthy atmosphere of the exchanges, would be of great service to the world of industry. By holding out to its votaries the hope of getting rich quickly, it discourages industry and thrift and makes men worshipers of the goddess of chance. It imbues thousands with the persuasion that acquiring wealth is a colossal game in which they are to be fortune's favorites. The career of the "Franklin Syndicate" in Brooklyn, in 1899, is a typical instance of the way in which those who have caught the speculative fever disregard the laws of probability and the laws of wealth. The promoters of this company agreed to pay 10 per cent per week on all deposits, pretending that they were enabled to do so through their "inside information" of the stock market. Within a few weeks they took in nearly one million dollars, showing how large is the number of people who regard the stock exchange as an institution that creates wealth without labor.

To the question that was asked above—Does speculation perform any social service?—the correct answer, then, would seem to be in the negative. At any rate, its good features, which are problematical,

are more than offset by its bad features, which are grave and unmistakable. Hence there is no reason to regard organized speculation as morally good because of any economic or social function that it exercises.

If the *institution* of speculation is at best of doubtful moral and social worth, what are we to say concerning the moral character of the *individual act* of speculating in stocks or produce? According to Funck-Brentano, speculation on the exchanges, although not highway robbery, is "robbery according to the rules of an art so refined that the keenest lawyer cannot exactly determine the point where fraud begins and legality ceases." This condemnation, however, seems too sweeping; for many of the transactions on the exchanges are made by men who have no intention of acting dishonestly. At the worst, they are actuated merely by the spirit of the gambler. But it is true that moral and immoral operations are often inextricably mingled, so that it is extremely difficult, no less for the moralist than the lawyer, to separate the good from the bad. For our purpose it will be best perhaps to point out the dishonesty of some of the more notorious practices and the extent to which they are followed, and then discuss the morality of speculative transactions that are entered into with the most upright intentions.

A favorite method of manipulating values is to disseminate false reports concerning property or market conditions. A description of the various ways in which this scheme is practiced is not possible nor neces-

sary here, but a typical instance may be given. In the spring of 1900 a prominent manufacturing company, having its headquarters in New York, sent out a report that a dividend was to be immediately declared on its stock. This caused the stock to rise several points, and the directors and their friends then "sold for a fall." Next the report concerning the dividend was denounced as false, and official announcement was made that the company's condition did not warrant the payment of a dividend. Immediately values began to fall, and those who had sold "short" bought in at a profit, while the small holders of stock became panic-stricken and sold their holdings to the larger ones. This last phase of manipulation, which consists in depressing values for the purpose of getting possession of the stock of the small holders, is expressively termed "shaking out."

The industrious circulation of false reports is an essential part of the process known as "supporting." The owners of some stock that is worth little send out glowing accounts of its desirability as an investment, and of the earning capacity of the property that it represents. At the same time they begin to make purely speculative purchases on a large scale. The intention is to deceive the public into the belief that the owners have confidence in the future of their own property. The result is that the price of the stock rises. When it has reached what the conspirators regard as its maximum, they sell both their cash stock and their purely speculative purchases to a confiding public.

Then the stock rapidly sinks to its proper level.

Another way of manipulating is by "wash sales." One or more operators scheme to depress the quotations of a particular stock by making a show of enormous sales. The natural effect of such wholesale selling when reported on the stock market is to cause a fall, but the peculiarity of these transactions is that they are not sales at all, for the same person is both buyer and seller. He employs two brokers, one of whom sells to the other. Thus the supposed sales are all counterfeit, since the supposed buyers have no existence. The same principle can be carried out in attempts to *inflate* values, and in the case of produce as well as stock.

A simpler form of manipulation is the attempt to raise or depress the value of a stock by extensive genuine buying or selling. Where several operators act together the operation is called a "pool." An extreme instance of continued buying for a rise is the "corner." If it is successful, the result is that one or a few men get control of sufficient of the available supply of a certain produce or stock to create what is practically a monopoly, and thus force up prices almost at will. The corner, however, is rarely successful.

The schemes above described are some of the more common forms of manipulation. Clearly they are all immoral, and the gains accruing from them dishonest. Closely allied to false rumors as a source of unjust profit is the special and secret information that is so often turned to account on the exchanges. When this

special information concerns a movement of prices that will come about naturally, not artificially, and when the information is acquired by the expenditure of some labor, either intellectual or physical, or when the information is not entirely certain—there would seem to be nothing wrong in making use of it for profit. But it is difficult to see how the profit will be honest if any of these conditions be wanting. Suppose that a certain stock is about to be manipulated upward. Now if an "outsider" is apprised of this fact, and buys some of the stock to sell at the advance, he is simply realizing unique possibilities of stealing. He defrauds the other party to the contract; for artificially produced gains for one man mean, in the long run, artificially produced losses for another. But suppose that an advance in the price of a certain property is due to the natural laws and conditions of trade. In that case a man who foresees the advance, by reason of exceptional skill and diligence in studying the conditions of the market, may rightfully invest in the property and reap a profit that will be in some sense the reward of ability. Again, if a man without exercising labor or skill obtains special information that is not entirely trustworthy, his gains from a speculation made on this basis might be regarded as the reward of risk-taking. But if the information is practically certain, and got without any personal expenditure of any kind, the morality of gains coming even from a natural movement in prices will usually be very questionable. Obtained as they are from differences in

price, their source will in most cases be the pocket of some one who is not possessed of this special knowledge. The transaction is substantially a wager in which one party takes the other at a disadvantage. These are the principles: in practice it would seem that most of the profits arising from secret information on the exchanges are unlawful.

To what extent do manipulation and the various other forms of immoral speculation prevail? A precise and definite answer to this question is, of course, not obtainable, but it is safe to say that on the more prominent exchanges of the country questionable methods are in very common use. "Schaeffle, who is not only an eminent political economist, but has been minister of commerce to one of the great political powers of Europe, says that when he became acquainted with the bourse he gave up believing any longer in the economic harmonies, and declared theft to be the principle of modern European commerce" (John Rae, "Contemporary Socialism," p. 326). A member of the New York Stock Exchange declared a few years ago that 50 per cent of the operations in that institution were attempts to manipulate prices. The maneuvers of the great operators have often been compared to a game in which the successful players use loaded dice or marked cards. Indeed, many close observers of the speculative market assert that, in the long run, money is made only by those who resort to questionable devices. This is probably an exaggeration, but we can readily see that when men

having great power, the big operators, are engaged in operations whose success depends solely on the movement of prices, they will be strongly tempted to use their power in order to influence this movement. It is impossible to watch their tactics for any length of time without concluding that they regard manipulation in some form as an essential feature of speculative operations. The stock market columns of almost any morning newspaper will show that on the preceding day there was "an assault by the bears" on this or that stock, and that under "constant hammering" the stock fell one or more points. Or, we are informed that, "after a rally by the bulls," such a stock "went skyward."

So far, at least, as the big operators are concerned, the exchange is a battlefield on which two opposing armies, the bulls and the bears, are constantly engaged at close range. "All is fair in war," and it is not surprising that in the speculators' warfare nice ethical discriminations as to methods should be overlooked. Manipulation is regarded as lawful, since it is merely fighting the enemy with his own weapons. The intellectual atmosphere of the bourse is so befogged that the moral vision of its habitues becomes easily dulled. The mental qualities that are most frequently called into play among professional speculators are those that characterize the activities of the professional gambler. "A man's nerve is put to the highest tension; his mind is always on the stretch; not guiding the policy of a great commercial venture, but bearing

up under, and watching over, the fluctuations of some stock which, in the opinion of the majority, and by virtue of what has been paid for it at the outset, is worth only so much, and which he has estimated at a different value. "The trade is not a noble one, and there are few noble men engaged in it" (*Frazer's Magazine*, vol. 94, p. 84).

So much for practices of speculation that are certainly dishonest: what about the acts of a speculator who has no desire to take advantage of any unlawful practice? Is it wrong to make a purchase or sale on the exchange solely for the purpose of realizing a profit out of a change in prices? The purchaser or seller, we will suppose, seeks no dishonest advantage, but is willing to take all the risks of an unfavorable turn in prices. We cannot say that such a transaction is, in itself, wrong. At the worst it is merely a wager on prices, and wagers are not immoral, provided: (1) that those who take part in them have the right to dispose of the property that they hazard; (2) that neither fraud nor violence be used; (3) that the chances for winning be approximately equal, so far as the knowledge of the participants is concerned; (4) that the parties risk no more than they can afford consistently with the duties of their condition and calling; and (5) that the transaction in question is not forbidden by the positive law. All of these conditions may easily be present in a speculative deal; consequently there may be nothing in it contrary to the moral law. This statement applies to an act of speculation in the abstract, not in the actual conditions of to-day.

For we have seen that from the side of economic welfare the whole institution of non-productive speculation is in all probability useless; that from the side of social welfare it involves many grave evils; and that from the side of morality its transactions are to an alarming extent carried on by dishonest methods. In the light of these facts, we may safely conclude that, so far as the principal exchanges of the country are concerned, it is morally impossible for a man who spends all or the greater part of his time speculating, to avoid all the dishonest practices of speculation. Secondly, we would seem to be justified in asserting that men who, even without any intention to be dishonest, participate to *any* extent in speculative transactions on these exchanges, are engaging in actions that may easily be *morally questionable*. As we said above, the isolated act of speculation may in itself be without censure—may be no worse than the placing of a wager—but because of its connection with a questionable institution, and because of its grave danger to the individual himself, it can never be pronounced licit in the sense that the transactions of ordinary trade are licit. The shadow of immorality is over it always. Every speculative deal is a participation, remote and insignificant, perhaps, in what can without exaggeration be regarded as a social and moral evil, namely, the institution of organized speculation.¹ Every anticipated profit, almost, is in danger of being promoted

¹ For a strong confirmation of this view, see A. Crump's well-known work, "The Theory of Stock Speculation."

by illicit manipulation; for the well-meaning outsider can seldom be certain, even if he tries, that movements of price by which he is the gainer have not been artificially produced. Every man who yields to the seductive temptation to speculate feeds the passion of avarice, strengthens the ignoble desire to profit by the losses of his fellows, cultivates a dislike for honest, productive labor, and exposes himself to financial ruin. Hence, no man who is fully acquainted with the character and effects of speculation, and who is possessed of a fine moral nature, will ever participate in the purely speculative operations of either the stock or the produce exchanges of our largest cities.

The question—"Is speculation wrong?"—cannot, therefore, be answered categorically. The phenomena with which it deals are too complex. But, with the help of the distinctions above drawn, an answer may be obtained that is fairly definite. To resume, then: speculation as an institution is *economically* of doubtful utility; *socially*, it is productive of great and widespread evils; and *morally*, it is vitiated by a very considerable amount of dishonest "deals" and practices.

VIII

FALSE AND TRUE CONCEPTIONS OF WELFARE

I

Between the ages of sixteen and fifty, the great majority of Americans unceasingly strive and hope to "better their position" by increasing their incomes, and thereby raising themselves above the social and economic plane upon which they have hitherto stood. In so far as they are successful in this aim, they obtain an increased satisfaction of their material wants. Increased satisfaction is immediately followed by a still larger increase, both numerically and intensively, of the wants themselves. It becomes literally true that "the more men have, the more they want." In proof of this statement, all that is necessary is to make a rapid survey of the chief ways in which material wants call for satisfaction.

The man who occupies a plain house of seven or eight rooms will expend a part of his larger income for a better house. A better house means, in the first place, a larger house. A larger house will, usually, be built of more costly materials. In addition, it will demand a greater quantity and a more expensive quality of equipment, furniture, and utensils—woodwork, wall paper, carpets, chairs, beds, tables, chinaware, etc. It means a larger outlay for "help." It implies also a more "select" neighborhood where land and, consequently, rents are higher. The cost of the new house

and furnishings may be, let us say, \$20,000 while the old one was built and equipped for \$5,000; yet when the occupier's income is still further and in a considerable degree increased, there will emerge in his consciousness, or in that of his family, the want of a still better house. This will necessitate a considerably larger expenditure for all the items above enumerated, as well as an additional outlay for several others that have hitherto been unthought-of or disregarded.

When income permits a change men are no longer content with plain and nourishing food. They must have more tender meats, more select vegetables, richer and more varied desserts, older and more costly wines, and complicated mixtures instead of plain beverages. The manner in which the food is served becomes more formal, elaborate, and expensive; there must be many courses, more and dearer chinaware, and much cut glass. The same process appears in relation to clothing. After the demands of reasonable comfort have been met, there will rise the desire for a greater number of suits, a more frequent replacement to conform to the fashions, a better quality of materials, and a more high-priced tailor. All these and many other expansions of the clothing want become operative in the case of men, and to a ten-fold degree in the case of women. Witness the single item of jewelry.

Intimately connected with and dependent upon the standard of shelter, food, and clothing is that class of wants that is somewhat inadequately called "social." With increased expenditure for the former, the last-

named want inevitably becomes more complicated and more costly. Entertainments and "functions" become more frequent and more elaborate; a notable increase takes place in the accessories of entertaining, such as decorations, flowers, attendants, etc.; and there is a considerable additional outlay for food and clothing. Finally, the desire for amusement and recreation is also capable of indefinite expansion. The person of moderate means goes to the theater occasionally and occupies a cheap seat. The rich or well-to-do person goes more frequently, rides to and from the theater in a carriage, pays much more for a seat, and not infrequently buys an elaborate luncheon after the performance. The pleasure trips and vacations of the poor and the moderately situated consist of trolley rides and a few days spent in some near-by town or country district; those who are rich enough to afford it possess carriages and automobiles, spend months at the seaside or in the mountains, take long ocean voyages, and make extended sojourns in Europe.

In the case of all but the few extremely rich, these five wants or classes of wants, comprised under the head of shelter, food, clothing, "society," and amusement, can be expanded indefinitely and can absorb all of a man's income. No matter how much a person spends in meeting these wants, he can still maintain, in accordance with the language and standards of the day, that he has merely "bettered his social position."

Now this indefinite striving after indefinite amounts of material satisfaction is not an accidental feature of

modern existence. It is but the natural outcome of the prevailing theory of life. "The old Christianity," says Paulsen, who is not medieval in his sympathies. "raised its eyes from the earth, which offered nothing and promised nothing, to heaven and its supersensuous glory. The new age is looking for heaven upon earth; it hopes to attain to the perfect civilization through *science*, and expects that this will make life healthy, long, rich, beautiful, and happy" ("A System of Ethics," pp. 139, 140). According to the dominant view, the loftiest object that man can pursue is the scientific knowledge of nature—not, indeed, for itself, but because of the abundance of material goods that it will put at his disposal. Hence the practical conclusion of the practical man is that he should seek to enjoy as much of these goods as possible. "It is a favorite principle of the ethical materialism of our days that a man is all the happier the more wants he has, if he has at the same time sufficient means for their satisfaction" (Lange's "History of Materialism," p. 239). Such is the prevailing conception of "wider and fuller life." Since life is merely, or at any rate chiefly, an aggregate of sensations, more abundant life means the multiplication of sensations, possessions, and pleasurable experiences.

This theory of life is evidently false. Not the number but the kind of wants that a man satisfies is the important thing. Reasonable human life is primarily *qualitative*. It consists in thinking, knowing, communing, loving, serving, and giving, rather than in

having or enjoying. When the demands of health and *moderate* comfort have been supplied, additional sense-satisfactions contribute little or nothing to the development of body, heart, or mind. They necessitate an expenditure of time, energy, and resources that might be employed in building up the higher and rational side of man. They exert a damaging influence upon morals, mind, health, and happiness. Let us view the situation in some detail.

First, as to morals and character. The qualities that are fostered through the activities of "society" are, in great part, undesirable and ignoble. This assertion applies not only to the doings of the most wealthy and exclusive "set," but to all of those more or less formal and pretentious "functions" whose participants regard themselves as "in society," though they may belong within the middle class. Except in a very small proportion of cases, the functions and gatherings of "society" do not make for true culture or for intellectual improvement. Their primary object is to entertain, but they have come to include so many factitious elements in the matter of dress, decorations, feasting, and other accessories, that one of their most common by-products is a group of unlovely and unchristian qualities. One of the most marked of these qualities is the desire for social preeminence, the passion for distinction, the wish to be thought at least as prominent as any other person in one's social set. Thus the desire to excel, which is in itself laudable and useful, becomes, in the case of a large number of society

persons, an ambition to outdo one's neighbors in the splendor of gowns, the elaborateness of feasting, and not infrequently in the ostentation and costliness of the entertainment generally. In the pursuit of this ambition are developed the vices of envy, hypocrisy, vanity, and snobbishness.

The realm of the animal appetites presents another instance of the damaging effects of the excessive pursuit of material satisfactions. In the matter of food and drink the line between sufficiency and gluttony is easily passed. Immoral indulgence takes place under the name of a more thorough, more discriminating, and more refined satisfaction of the desire for nourishment. Those who are guilty of this inordinate indulgence often do not realize that they are acting the part of animals rather than of rational beings, in whom the higher nature ought to exercise a controlling influence. Again, violations of the precept of chastity are apt to increase rather than diminish when the personal expenditures of the individual pass beyond the limits of moderate and reasonable comfort. Excessive satisfaction of the other senses creates increased cravings in the sex appetite. And these cravings are less likely to be resisted, precisely because the persons who experience them have become unaccustomed to deny the demands of the other appetites.

Another evil effect is the weakening of the religious sense and of the altruistic sense. It is a fact of general observation that after the stage of moderate income and plain living has been passed, there follows in

probably the majority of instances a decay of religious fervor and of deep and vital faith. The things of God are crowded out, "choked by the cares and riches and pleasures of life." Owing to the essential selfishness of the process, inordinate satisfaction of material wants also weakens the feelings of disinterestedness and generosity. Hence the rule is almost universally valid that persons above the line of moderate comfort give a smaller proportion of their income to charitable and religious causes than those who are at or somewhat below that level.

Did men put a true valuation upon material goods, they would increase the *proportion* of their income given to these causes whenever an increase took place in the income itself. For example, if the man with an income of \$2,000 per year contributed 3 per cent of this sum, the man who received \$4,000 ought to give more than 3 per cent. The bulk of the extra thousand dollars goes, in most cases, to satisfy less important material wants; consequently, a larger proportion of it ought to be expended in meeting the higher want, that is, benevolence. What generally happens, however, is that the proportion decreases. The explanation is obvious; the receivers of the larger incomes become dominated by a false idea of the relative values of things, holding the goods of the senses in higher esteem than when their income was smaller.

Moreover, there are certain of the higher comfort and conveniences whose net effect upon human welfare is probably good, which involve no self-indulgence

that is actually immoral, and yet which are in a considerable degree injurious to character. For example, the habit of using parlor cars, electric bells, and street cars, in season and out of season, makes us *dependent* upon them, and renders us less capable of that measure of self-denial and of endurance which is indispensable to the highest achievement. These and many other contrivances of modern life are undoubtedly an obstacle to the development of that invaluable ingredient of character which consists in the *power to do without*. They contribute insensibly, yet effectively, to a certain softness of mind, will, and body which is no advantage in life's many-sided struggle. It does not follow that these conveniences ought not to be utilized at all; it follows that they are not the unmixed blessing which they are commonly assumed to be.

Nowhere are the harmful effects of this materialistic conception of life that we are considering more manifest than in the phenomena associated with the reduced birth rate. The deliberate limitation of offspring is as yet chiefly confined to the middle and upper classes, to the persons whose elementary and reasonable wants are already fairly well supplied. They wish to be in a position to satisfy a larger number of material wants in themselves and to ensure the satisfaction of a still larger number in their children—if they have any. They speak much of aiming at quality rather than quantity in offspring. They do not realize that the special qualities developed in the artificially restricted family are almost entirely materialistic, while the

qualities that go to make up strong and virtuous characters are almost inevitably neglected. In one word, the theory of life-values, which impels men and women to decline the burdens of a normal family, makes for enervating self-indulgence and perverted moral notions in parents, a morally and physically enfeebled generation of children, a diminishing population, and a decadent race.

So much for some of the damaging results to morals and character. It seems inevitable that mental powers and activities must likewise suffer. A people devoted to the pursuit of material things, of ease, and of pleasure does not seem to possess the best conditions for achievement in the higher and more arduous fields of mental effort. Even today an ever-increasing proportion of our college and university students choose those courses of study that have a "practical" rather than a theoretical or academic object and outcome. Whether or not this training is as effective as the "liberal" branches in developing the mental powers, those who select it will almost all devote their energies in after life to the business of money-getting. This means the exercise of the lower powers of the brain and intellect. The products of their mental activity will be material things and mechanical progress, rather than the thoughts and ideas and knowledge that make for the intellectual, moral, or spiritual improvement of the race. While the proportion of our population that is educated has greatly increased, there is reason to doubt that the proportion which reads serious, solid, and uplifting

literature is any greater today than it was fifty years ago. The great mass of the reading public is now satisfied with the newspaper, the cheap magazine, and books of fiction, good, bad, and indifferent. Half a century ago the majority of those who read had access to only a few books, but these were generally serious and highclass, and were read again and again. It is maintained by some that the general quality of literature itself has deteriorated. Thus, Mr. Frederick Harrison, whose Positivism would naturally dispose him in favor of the present age and spirit, recently wrote: "As I look back over the sixty years since I first began to read for myself, English literature has never been so flat as it is now. . . . In my student days, say, the mid-40's and mid-50's, our poets were Tennyson, the two Brownings, Fitzgerald, Rosseti—all at their zenith. So were Dickens, Thackeray, Bulwer-Lytton, Kingsley, Disraeli. The Brontës, Trollope, George Eliot, Swinburne, Morris, were just coming into line. Year after year Ruskin poured out resounding fugues in every form of melodious art. Our historians were Carlyle, Grote, Milman, Macaulay, Kinglake—then Froude and Newman. Our philosophers were Mill, Buckle, Newman, Hamilton, Mansel. As I look back over these sixty years, it seems to me as if English literature had been slowly sinking, as they say our eastern counties are sinking, below the level of the sea. . . . Railroads, telegrams, telephones, motors, games, 'week ends,' have made life one long scramble, which wealth, luxury, and the 'smart world' have debauched

The result is six-penny magazines, four-and-six-penny novels, 'short stories' in every half-penny rag—print, print, print—everywhere, and 'not a drop to drink'—sheets of picture advertisements, but of literature not an ounce." Among the forces responsible for this decadence Mr. Harrison mentions "the increase of material appliances, vulgarizing life and making it a scramble for good things" (quoted in the *Literary Digest*, March 9, 1907).

The indefinite pursuit of material satisfaction is, in considerable measure, injurious to health. Rich and varied food is not always more nourishing and healthful food. Usually it perverts the taste and artificially stimulates the appetite to such an extent as to produce serious ailments of the digestive organs. The inordinate and feverish endeavor to increase income, the mad race for social distinction, and the unceasing quest of new enjoyments, new ways of satisfying tyrannical and jaded appetites, is disastrous to the nervous system. As a consequence of this twofold abuse of their physical and mental faculties, a large section of the American people are already confirmed dyspeptics or confirmed neurasthenics. The injurious physical effects of unchastity and intemperance are too obvious to need extended comment.

Even the claim that a larger volume of happiness will result from the development and satisfaction of a larger volume of wants is unfounded. For the greater the number of wants that have become active, the greater must be the pain or inconvenience suffered

while these wants are unsatisfied. The more numerous the wants that clamor for satisfaction, the greater is the likelihood of disappointment, the greater is the care and worry needed to meet them, and the more numerous are the instances in which satisfaction leads inevitably to satiety. The more frequent and the more varied the satisfaction accorded to any want, the more must the stimulus or satisfying object be increased in order to produce the former measure of enjoyment. In a sense, we are all slaves to the wants that we habitually satisfy; consequently, the greater the number of indulged wants, the greater is the slavery. Socrates thanked the gods because they had given him but few wants; both Epicurus and Diogenes sought happiness in freedom from wants. As the author of the "Simple Life" says: "The question of food and shelter has never been sharper or more absorbing than since we are better nourished, clothed, and housed than ever. It is not the woman of one dress who asks most insistently how she shall be clothed. Hunger has never driven men to such baseness as the superfluous needs, envy, avarice, and the thirst for pleasure."

Not only the rich but the middle classes experience increased discontent as a result of yielding to the "higher-standard-of-living" fallacy. An effective illustration of this fact is contained in an article by Annie Webster Noel in the *New York Independent*, October 26, 1905. Following are some of its most pertinent passages: "We married in New York City on twelve a

week. . . . If our friends would only be happy our great trouble would be removed. They do enjoy staying with us. It is the plunge (into a cheaper house and neighborhood) that is hard. The fact is that our happiness, without so many of the things being striven for, is a slap in the face. . . . We kept house on twelve dollars a week for three months, on fourteen a week for six months. Then we had twenty a week. We have come to the conclusion that *twenty a week is about where poverty commences*. Below that contentment is found in meeting living expenses. But above that new wants begin to take shape. If one hasn't a dollar, one stays at home and is content. But whoever went out to buy something for a dollar and did not see just what she wanted for two? . . . We have reached the critical stage in our *ménage*. We are spending a little more here, a little more there. We are entertaining a little more. We are mixing more with people of larger means. . . . 'Through a gradual increase in our income we have been reduced to poverty.' In other words, the increase of income brought into practical consideration new but purely material wants, whose satisfaction or attempted satisfaction not only did not make for improvement of mind or character, but left this woman and her husband less contented than before.

The worst effect of the failure to find increased happiness in the increased satisfaction of material wants is the realization of this fact by the seekers. The disillusion and disappointment not infrequently make them

pessimists in their view of life as a whole. Having cherished for such a long time a false conception of what constitutes true worth and rational living, they do not readily return to saner views. In this connection the work of Paulsen, already quoted, furnishes some significant passages. After citing a document which was placed in the steeple-knob of St. Margaret's Church at Gotha in 1784, and which glorifies the modern age, with its freedom, its arts, and its sciences, and its useful knowledge—all pointing to greater material enjoyment and greater happiness—the author makes this comment: "When we compare the self-confidence of the dying eighteenth century, as expressed in these lines, with the opinion which the dying nineteenth century has of itself, we note a strong contrast. Instead of the proud consciousness of having reached a pinnacle, a feeling that we are on the decline; instead of joyful pride in the successes achieved and joyful hope of new and greater things, a feeling of disappointment and weariness, and a premonition of a coming catastrophe; . . . but one fundamental note running through the awful confusion of voices: *pessimism!* Indignation and disappointment; these seem to be the two strings to which the emotional life of the present is attuned. . . . What Rousseau hurled into the face of his times as an unheard-of paradox, namely, that culture and civilization do not make men better and happier, Schopenhauer teaches as a philosophical theorem: Civilization increases our misery, civilization is the one great *faux pas*" ("A System of Ethics," pp. 147, 148).

This doleful picture is truer of Europe than of America. We have not yet adopted the philosophy of Schopenhauer. We are younger than the European peoples, and have less experience; consequently, we have more enthusiasm, more illusions, more hope, more faith in ourselves and in the satisfying qualities of the material riches that we will secure from a land lavishly endowed by nature. And yet the rapidly increasing number of persons among us whose creed is pessimism, indicates that with the coming of more years, more experience, and more mature knowledge, we too shall be of the opinion that "culture"—so-called—"and civilization"—so called—"do not make men better and happier."

It is sometimes asserted that the indefinite pursuit of material goods is necessary for the sake of beauty and refinement. Undoubtedly these have a legitimate place in any complete theory of right living, but their importance is only secondary. They ought not to be sought or obtained to the detriment of the primary goods of life, such as health, mentality, virility, good morals, contentment. Besides, much of the so-called refinement, that is so much prized and sought, is not genuine. It is largely imitation, effeminacy, artifice, vulgarity. True refinement includes not merely elegance, polish, and delicacy—which often appear in very artificial forms—but purity of mind, feelings, and tastes. In the endeavor to satisfy minutely one's material wants, the latter qualities are often weakened instead of being developed. The search for beauty and magnificence also leads frequently to grave per-

versions. Professor Veblen maintains that the expenditures of the richer classes in America are governed by "the principle of conspicuous waste." This means that a man or a woman—especially the latter—must strive in the matter of dress, entertainment, and equipage, to show that he or she is able to command the most costly articles that money can buy, and then must treat them with such recklessness as to indicate that they could be immediately replaced. And Mrs. Charlotte Perkins Stetson tells us in *The Home* that, "woman puts upon her body, without criticism or objection, every excess, distortion, discord, and contradiction that can be sewed together. . . . The esthetic sense of woman has never interfered with her acceptance of ugliness if ugliness were the fashion."

This superficial survey of a field that is so broad as to demand a volume for adequate treatment, and so difficult as to be nearly incapable of definite description, no doubt appears fragmentary, vague, and possibly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the hope is entertained that two or three points have been made more or less clear. First, that the theory of values and of life which impels men to multiply and vary and develop and satisfy *indefinitely* those wants that are grouped under the heads of shelter, food, clothing, social intercourse, and amusement, is false, and makes as a rule for physical, mental, and moral decadence. To those persons—and their number is legion—who explicitly or implicitly adopt and pursue this materialistic ideal, money is literally "everything." Money

does, indeed, "enslave" them. And it is difficult to say which class receives the greater hurt—those who succeed to a considerable degree in realizing their aim, or those who utterly fail. Although the latter do not attain to that excessive satisfaction of material wants which is demoralizing, their incessant striving for it prevents them from adopting reasonable views of life, and their failure leaves them discontented and pessimistic. In the second place, ninety-nine out of every hundred persons are morally certain to lead healthier, cleaner, nobler, more intellectual, and more useful lives if they neither pass nor attempt to pass beyond the line of moderate comfort in the matter of material satisfactions. Lest this statement be accounted too vague, let us hazard the assertion that the majority of families that expend more than \$10,000 per year for the *material goods* of life would be better off in mind and character if they had kept below that figure. Because of this general fact, reflecting and discriminating persons have but scant sympathy with the ambitions of the mass of comfortably situated country people who come to the city to "better their position," or with the desire of the highest paid sections of the laboring classes to increase their remuneration. Today, as of old, the prayer of the Wise Man represents the highest practical wisdom: "Give me neither poverty nor riches; give me only the necessaries of life." In this connection the hope may be expressed that the foregoing pages will have shown the "indefinite-satisfaction-of-indefinite-wants" theory to be directly at variance with the

Christian conception of wealth and of life. Even the majority of Catholics seem to hold to the Christian conception only theoretically and vaguely, not clearly and practically. In a subsequent paper an attempt will be made to apply this conception to the actual life of today, and to indicate more precisely the content of a reasonable standard of life.¹

II

We speak much about the duty of avoiding excessive attachment to and misuse of wealth, but our utterances are mostly of the nature of platitudes. We do not often think into them any concrete meaning as to what precisely constitutes excessive attachment or misuse in the matter of food, clothing, houses, amusements, and "social" activities. Or, when our concepts are more specific, they are generally so liberal and lax as to fit only the very few whose offences under these heads are striking, notorious, and universally condemned. As a contribution toward more definite views and estimates, the present paper will attempt "to apply the Christian conception to the actual life of today and to indicate more precisely the content of a reasonable standard of life."

¹ In order to make more concrete the argument set forth above, let us suggest that if the most costly one-fourth of the houses in any large city were to disappear, to be replaced by dwellings costing on the average one-third as much, and if the general standard of living of the occupants were reduced accordingly, practically all of them would be better off, and their example of sane living would have a very beneficial effect on the rest of the community.

According to the Christian teaching, man's chief business on earth is to fit himself for the Life Beyond. This task he fulfils by living up to the commandments of Christ and the moral law of nature. As applying to the use of material goods and the satisfaction of material wants, the moral law may be summarized in the following sentences. The soul, its life, and its needs are intrinsically superior to the life and needs of the body. The intellect and the disinterested will are essentially higher faculties than the senses and the selfish will. Hence right human life consists, not in the indefinite satisfaction of material wants, but in striving to know more and more, and to love more and more, the best that is to be known and loved, namely, God and, in proportion to their resemblance to Him, His creatures. It demands that man shall satisfy the cravings of his animal and lower nature only to the extent that is compatible with a reasonable attention to the things of the mind and spirit. The senses and their demands are not on the same moral level as the reason; they are of subordinate worth and importance; they perform the function of instruments. Whenever they are made coordinate with, or superior to, the reason, whenever they are indulged so far as to interfere with the normal life and activity of the reason, there occur moral disorder, perversion of function, and unrighteous conduct. Similarly, whenever the selfish encroaches upon the disinterested will—as when we satisfy our senses with goods that ought to go to the neighbor, when we indulge such passions as envy and hatred, or when we expend upon our

minds the time and energy that ought to be given to family, neighbor, or country—the moral order is inverted and violated.

Thus far the moral law of reason and nature. The supernatural, the Christian, moral law is frankly ascetic; not in the sense that it imposes upon all persons the Evangelical Counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience, but inasmuch as it requires men to wage a continuous struggle against many of the cravings of appetite, and to deny many desires and ambitions which are dear to self. Unless the child subordinate his will to that of his parents, his love of play to the demands of school, his desire of possession to reasonable self-discipline, his selfishness and cruelty to the just claims of his playmates, he will grow into a self-willed, passionate, and unlovable youth. He will be the antithesis of the Christian type. The Christian young man or young woman enters into a series of relations in which the need of self-denial is intensified and widened. Purity demands rigid control of the desires of the flesh; temperance requires careful self-restraint in eating and drinking; justice enjoins respect for the rights and goods of others, notwithstanding the powerful, manifold, and insidious impulses that make for the violation of this precept; the law of labor forbids indulging the tendency to idleness and slothfulness; charity commands the denial of that self-satisfaction, self-comfort, and self-assertion which are incompatible with the claims of Christian brotherhood. Christianity is ascetic in the stricter sense of the term when

it urges, nay, requires men to do without many things which are in themselves lawful, in order that they may be the better able to pass by the things that are unlawful. The words of St. Paul concerning the athlete who "refrains himself from all things" express the true Christian theory and practice.

Both the natural and the Christian laws of conduct are, consequently, opposed to the current ideals of life and welfare. Both demand that the power to do without shall be cultivated to such a degree that the lower nature in man shall be kept in constant subjection to the higher. Both deny that it is lawful for man to satisfy all wants indifferently or to seek the indefinite expansion and satisfaction of his material wants.

Concerning the value of material goods, the teaching of the Divine Founder of Christianity is clear and forcible. Consider a few of his pronouncements: "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven." "Woe to you rich." "Blessed are you poor." "Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth." "For a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of things that he possesseth." "Be not solicitous as to what you shall eat, or what you shall drink, or what you shall put on." "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." "You cannot serve God and Mammon." "If thou wouldst be perfect, go sell what thou hast and give to the poor, and come follow

me." The doctrine of these texts is remote, indeed, from the theory that right life consists in the ever-widening and varying of material wants, and the ever fuller and more diversified satisfaction of them. In many places, and under many different forms, Christ insists that material possessions are unimportant for the child of God, and that those who have much wealth will find it almost impossible to get into his kingdom.

The great Fathers of the Church used strong, almost extreme language in describing the dangers of riches and denouncing the men of wealth of their time. Many of them are so severe that they have been, incorrectly however, classified as socialists. St. Thomas Aquinas declared that although man cannot entirely disregard the pursuit and the possession of external goods, he ought to seek them with moderation, and in conformity with the demands of a simple life. Essentially the same views have been held and taught by all the representative authorities of the Church throughout the Middle Ages and down to the present hour. Neither Christ nor His Church has ever sanctioned the theory that right and reasonable life requires magnificent houses, furnishings, equipage, and entertainment, sumptuous food and splendid apparel, costly recreation and luxurious amusements.

Let us apply these general truths and principles to the use of material goods and the process of satisfying material wants, with a view to more definite and particular conclusions. To begin with, we can enclose

the field of material welfare by certain upper and lower limits, within which ninety-nine of every hundred persons must have a place if they are to enjoy satisfactory conditions of Christian living. It would seem that these conditions are lacking whenever an average-sized family in one of the larger American cities receives an annual income of less than \$1,500. When the family income falls below that amount per year, the quality and amount of food; the size, appearance, adornment, and equipment of the home; the kind of clothes; the scant provision for sickness, accidents, and old age; the lack of sufficient means for recreation, books, newspapers, charity, and religion; and the oppressively real fear of want, will subject the members of the family to severe temptations that would be unfelt, or much less keenly felt, if the income were above the figure named. Insufficient and monotonous food increases the craving for strong drink; shabby clothes make persons ashamed to appear among their fellows, and lead to loss of self-respect, discouragement, and discontent; an unattractive home produces similar results and impels some members of the family to seek outside associations, perhaps in the saloon; lack of provision for the untoward contingencies of life fosters discouragement and discontent which are harmful to thrift and industry, and productive of irreligion and envy of the neighbor; inability to contribute to religion causes men to remain away from church, while the absence of reading matter leaves the mind barren; insufficiency of recreation is injurious to health, efficiency,

and contentment. All these evils are, indeed, relative. They are felt by families above as well as by those below the \$1,500 limit. Nevertheless, they inflict serious, objective injury upon one hundred of the latter to one of the former.

How shall we define the upper limit of family expenditure that is compatible with decent Christian living? The question may at first sight seem preposterous, inasmuch as reasonable life is possible at many different stages above the decent minimum. Yet if the Christian view of life is correct, the maximum as well as the minimum ought to be susceptible of concrete statement. If expenditures for material goods begin to be harmful as soon as the limits of moderation are passed and the satisfaction of the senses comes into conflict with the life of the spirit, those limits ought to be capable of definition in terms of goods and of money. To deny this is implicitly to defend the theory that right life consists in the indefinite satisfaction of indefinitely expanding wants.

In the matter of shelter the maximum for an average-sized family—husband and wife and four or five children—would seem to be a house of about twelve rooms. Obviously the mere fact that the residence contains a larger number of rooms does not constitute a serious impediment to reasonable living. Not the quantity of housing, but its accidentals and accessories, is the important consideration. Not the rooms in excess of twelve, but what they generally bring in their train, makes the difference. When the limit here set

down is passed, it is not additional comfort in the legitimate sense of that term that is desired, but rather accommodations for numerous servants, facilities for elaborate social functions, and the consciousness of occupying as large or as imposing a dwelling as some neighbor or neighbors. Such a house will usually involve adornment, furnishings, and equipment which will be distinguished more for costliness, richness, and magnificence than simply for beauty.

All these and many other ends, which assume prominence about the time that the twelve-room limit is exceeded, do create real and serious hindrances to decent Christian living. Chief among these hindrances are: a great waste of time, energy, thought, and money; many other demoralizing conditions that seem to be inseparable from sumptuous dwellings and the individual and social life therein fostered; the inevitable intensification of the passion of envy; the desire to outdo one's neighbors in the splendor of material possessions and in outward show generally; a diminution of sincerity in social relations; a lessened consciousness of the reality and the universality of Christian brotherhood; and, finally, immersion to such a degree in the things of matter that the higher realities of life are easily forgotten or ignored.

Satisfaction of the fool want becomes excessive when the appetite is stimulated or pampered to the injury of health, and when victuals come to be prized for their capacity to please the palate rather than for their power to nourish. These conditions are reached

sooner than most persons realize. Habitually to pass by plain food, and to seek the tenderest and most delicate grades, implies a condition in which the digestive organs are being overtaxed. Mere variety in the articles of diet, when extended beyond moderate bounds, produces the same result. A liberal use of the accidentals, such as condiments, relishes, exquisite desserts, is likewise harmful. Even a nice attention to the preparation and serving of the food easily produces undue and injurious stimulation of the appetite. These physical excesses, or extravagances, are generally accompanied by evils of the moral order. The pleasure-giving aspects of diet and of eating become too prominent and are too carefully sought. There is an excessive attention to the satisfaction of the food want which constitutes one form of the vice of gluttony. From it follows a lessening of control over other appetites; for the power of governing the senses is a unified thing which becomes weakened as a whole whenever it suffers injury in any part. Failure to control the food appetite, for example, reduces the ability to govern the sex appetite. Finally, the limits of reason are exceeded when the accessories of eating, as the service, the dishes, the dining-room furniture, are distinguished chiefly for their costliness, richness, and magnificence.

With regard to clothing, there is excess as soon as the desire to be dressed comfortably and decently becomes less prominent than the desire for conspicuousness, richness, elaborateness, splendor. All these are re-

finements, artificial complications, of the process of satisfying the clothing want. When they come to be regularly sought after, they cause a waste of money and a deterioration of character. There is waste of money, inasmuch as these ends are relatively—indeed, we might say, absolutely—of no importance to reasonable living. The character suffers through the indulgence of the passion for distinction in mere possessions and the passions of pride, vanity, and envy. It is obviously impossible to draw with precision the line which separates comfort, decency, and simple beauty from conspicuousness, richness, elaborateness, splendor; but the several estimates of a carefully selected committee would probably show a fairly close agreement.

The tests of simplicity, moderation, and comparative inexpensiveness mark off the reasonable from the unreasonable in the matter of amusement and recreation. When these conditions are present all the legitimate demands of these wants are abundantly supplied. The spirits are refreshed, the energies are relaxed, the faculties are *recreated*. When these bounds are exceeded, when amusements and recreation become elaborate, manifold, and costly, or when they are elevated to a place among the important aims of life, there occurs a perversion which is injurious both physically and morally. Time and money are wasted, energy is expended in the feverish pursuit of new forms of amusement, satiety and disappointment increase, and the temptations to unrighteous conduct are multiplied. Even the practice of making extensive

and frequent sojourns in foreign countries, while possessing some educational advantages, consumes time and money out of all proportion to the resulting benefits. In many cases its chief effect is to satisfy jaded curiosity, fill up heavy-hanging time, or feed the passions of vanity and conscious superiority.

The activities that are denominated "social" afford perhaps the most striking indication of the distinction between the reasonable and the meretricious in the satisfaction of material wants. There is a certain moderate scale of social activity and entertainment in which the exercises, the dress, the refreshments, and all the other accessories, are distinguished by a certain naturalness and simplicity. Where these conditions (which are more easily recognized than described) are verified, the usual result is a maximum of enjoyment and right human feeling. When these limits are passed; when the chief concern is about the accessories of the entertainment rather than the promotion of kindly human intercourse and enjoyment; when the main object is to emulate the elaborateness, costliness, or magnificence of some other "function"—genuine enjoyment and kindly feeling are generally less than in the simpler conditions, while the damage to purse, health, nerves, and character is almost invariably greater.

The foregoing paragraphs may be concretely summarized in the statement that the annual expenditure for material goods in the case of the overwhelming majority of moderately sized families, ought not to exceed

\$10,000. Probably the range of expenditure which would afford the best conditions of Christian life for a considerable majority of all American families lies between \$3,000 and \$5,000 per annum.

The attempt to state so precisely and to define so narrowly the cost of living according to the Christian rule of life will probably strike many as presumptuous, preposterous, artificial, arbitrary. Nevertheless, if one is sincere, if one wishes to write to any serious purpose, if one intends to get beyond empty platitudes, one must make some such attempt and in some such terms. And the writer is perfectly willing to have his estimate subjected to criticism, to criticism as definite and concrete as the estimate itself. He is quite confident that, with very rare exceptions, \$10,000 will seem ample to cover all reasonable family expenditures for material goods. When families go beyond this figure they are satisfying wants which in the interests of the best Christian life ought to be denied. In so far as the added amount is spent on a house, its principal effect is to increase not legitimate comfort, but pride, vanity, waste of time, and unsocial feelings of superiority. In so far as it is expended for dress it produces the same results, and makes persons unduly attendant to and dependent upon wants that are unnecessary, artificial, and fundamentally ignoble. In so far as it goes for food, it does not mean more nourishment, but some injury to health and an undue attachment to the lower or animal self. In so far as it is exchanged for amusements, recrea-

tion, or social activities, the same and other vices are fostered without any counterbalancing good result.

Where the family expends more than \$10000 for material goods, the results, except in a few cases, will be harmful to Christian life, inasmuch as the senses will be exalted to the detriment of the higher will and the reason, the altruistic qualities will be unable to obtain reasonable development in the midst of so many influences making for selfishness, and the character will grow soft, while the power to do without will grow weak.

The belief that men can live noble, religious, and intellectual lives in the presence of abundant material satisfaction, is well called by the economist, Charles Perin, "the most terrible seduction of our time." It counts among its adherents even the majority of Catholics. Whether they have little or much of this satisfaction, they long for more, and are willing to run the risk of the resulting demoralization. Nay, there are Catholics, both clerical and lay, who realize that the majority of their co-religionists whose expenditures are above the level described in these pages would be "better off" in the true, the Catholic, sense of these words, below that level; yet these same Catholics rejoice when their friends reach that scale of expenditure. So great is the power of a dominant popular fallacy!

Perhaps the strongest objection against the maximum set down here will be made on behalf of "social position." Larger, much larger expenditures seem to

many persons to be justified and necessary in order to maintain that rank in society, that place among their fellows, that standard of living to which they have become accustomed. To sink below this scale would be a hardship and a departure from what they and their friends have come to regard as decent living. Now the requirements of social rank are among the legitimate needs that ought to be regularly met, for, as St. Thomas expresses it, "no one ought to live unbecomingly." In their discussions concerning the duties of almsgiving and of restitution, the theologians have always made definite and liberal allowance for this class of needs. Let us remember, however, that their estimates and conclusions reflect the social conditions of the Middle Ages, when the higher conveniences and the luxuries which absorb the greater part of the expenditures of the well-to-do classes today were practically all unknown; when most of the exceptional outlay was for servants, attendance, and the other accompaniments of public power; and when high social rank had its basis less in wealth than in public or quasi-public authority and functions. Reference was for the most part to rulers, members of the nobility, and public officials. Large concessions were made to their demands on behalf of social position, in order to safe-guard their functions and influence among the people. In other words, the chief reason was a social one; the people demanded a certain magnificence in the lives of their rulers and of the other wielders of social authority.

No such considerations can be urged in favor of the rich in a country like ours. Neither popular welfare, nor popular sentiment, nor any sane interpretation of decent or becoming living will justify expenditures in excess of \$10,000 per year. If any serious defense of them is to be attempted, it must be based upon the assumption that any reduction of them would injure the morals or the self-respect of persons who had long been accustomed to this scale of living. That any permanent deterioration in conduct or character would overtake any considerable fraction of those who would descend to the \$10,000 level, is a supposition that may be summarily dismissed. It is overwhelmingly probable that after a short time of adjustment to the new conditions, the "descenders," with rare exceptions, would be stronger morally than before. The hypothetical injury to self-respect does not deserve serious consideration, inasmuch as it refers to a false self-respect, a fear of being looked down upon by those who have false standards of worth, dignity, and decency. The self-respect which is based upon the extravagant satisfaction of material wants, and conditioned by the approval of those who believe in that sort of thing, ought to be trampled upon and eradicated.

Suppose that Mr. Carnegie, who has declared that the duty of the man of wealth is "to set an example of modest unostentatious living, shunning display or extravagance," were to take these words seriously, interpreting them according to their ordinary acceptation, and to move from his sumptuous Fifth Avenue

mansion into a comfortable, medium-sized house in a respectable, middle-class neighborhood, there to live on a scale of simple and moderate comfort. Does anyone think that he would suffer any real loss of self-respect, honor, reputation, public appreciation, or influence for good? On the contrary, he would gain in all these regards. Not the least of his gains would be his enhanced credit for seriousness and sincerity. And his experience would be duplicated by every rich man and rich woman who would make the experiment.

Those who would take this step would be better off, not only in character and public esteem, but even as regards contentment and happiness. At least, this would be the result if practically all who are now above the \$10,000 level were to place themselves below it; for the principal factor impelling men to believe in the worth of luxurious living, namely, the social worship of luxury, would have disappeared. It is the popular faith in the happiness-producing power of abundant material satisfaction that leads the possessor of such satisfaction to cling to it. In reality it causes a greater slavery of the mind to the senses, and increases anxiety, worry, and satiety. "In proportion as a man strives to exalt and secure himself through external goods, he falls back wretchedly upon himself, and experiences an increase of dissatisfaction and *ennui*" (Perin, "De la Richesse," p. 11).

If only a few were to make the experiment, they would undoubtedly suffer considerable mental anguish, but it would be only temporary. Besides, it would be

more than offset by the increase of mental and moral freedom, by a deeper and truer self-respect, and by the genuine approval of the larger and saner part of the community.

The foregoing discussion may be profitably supplemented by a word on the social aspects of excessive living expenditures. Beyond doubt, a scale of living in excess of the maximum limit defined in these pages renders the overwhelming majority of those who adopt it less able and less willing to make sacrifices for the public good, whether on the field of battle, in public life, or through any other form of social service. It makes great achievements in art, science, or literature morally impossible, for the simple reason that it reduces to a minimum the power to abstain, to endure, to wait patiently for large results. Nor is this all. For every person who lives according to this pernicious standard, there are thousands who are unable to do so, yet who adopt it as their ideal and strive to imitate it so far as they are able. Hence these, too, suffer immeasurable hurt in their capacity for self-sacrifice, generosity, and disinterested social service. All the lessons of history point unhesitatingly to the conclusion that social no less than individual welfare, is best promoted by moderate living. Colonel Roosevelt stated this truth in terms that ought to be committed to memory and constantly pondered by every one of his countrymen: "In the last analysis a healthy state can exist only when the men and women who make it lead clean, vigorous, healthy lives; when the children

are so trained that they shall endeavor, not to shirk difficulties, but to overcome them, not to seek ease, but to know how to wrest triumph from toil and risk. The man must be glad to do a man's work, to dare and endure, and to labor; to keep himself, and to keep those dependent upon him. The woman must be the housewife, the helpmeet of the homemaker, the wise and fearless mother of many children" ("The Strenuous Life," p. 5). In the opinion of the writer, there are five hundred chances to one that a family will realize these conditions much more fully below than above the \$10,000 level.

A stock objection to the doctrine here defended rests on the assertion that every community needs some examples of life on a scale of material magnificence, in order to prevent the dulling and deadening effect of monotonous mediocrity. Precisely why all the real and solid effects of variety could not be had within the limits set in this paper is not easily seen. The satisfaction and the uplifting influence that are derived by the masses from the contemplation of palatial residences, splendid raiment and equipages, and the other public manifestations of excessive expenditure, would be vastly overtopped by the benefits that would follow the investment of this money in decent habitations for the poor, schools, hospitals, parks, play-grounds, art galleries, and public concerts. There would also be a decrease of social hatred, envy, and discontent. At any rate a reduction of 90 per cent in the number of the existing instances of magnificent living would, ow-

ing to the comparative rarity of the phenomenon, increase the impression made upon the minds and imaginations of the masses.

The argument on behalf of lavish expenditures for works of art in private residences is likewise of little value. The assistance and encouragement given to artists would be equally great if these purchases were made for the benefit of public galleries.

It must be admitted that luxurious living benefits industry in so far as it prevents an excessive accumulation of capital and increases the demand for the products of capital and industry, but the money thus spent would be doubly beneficial if it were employed in works of public and private benevolence.

No direct reference has been made in the present paper to the question of great private fortunes. While these are a necessary condition of excessive standards of living, they are separable, at least in theory, from the latter, and present a distinct problem. The sole object of these pages has been to define as precisely as possible the range of expenditure which is most compatible with—which, indeed, may be called normal for—Christian living. Describing this in terms of dollars may, at first sight, seem ridiculous. Nevertheless, those who admit the soundness of the underlying principles cannot set aside the estimate with a wave of the hand. Possibly they will find that it is not easily overthrown by concrete argument. Throughout the article the writer has had chiefly in mind Catholics. For they too are, to a deplorable extent, under the

delusion that valuable life consists in the indefinite satisfaction of material wants. This delusion injures those who are below as well as those who are above the reasonable maximum. The former are discontented where they ought to be well satisfied, and envious where they ought to be thankful because of the temptations that they have escaped. The latter frequently see their children grow weak in faith and character, while they themselves become worldly, cold, and ungenerous. The contributions to religion, charity, or education by Catholics who live sumptuously, by all Catholics, indeed, who exceed the bounds of simple and moderate living—are, generally speaking, utterly inadequate as compared with their income. Herein consists the *inordinate attachment* to wealth which is contrary to the Christian principle. It is no longer that ridiculous passion for gold which obsessed the misers of our nursery tales; it is simply the striving for and indulgence in excessive amounts of material satisfaction.

IX BIRTH CONTROL

I

At the forty-fourth annual meeting of the American Public Health Association, held in Cincinnati, October 27, 1916, Dr. S. Adolphus Knopf read a paper advocating deliberate family limitation by the poor. The Women's City Club of New York has endorsed the practice and the movement. In suspending sentence for burglary in the case of a mother of six children who has a tuberculous husband, Judge William H. Wadhams, of New York City, denounced the law which forbids giving information on methods of preventing motherhood. He maintained that women in the circumstances of the one before him for sentence should be provided with this species of "knowledge." A New York woman who was sentenced to thirty days in jail for violating the law which prohibits the spread of such information went on a "hunger strike" and, after eleven days, was pardoned by the Governor on her promise not to break the law again. While she was in prison a large mass meeting of protest was held, attended mostly by women, and by many girls of high school age. "The boxes were filled with richly dressed persons, many of whom are socially prominent." The sister of the woman in jail was "wildly cheered" by the audience when she declared her intention of continuing to break the law, and the meeting adopted resolutions to work for the abolition of all laws such

as the one violated by the imprisoned woman. The physicians of the Health Office of New York City admit that they tell the women who come under their care, suffering from tuberculosis and some other diseases, how to avoid pregnancy. Evidently they do not believe that the use of such devices is an essential violation of the moral law, and they contend that they are not transgressing the spirit of the civil law.

The instances just cited are sufficient to indicate the wide and varied activity of the agitators in this movement. In the presence of such open propaganda, Catholics can no longer afford to remain silent and inactive. The policy of reticence must, so far as necessary, be modified. If it is continued, if we persist in ignoring this insidious movement, our own people will in considerable numbers be among its victims. The practices of marital perversion will be more and more generally urged upon Catholics of the laboring class as a remedy for social and economic ills. Social workers and friendly visitors representing secular charitable organizations will be particularly zealous in impressing upon indigent mothers the necessity of having no more children. This indecent meddling creates a new duty of charity for our social workers. They must assist the poor, not only along the well-recognized lines, but in this new and repulsive field which has been brought into existence by the contraceptionists. Our Catholic poor who have come under the influence of these pestiferous persons must be firmly and clearly told that these unspeakable perversities

are deadly sins, violations of the law of nature and of God. No condition of poverty nor any other set of physical evils can justify the perpetration of moral evil. A good end never justifies a bad means.

Perhaps the most pretentious argument yet made in favor of birth control is that contained in the paper, referred to above, which was read by Dr. Knopf before the American Public Health Association. Inasmuch as it comes from a medical man, and was given a place in the proceedings of an important society, it will be accorded considerable authority. In the following paragraphs we shall examine it critically, and take therefrom occasion to state the correct and Catholic position.

II

The paper defends birth control on grounds of public health, economics, and ethics. Let us first deal with his contentions under the head of health.

Dr. Knopf: Child mortality is extremely high among the large families of the poor. The reasons are: the weakening of the mother through frequent pregnancies and labor in factory or shop, congestion in the home, and lack of sufficient income to prevent and cure illness. This is particularly true with regard to tuberculosis.

This statement of fact, and all the reasons given but one, may be accepted without admitting for an instant that the proper remedy is smaller families obtained through artificial prevention of conception.

The obvious, the reasonable, and the just remedy is a living wage for the father; that is, a wage sufficient to enable him to support the entire family in reasonable comfort. It is monstrous and cowardly to attempt to put upon the parents the responsibility for a condition which is plainly due to social injustice. It is unjust and unreasonable to require the parents to give up their right to a normal number of children, while the employing classes and society continue to profit by the exploitation of underpaid labor. Despite the emphasis placed by the doctor on tuberculosis, it offers no exception to the foregoing sentences. The true remedy is more income. The insinuation that frequent pregnancies are in themselves harmful to the average woman is simply not justified by experience. Such a result sometimes happens in the case of poor mothers, but the true cause is malnutrition and overwork, not the mere number of pregnancies. Here, again, the genuine and the just remedy is a living wage for the father.

Dr. Knopf: In Holland, where artificial birth restriction is encouraged by public authority, it is said that the stature of the people has increased 4 inches in the last fifty years.

This statement is "important if true." As a man of science, Dr. Knopf ought to know that he is acting quite unscientifically and uncritically when he accepts this remarkable assertion on the authority of an unnamed speaker at a eugenics congress. If he were a logician he would realize that, even though the increase in height had taken place, it might properly

be ascribed to many other factors than the practice of birth restriction. As a matter of fact, the birth rate of Holland during the last sixty years has varied from 37.7 to 29 per thousand, reaching the latter figure only in the year 1910. This average rate is almost as high as that of Germany, and exceeds that of Belgium, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Massachusetts (Thompson: "Population: A Study in Malthusianism, pp. 104-109"). Consequently the argument from Holland must be revised somewhat as follows: Possibly, though quite improbably, the people of Holland have, in the last fifty years, increased their stature by 4 inches; if this has occurred it may have been due to birth restriction, which, however, has not been greatly practiced, either extensively or intensively, as is evident from the fairly high birth rate that has prevailed in that country synchronously with the remarkable elongation of its inhabitants.

Dr. Knopf draws some equally authentic, scientific, and convincing examples and proof from certain sections of the people of France and Australia. Far be it from us to suggest that the shoemaker should always stick to his last, that the good doctor can serve humanity better in the field of medical practice than in applied sociology.

III

The second division of Dr. Knopf's paper deals with the economic and sociological aspects of birth control.

We consider briefly his main contentions under these heads.

Dr. Knopf: The economic loss caused by the presence of thousands of children, mentally and physically crippled for life, is beyond calculation.

This is a typical example of the loose and exaggerated statements of the contraceptionists when they touch the question of heredity. So far as the "mentally crippled" are concerned, birth control is utterly irrelevant; for the persons who are likely to transmit this defect will not generally be induced to adopt the devices of contraception. With the exception of syphilis, the physical defects that are strictly hereditary are relatively unimportant and affect an insignificant number of persons. The transmission of syphilis can and should be prevented by entire abstinence from marital intercourse. The majority of the babies who now come into the world puny and anaemic would not be thus handicapped if their mothers were properly nourished. Here, again, the real remedy, the normal remedy, is a larger family income.

Dr. Knopf: The larger the family of the poor, the more child labor and family disruption, and the lower the standards of life and morals in general.

The child labor to which the doctor refers is either a good thing or a bad thing for the child. In the former case, there is nothing to deplore; in the latter case, the laws against child labor are at fault, not the size of the family. As regards the charge that the integrity and

morals of the family decline as its size increases, we take the liberty of making a flat denial, and we ask the Doctor to produce his evidence.

"More domestic trouble occurs in Chicago families with one child than in those with a large number of children," states the monthly report of the non-support cases in the Domestic Relation Court of Chicago. Among 535 warrants issued for negligent husbands, 147 were sworn out by women with one child, 118 by mothers of two, 15 by mothers with five and one each by women with from nine to thirteen children."

Dr. Knopf: Judicious birth control does not mean race suicide; for in Holland the death rate declined faster than the birth rate between 1881 and 1912.

This is another of those superficial and unscientific inferences which are all too common in the writings of birth control advocates. Dr. Knopf draws a general conclusion from the statistics of *three cities of one country*. As we intimated above, he would be well advised if he kept out of the field of statistics. What are the *general* facts about the relation of the birth rate to the death rate? If we divide the countries of the world for which we have appropriate statistics into two classes, calling those with a birth rate of thirty or more per thousand high birth rate countries, and those falling below that figure low birth rate countries, we get the following results: In the nine low birth rate countries, including Holland but excepting Denmark, the rate of increase of population declined between 1880 and 1910. At the former date the average rate of increase of these nine countries was 14.2 per cent per thousand; in 1910 it was only 11.6 per

cent. We take the year 1880 as a starting point because most of the countries do not present statistics for an earlier date, and those that do give earlier figures show the same trend for the forty-year as for the thirty-year period. In five of the nine high birth rate countries, the rate of population increase was higher in 1910 than in 1880. Three of the nine give figures only from 1890, but they show a rise in the rate of increase for the twenty years between that date and 1910. The last of the nine, Uruguay, presents statistics for only twenty years, but they indicate a decline in the rate of increase. The average rate of increase of all nine countries in 1910 was 13.3, which was 2.1 per cent higher than the average at the earlier dates.

In the low birth rate countries, therefore, the falling birth rate has not been offset by the falling death rate, and the present rate of population increase is lower than it is in the high birth rate countries. Moreover, the decline in the death rate was considerably greater in the high birth rate countries than in the low birth rate countries between 1880 and 1910.¹ We shall not imitate Dr. Knof's reasoning by concluding that the greater decrease in the death rate of these countries was caused by their greater birth rate. It was mainly due to the fact that they had a further distance to go before they should reach the point at which the rate of reduction necessarily becomes relatively slow.

¹ The statistics upon which our computations are based will be found in Thompson's "Population: A Study of Malthusianism," pp. 104-109.

Since most of the low birth rate countries have now got their death rate down rather close to the lowest practicable limit, future reductions of it will be both slow and slight. On the other hand, their birth rate will in all probability continue to decline indefinitely. France has practiced birth control much longer than any other country, and its population is now stationary. There is no reason to expect that any other country which adopts the practice widely and generally will check it in time to escape a like condition. Indeed, there are solid, positive grounds for fearing this very outcome. In order that the population of a country should make some increase, those couples that marry must average about four children each; but no social class that adopts the theory and practice of contraception shows such a high average; consequently a stationary or declining population becomes inevitable as soon as the cult has been taken up by all the important social classes. Once the laboring and farming groups become addicted to the practice in this country, the days of increasing population will be ended. We might agree with Dr. Knopf that "judicious" birth control need not lead to race suicide, but we know that if it becomes general it will exceed the limits of the "judicious."

IV

Dr. Knopf: The sufferings of frail and poverty-stricken mothers and of their puny and ill-fed babes have convinced me that thoughtless procreation is utterly immoral.

The doctor identifies immorality with pain. Conduct that produces pleasure, or happiness, is good; conduct that produces pain is bad. If one accepts this view, and is capable of logical thinking, one must look upon duty, benevolence and sympathy as superstitions, or at least as having no value except in so far as they bring pleasure to oneself. Pleasure and happiness are good only because they are *my* pleasure and happiness. If I find happiness in being truthful, honest and chaste, it is reasonable that I should practice all these virtues; but if they do not bring me happiness I am a fool to trouble myself with them. Such is the moral code of the man who accepts the doctrine that immorality and suffering are one.

Needless to say, Catholics reject this pleasure-and-pain standard of morality. It is condemned by the Church, and it is contrary to the voice of reason. Right reason tells us that those actions are morally good which are in harmony with our rational nature, which promote the perfection of human nature, both individual and social. Therefore, the question whether pleasure and pain be morally good or morally bad depends upon their relation to rational nature and the ends of rational nature. We may agree with Dr. Knopf that the use of birth control devices will in some cases increase pleasure and diminish pain, but these practices remain bad simply because they are contrary to nature and nature's purposes. They are a perversion of nature, since they use the generative faculties in such a way as to prevent the natural ends of the

faculties from being attained. The very use of the faculty is made an abuse; marital intercourse is made an acted lie. This is intrinsically, essentially, necessarily and forever wrong. No considerations of pleasure or pain or any other form of mere utility can make it morally right.

We are well aware that this reasoning will not be convincing to persons who believe in the pleasure and pain theory of morality. Such persons, if they are logical, must also deny the immorality of infrequent acts of solitary unchastity or solitary drunkenness. These cannot be shown to be wrong except on the ground that they are perversions of nature. To persons who believe that all three of these classes of actions are morally good in so far as pleasurable we can only say, in the words of Lincoln, "If that is the sort of thing these people like, why, that is the sort of thing that they like."

For Catholics the morality of artificial devices for preventing conception is not entirely dependent upon our perception of their unnatural character. They have all been condemned by the authoritative decisions of the Church.

Of course we admit that the suffering involved in bearing children is in some rare cases a moral evil. When it interferes gravely with the maintenance of a reasonable degree of health, and when it prevents members of the family from having access to those other goods which are essential to reasonable and virtuous life, it is not a morally good thing. The question is sometimes

asked whether it would be permissible to advocate "birth control by self-control" in extreme cases, as when insanity or feeble-mindedness in the parents was likely to be transmitted to the children. Perhaps the safest answer to this question is to cite the appropriate general principle laid down by the moral theologians. It is that if grave injury, such as loathsome disease, will follow intercourse, the parties, or either of them, are justified in refraining from intercourse. Our opinion is that the same course is justified when it is reasonably certain that the offspring will be feeble-minded, or when additional children will mean dire and degrading destitution; for these evils are surely of as great magnitude as those forms of sickness mentioned by the moral theologians. But it must be understood that the remedy that we are now discussing is abstinence from intercourse, not the perverted intercourse advocated by the birth controlists. The latter practice is as certainly and invariably immoral as murder.

Dr. Knopf: Fear of a large family prevents innumerable young men from marrying early; consequently they become diseased through irregular intercourse and afterwards transfer the disease to their innocent wives and children.

This is pretty far fetched. The men who resort to such unchaste relations are generally well acquainted with the artificial devices for keeping families small. Moreover, the men who indulge in contraceptive practices in the marriage relation have few moral scruples

against commercialized adultery, and have peculiarly strong temptations in that direction. As a "moral" remedy against the contraction and spread of venereal disease, instruction in birth control methods seems to be preposterous and futile.

v

Dr. Knopf: I have been the recipient of communications from many leading physicians, divines, political economists and sociologists, all agreeing with me that judicious birth control, under the highest ethical medical guidance, is a national necessity.

The doctor then submits eighteen or twenty names of rather prominent persons who are in favor of birth control. A few of these are repeated in a list of some fifty names appended to an "Endorsement of Birth Control," which appeared as a full page advertisement in the *New Republic*, March 3, 1917. About half of these are the names of women. The majority of the women might be classified as social reformers. The majority of the men whose names appear are either physicians, college professors or clergymen. Most of the physicians and professors are fairly prominent, while the few clergymen are of the ultra-radical and unorthodox variety.

What is the significance of these endorsements? What amount of weight may properly be attributed to them?

In the first place we note that it would be very easy to bring forward a much larger number of persons, of

at least equal prominence as physicians, professors, clergymen and reformers of both sexes, who are opposed to birth control. The balance of authority in all the pertinent fields of activity is probably very decidedly against the views and the program of the contraceptionists. Against the authority of the physicians whose names appear in Dr. Knopf's and the *New Republic* lists may be set the action of the Medical Society of the County of New York. By a large majority, this association, a few months ago, refused to endorse an amendment to the Penal Code which would permit physicians to prescribe for their patients methods of preventing conception.

The main significance of the "authorities" that we are discussing is to show how far wrong well-meaning persons can go when they are without sound moral principles, and when they look at only one side of a complex social question. Almost all these persons are greatly interested in the welfare of the weak and oppressed. Many of them are actually engaged in works for the relief of suffering and the betterment of social conditions. Experience and observation have shown them that the greatest amount of physical and economic distress is to be found in the large families of the poor. Therefore, they hasten to conclude, the obvious remedy is small families among the poor, and the obvious method is deliberate prevention of conception.

This conclusion ignores entirely a consideration that ought to be primary; that is, the morality, the right and wrong, of contraceptive methods. The

average Catholic husband or wife who is advised or tempted to have recourse to these practices will immediately ask himself whether they are morally lawful. Instinctively the answer will come that they are not, for they are against nature. They are not, as the birth control advocates flippantly tell us, merely acts regulating or directing nature; they are perversions of nature, acts which thwart the course of nature, which prevent the ends of nature and of nature's faculties from being attained. Hence these birth control devices are all morally wrong. They are quite as immoral, and for the same reason, as suicide, self-mutilation, solitary unchastity, or solitary drunkenness. This is the answer that the Catholic makes to the recommendation that the burdens of a large family be avoided by the practice of contraception.

Now this principle that the perversion and thwarting of nature is morally wrong, has either become obscured in the minds of the "authorities" above mentioned, or has been deliberately rejected by them in favor of a contrary theory of morality. Probably the majority of them hold that there is no such thing as intrinsic right and wrong, they believe that right and wrong, good and bad, are only names for the socially useful and the socially harmful. They think that only those actions are bad which are injurious to society. Believing that contraceptive practices are beneficial to the community, they consequently hold such practices to be morally good.

We have not the space here to show that this social-

utility theory of morality is illogical and false. We merely point out that the person who holds this theory, and who is capable of logical thinking, will find that he must give up entirely the utility doctrine of morality or come to the conclusion that not social but individual welfare and happiness is the rule of right and wrong. In this case he will have to maintain that any action whatever, which makes for one's happiness or pleasure is morally good, no matter what suffering it brings to the neighbor or to society. Probably no human being has ever completely adopted or acted upon this monstrous principle.

The birth control "authorities" take into account only one, and that the superficial, aspect of the situation. They see clearly that in thousands of poor families a smaller number of children would mean a smaller amount of physical hardship. What they do not see, or see with sufficient clearness, is that if the laboring classes were to adopt the practice of birth control the country would inevitably witness a declining population.

The birth control advocates hope to see a situation in which the poorer classes would deliberately keep their families small while the comfortable and rich classes would have fairly large families. If these birth controlists were not so superficial, if they would take the trouble to consider adequately all sides of the question, they would realize that this hope is vain. It is precisely among the better-off classes that the practice of avoiding large families is most prevalent.

No arguments of patriotism or social welfare will prevent these classes from continuing their selfish course; for the man and woman who deliberately violate some of the strongest instincts and dictates of nature for the sake of ease and pleasure will be deaf to appeals drawn from the common good. They are too deeply sunk in the quagmire of egotism.

The average number of children per family among those classes that now practice birth control is not sufficient to produce a third generation that will be equal in numbers to the present generation. For example, any one hundred couples addicted to birth control will not have one hundred married couples among their grandchildren. The studies that have been made of birth control couples all show that they average less than three children each, whereas an average of between three and four children per family is necessary to maintain the present numbers of any group. The excess above two children is required on account of those who die before maturity, those who do not marry, and those married persons who have no children. Of course this argument assumes that the children will follow the deadly example set by the parents, an assumption which is abundantly verified by experience.

If the laboring classes should adopt birth control, their numbers would inevitably be reduced in the third generation, just as in the case of the comfortable classes who have already become addicted to the practice. Let the farming classes and all other classes

become birth controlists, and a decline in the country's population (except as offset by immigration) would become as certain as any social fact that has been established by experience and statistics.

This outcome seems never to be frankly faced by the birth control "authorities." They prefer to ignore it, hoping that a sufficient number of couples will somewhere be found to produce large families and prevent a decline in the total population. We believe that their hopes will be fulfilled, but not in the way that they expect. Those groups in the community which will continue to have large families will not be the comfortable classes or any other classes that subscribe to the doctrine of birth control. They will be those persons who reject entirely birth control on the grounds of morality. In other words, they will be mainly the Catholic element of the population. Thus the fittest will survive; that is, the fittest morally. This will be a good thing both for the survivors and for the nation, even though it is not at all the outcome desired by the birth control "authorities."

Another indication of the one-sided and superficial view taken by our "authorities" is found in their utter inability to perceive the disastrous effects of birth control upon character and efficiency. Men and women who deliberately slirk the duties of child bearing and rearing for the sake of ease and enjoyment sooner or later become incapable of the highest effort. And this effect naturally becomes more pronounced in the succeeding generations that grow up in this enervating

atmosphere. It is a law of life that nothing worth while is accomplished without struggle, sacrifice, and a considerable capacity to endure the things that are unpleasant and to do without the things that are pleasant. In the great majority of instances the practice of avoiding large families reduces the capacity to endure and to do without to such a degree that the devotees of the practice, and especially their children, are woefully handicapped in the struggle for achievement. They become weak of heart, flabby of intellect, and inconstant of purpose. To those who take the trouble to study birth control families, this condition is as clear as any general fact of social experience. But it has not yet penetrated the consciousness of the birth control "authorities."

X

WOMAN SUFFRAGE

In two years the voters of New York State changed a majority of 190,000 against woman suffrage to a majority of 95,000 for it. No such reversal of sentiment, or victory for female enfranchisement, has occurred before in the United States. While it is not within the purpose of this article to attempt an explanation of this remarkable conversion of a state's electorate, it is worth while to point out that the majority for suffrage in the Empire State came entirely from the cities and almost entirely from the city of New York. At the same election, the socialist candidate for mayor increased the vote of his party by some 115,000 ballots. Undoubtedly the great majority of these voters were moved by more or less radical considerations, by discontent with the existing political and economic conditions, and by a strong but undefined hope that Mr. Hillquit would be able to reduce the cost of living and remove other economic hardships. In such a discontented and radical mood men would be quite likely to support woman suffrage, especially since it has always been largely identified with radical movements in politics and industry. Probably the greater part of the suffrage majority in the recent New York election was provided by those who voted the socialist ticket.

Nevertheless, there is very little danger that radical movements will attract the majority of the women

voters. In the first place, no such outcome is visible in states where women already exercise the franchise. In the second place, women are, on the whole, more conservative than men, more fearful of sudden and great changes, more inclined to cling to the existing order, whether of the family, the state, or industry. In the third place, the extremist leaders in the suffrage movement are not representative. While a very large proportion of the women agitators for suffrage have been and are of the radical type, or the advanced feminist type, their theories and performances do not reflect the ideas and temper of women generally. Most of the leaders are exceptional rather than typical. Their dissatisfaction with male political rule and their desire that women should share the business of government arise mainly from facts and considerations peculiar to their special classes, and sometimes to their personal conditions. No doubt these leaders think that they represent their sex, but calm observation and analysis seem to show that their ideas and psychology are remote from the mental habits and attitudes of the majority of women.

What are the proofs of this assertion? There is none that amounts to a demonstration. Neither is there any conclusive argument for the contrary proposition. All the surface indications—and we have nothing better to go by—show that the majority of women have not asked for, indeed, do not want the privilege of voting. By far the greater number of the women acquaintances of any of us are either opposed or indifferent to political

enfranchisement. In fact, the suffragist leaders have pretty generally rejected proposals to leave the decision of the question to the women themselves. They have preferred to entrust their cause to the men rather than to the members of their own sex as a whole.

Again, the position, antecedents and opinions of the most active leaders in the suffrage movement create a strong presumption in favor of the belief that their social and political views are not typically feminine. For the most part, they are either women of means, women of leisure, women in the professions, or women active in labor unions. Those in the first two of these categories have taken up suffrage agitation largely by way of reaction from lives of emptiness and aimlessness, and with the desire to be of some genuine service to their sisters. In the main, they are responding to essentially the same motives that impel other women of their class to go in for settlement work and works of philanthropy generally. Equally with the latter they are exceptions in their class. Professional women in the suffrage movement, particularly teachers, find therein scope for the exercise of their active and competent minds. They are in an exceptional position to see the great influence exerted by politics and government upon education and industry. They come to have some understanding of politics, and they have the desire and the leisure to translate that understanding into action. While their motives are mainly unselfish, it is obvious that their circumstances and mental processes are not typical of their sex. The trade-

union women have a very practical reason for their activity in the suffrage movement, for they see the industrial abuses and evils suffered by wage-earning women, and they know that most of these bad conditions can be removed by legislation. They realize that if women wage-earners had the franchise and would use it intelligently, the industrial position of the latter could be improved promptly and considerably. Nevertheless, it is fairly certain that the great majority of women workers do not grasp in any vital or tenacious way the reasoning or the convictions of the officials of the female trade unions; for the great majority are unorganized even industrially, have not acquired the industrial or political consciousness of the leaders, and are constantly hoping to abandon at an early date the position of wage-earner for that of housewife. Moreover, the whole number of female wage-earners constitutes only a small minority of the women of the United States.

The situation seems to be this: While the leadership of the suffrage movement in New York has been considerably tainted with excessive radicalism of various kinds, it does not adequately represent the great majority of the women, even on the question of the desirability of suffrage; therefore the antecedents of female enfranchisement provide no solid reason for thinking that the masses of women voters will be found on the side of radical movements or measures.

In these circumstances, the proportion of the woman vote in New York that will support advanced feminist proposals, such as easier divorce, legitimizing birth-

control propaganda, the legal right to bear children outside of matrimony, etc., will depend entirely upon the extent to which the different classes of women accept their new political responsibilities. If only those women who believe in socialism, feminism, and other forms of radicalism exercise the franchise, such movements will be strengthened politically. If the women who do not accept these radical theories take the trouble to vote, the political influence of the feminist group will be much more than counterbalanced. Indeed, if the women of each social and economic class of the community go to the polls in as large proportions as the men of the same class, unsound social proposals will probably receive a smaller share of the vote than they do today; for in every class the proportion of women extremists is smaller than that of men. Recent news despatches represent King Albert of Belgium as affirming his belief in woman suffrage as inevitable after the war. It is not generally known, perhaps, that before the war the socialists of that country were mostly opposed to this policy; for they were afraid that their cause would suffer through the preponderance of conservative voters among the women. What the socialists feared in Belgium, the friends of sound social policies may await calmly in the State of New York. Even in this land of greater freedom and opportunity for women, they are less attracted than men by revolutionary social doctrines, and our Catholic women, naturally, are the most conservative of all.

It is of the greatest and most urgent importance that

the Catholic women of New York, and all other women who believe in the integrity of the family and in the maintenance of Christian social principles and institutions, should realize immediately that political enfranchisement has put upon them a very serious responsibility. The power to vote is not a personal prerogative that one is morally free to use or not to use. It is a personal privilege granted for a social purpose, and carrying with it social and civic obligations. If the women who cling to right social doctrines fail to vote in as large proportions as the feminine adherents of extreme theories, they will be as certainly and as definitely to blame for the resulting injury to the home and to right social order as though they had openly preached the doctrines they abhor. In order that they may exercise the franchise intelligently, in order that they may be able to distinguish between good and bad political policies, they will obviously be compelled to study consistently social and political questions and conditions. Undoubtedly this will be the most irksome feature of their responsibilities as voting citizens.

Many Catholic and other conservative women of New York State will accept this conclusion with great reluctance. They will insist that they had not desired this privilege and this responsibility. They will complain that the men voters acted unfairly by imposing the franchise upon them in order to please a small but active minority of the women of the state. Undoubtedly it would have been better to permit the

majority of the women themselves to decide the question of suffrage. The refusal of the leaders of the movement to seek or consent to such a decision, showed not only a lack of faith in the political sense of their sisters, but a want of regard for the methods and principles of democracy. Had the extension of the franchise been left to the determination of the masses of the women, they probably would have refused the privilege at first; but the field would then have been open for a direct campaign of political education among those who most needed it, the women themselves. By the time that the majority of them were convinced and ready to accept the franchise, they would have a much better conception of its importance, power and responsibility than they have as the result of an appeal which was primarily addressed to males.

All these complaints and all these speculations on "what might have been" are now worse than futile. The outstanding fact is that the women of New York have been empowered to vote; that if they wish to be good citizens they must inform themselves concerning public and political questions and conditions, and that the Catholic women may not conscientiously shirk their new obligations.

Some twenty-five years ago the writer defended in a classroom essay the proposition that female suffrage had become reasonable and expedient, on account of the large number of women that are otherwise occupied than in the home. Time and observation have strengthened him in that opinion. That woman's true and

permanent place is the home, and that her duties as homemaker are so engrossing and so remote from political problems as to make her much less apt than man to acquire political knowledge or capacity are propositions that will always be true of the wives, mothers and daughters whose time is devoted to domestic occupations. With a reasonable amount of effort they can, however, learn enough about the more concrete political and civic matters to provide the basis for a fairly intelligent exercise of the voting privilege. They can make themselves fairly well acquainted with those public problems, situations and projects which affect the home and morals. And their instincts in this province are sounder than the instincts of men. As regards the more abstract political issues, they will probably vote in the same way as their husbands, fathers and brothers, thus doing neither more good nor harm to the public weal than the latter.

On the other hand, the millions of women who have gone, for longer or shorter periods, into professional, industrial or commercial occupations will have the same interest in the politics of domestic and moral questions as their sisters of the household, and in addition will be immediately and vitally concerned with those political proposals which affect their own gainful occupations. The conditions surrounding and affecting women who work for wages are far from satisfactory. For the majority, neither the remuneration, the hours of labor nor the sanitation and safety are up to the standard required by decency, humanity

and Christianity. Most of the measures necessary to remove these abuses will have to come through legislation. Owing to their intimate and practical connection with these problems, wage-earning women are in a position to understand most of them, quite as well as men, and some of them very much better. After all, one of the fundamental justifications of democracy is the fact that the members of every social or industrial class understand certain of their own needs better than do the members of any other class. The principle is strikingly true of wage-earning women.

While writing the concluding paragraphs of this paper, I received a letter from a talented and active Catholic woman who declares that educated Catholic women are doing splendid work in purely charitable fields, but have taken little or no interest in civic and social reforms. This thought reinforces and makes more concrete what I wanted to say by way of conclusion. I have already pointed out the responsibility that rests upon the Catholic women of New York State to use their votes against socialism, feminism, and all other forms of extreme radicalism. But if their political interest and activity do not go beyond this purely negative policy they will prove themselves no better citizens, and, from the viewpoint of civic opportunity, no better Catholics than their coreligionists of the male sex. It is unfortunately still a commonplace that the majority of our Catholic men have restricted their beneficent activity in civic and social movements to the task of combating wrong views and

measures. In the main they have done little or nothing for constructive reforms. The Catholic women of New York State have a splendid opportunity to put the men to shame. May they realize this opportunity by taking the trouble to find out the social, civic and industrial evils that ought to be removed, and to support and vote for positive measures of betterment. Once they seriously adopt this resolution, they will find the practical ways and means ready at hand.

XI

SOCIAL SERVICE AS A PROFESSION

It is only those who are profoundly ignorant of the needs and deficiencies of Catholic charities who still think that all the work can be done by volunteers. There is no intention here of belittling or underestimating the volume or the quality of service rendered by those noble Catholic men and women who have given and are giving their time, energies, and talents gratuitously to the relief of the manifold forms of distress which characterize modern life. Nevertheless, the persons who have had most experience, and who are most efficient in these gratuitous activities are the first to realize and confess that volunteer effort is subject to three insuperable obstacles; it is inadequate, owing to the lack of a sufficient number of workers; it is uncertain because a considerable proportion of the workers cannot be relied upon to perform their allotted tasks regularly, at the appointed time, and in a systematic way; and it is relatively inefficient because most of the volunteers are without adequate training.

The need of trained workers who will give all their time to charity and social service is, therefore, primary, fundamental, and exigent. We need a much greater supply than we have of persons who adopt social service as a profession, and who get from it their living. Occasionally the objection is raised that the employment of salaried and professional workers is a perversion, a degradation, of the blessed function of charity. Giving one's time and energy in the service of the poor ought

to be as gratuitous as giving one's money to relieve their material needs. Very true; but the vital question is, can a sufficient amount of gratuitous and competent service be obtained? And the answer of abundant experience is in the negative. Therefore, we must either have paid and professional service or carry on our charities inadequately and to some extent injuriously. Between these two alternatives there should be no hesitation in choosing the former.

Moreover, it is difficult to appreciate the logic of those who find, or affect to find, in the services of the paid worker something unworthy and even mercenary. It is assumed that the paid worker is restricted to a single motive. But the fact that one's occupation or vocation is also one's source of livelihood, does not shut out the higher motives of action. The salaried worker can still see in the poor, the distressed and the helpless God's unfortunate and needy children, can still feel that in serving them he is serving Christ, can still sanctify all his charitable duties by the motive of supernatural love. Even those who serve the altar live by the altar, and no one thinks of calling them mercenary because of that circumstance. Nay, even the members of religious orders who observe the vow of poverty and whose time is devoted to the care of the helpless, say, in an orphan asylum, obtain their living through this service. Assuredly the degree of unselfish and supernatural love that is to be expected and that is obtained from the members of the religious community is greater than that of which the paid worker is ordinarily capable; but this circumstance does not justify the assumption

that the higher motive must be utterly wanting in the paid worker. The fact that it is combined with and qualified by the motive of getting a secular livelihood does not prove that it is non-existent. Obviously the paid worker would be able to cherish the higher and supernatural motives to a greater degree if he were to give his services gratuitously, but practically none of those who adopt social service as a profession have the financial ability to follow this course, any more than have the members of religious orders. On the other hand, those persons who have the means of independent maintenance do not in considerable numbers adopt the profession of social service.

The paid charitable worker is engaged upon tasks that are peculiarly helpful to his fellows, and he has the constant incentive to perform them from the highest of all motives, supernatural love of God. Few secular careers afford as much opportunity for human service, and none presents duties that are more varied, fundamental, or interesting. The profession of social service ought to be very attractive to generous-minded Catholic young women, particularly to those who have obtained or are in the course of obtaining a college education. While the teacher and the nurse are peculiarly effective benefactors of mankind, neither of them is given as wide and as diversified opportunities for service as the social worker. The latter deals not merely with a single subject, such as the formation of the expanding intellect and will, or the recovery of health, but with the manifold forms of distress, with its various social and individual causes, with the ways and means of

moral and economic rehabilitation of individuals and families, and with a great number of social problems and remedies. Says Dr. E. T. Devine:

“This calling, from the very nature of the work to be done in it and from the character of its leaders, makes an extraordinary appeal to the missionary spirit of the young men and women in and out of the universities who have seen the vision of a new social order in which poverty, crime and disease, if not wholly abolished, will certainly be vastly diminished, and will not exist, at any rate, as a result of social neglect, as the result of bad traditions which enlightenment can end, or of obsolete institutions which the law can change.”

While we may regard this “vision” as rather highly colored and remote, we cannot deny that something approaching it is sooner or later cherished by every thoughtful social worker. For the latter does come to realize that the problem of relieving distress need not always be as great as it is today, and that very much of the misery of our time can be abolished. The well equipped social worker has not only the satisfaction that comes to every person who alleviates human suffering, but the consciousness of attempting to make some contribution toward the abolition of the removable causes of misery. He can feel that he is doing God’s work in a larger and farther-reaching way than is open to the great majority of persons outside the religious life.

It may be objected that the field of opportunity for trained workers in Catholic charities is very small since the majority of these cannot, or at any rate do

not, employ salaried workers. To this objection there are two answers: first, that if the supply of trained Catholic workers were greater their usefulness and indispensableness could be more effectively brought home to those organizations that have not yet come to realize the necessity of expert service. In the second place, it is not necessary that the Catholic trained workers should all be in the service of Catholic organizations. The majority of our Catholic teachers are not in Catholic schools, nor do our Catholic nurses take care of only Catholic patients. In several of the largest cities fully one half of the relief work of the secular organizations is done among Catholic families. The desirability of Catholic workers to administer aid to and visit these families is obvious. And it is only exceptionally that secular organizations would refuse to employ a trained worker because she was a Catholic. Indeed, the difficulty is more frequently in finding the qualified Catholic worker than in finding the position for such a worker. Recently we were asked by a pastor in a manufacturing town to recommend a Catholic young man qualified to take charge of the welfare work in a large factory. The manufacturing company had given the pastor full authority to select the person, and was ready to pay a liberal salary. We were unable to find anyone, and the position has presumably gone to a non-Catholic. At about the same time we were asked to recommend a Catholic woman to take charge of the organized charity work in a large city. Here, too, our quest was unsuccessful. The

Catholic workers that we happen to know in secular charities assure us that there is plenty of opportunity for Catholics who are really qualified.

Some idea of the size of the field of social service may be obtained from a consideration of the fact that in 1915 there were more than 4,000 workers employed by the unofficial and private social-service organizations of New York City. This estimate leaves out of account not only the social workers in public service, but all those in religious institutions, Catholic and non-Catholic. The workers were engaged in a great variety of activities:

Institutions for children; institutions for the aged; working girls' boarding houses; homes for immigrants; other institutions for temporary relief; fresh air and convalescent homes; institutions for the defective; correctional institutions; settlements and clubs; educational agencies; relief and rehabilitation societies; agencies for immigrants; day nurseries and kindergartens; other agencies for children; correctional agencies; agencies for the defective; agencies for the sick; employment agencies; recreational agencies; research and educational propaganda; general social conditions; health; industry; education; child welfare; correction; race betterment; recreation; civic affairs.

Girls in our Catholic colleges are sometimes advised that if they wish to engage in social work they should enter a religious community. With quite as much reason, and quite as little, they should be urged to seek the cloister if they desire to become school teachers.



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